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Abstract 
Considering women's increased levels of employment globally, this 
project addresses a crucial question: When, if ever, is women's increased 
employment linked to women getting good jobs? Extensive research shows that 
women-friendly policies at the national level and national integration into the 
global economy increase women’s employment. However, it is unclear if either or 
both of these factors are linked to the quality of women’s employment. This 
dissertation research argues that the way women are incorporated into the labor 
force is critical in determining if increased female labor force participation is 
linked to women’s representation in higher status positions.  
This dissertation research integrates global and national policy theories to 
examine their implications on the quality of women’s employment, utilizing 
quantitative pooled time-series analyses on women’s relative chances to be 
employed in two higher-status occupational groups—managerial/administrative 
and professional/technical occupations. As key independent variables, original 
indicators of anti-discrimination and maternity leave policies that are comparable 
across developed and developing countries are created.  
This study not only provides a crucial test of those theories that suggest 
women’s increased labor force participation leads to women’s employment in 
high quality jobs and those that suggest the opposite, but also explains the factors 
that make one or the other outcome more likely. This research also advances 
  vi 
sociological theories about the links between globalization, state policies, and 
actual employment outcomes on the ground by integrating state-centered and 
global theories of women’s employment and testing the scope of theories in both 
developed and developing countries. 
This research finds that women’s employment policies are important to the 
quality of women’s employment, particularly in developing countries, as well as 
the levels of gender prejudice. Then, I discuss academic and policy implications 
of the main findings. The cross-national, historical research design makes findings 
from this project particularly applicable to diverse national contexts.  
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Introduction 
In recent decades, women's labor force participation has increased 
worldwide. At the same time, there are marked national differences in the rates of 
women’s work. Scholars have long been interested in both the increase and the 
cross-national variations in women’s work. Particularly, extensive research shows 
that women-friendly state policies and the process of globalization (including the 
development and transformation of international human rights laws and global 
economic integration) increase women’s employment (see, e.g., Standing 1989; 
Stichter 1990; Fernandez-Kelly 1994; Cerruti 2000; Chang 2004; Mandel and 
Semyonov 2006). Current research, however, does not answer the crucial question 
of the extent to which national policies and/or global forces are linked to the 
quality of that employment. This question is crucial because it goes to the heart of 
the matter—the general empowerment of women with respect to men. To answer 
it, we need to know, among other things, if women are getting good jobs. We also 
need to know if women’s entry into the labor market and the nature of their 
employment have any impact on societal gender norms.  
Furthermore, women’s employment in high-status occupations represents 
a key site for an integrated understanding of global cultural and economic forces 
and state policies. While all of these factors promote women’s incorporation into 
the labor market, the mechanisms through which the effects occur are different. 
For example, pressure toward unfettered national participation in the global 
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economy is likely to have a very different effect on the quality of women’s 
employment than pressure to adopt international laws promoting women’s rights. 
This is true even though both are important elements of globalization. At the 
national level, laws designed to help women combine employment and 
childrearing responsibilities (e.g., requiring maternity leave) and laws that 
promote women's unrestricted access to all occupations (e.g., anti-discrimination 
laws) may also have different effects on women’s employment in the best jobs. 
Delineating the host of mechanisms involved is critical to accurately extend 
theories of women’s employment to explain women’s presence in high-status 
occupations. This dissertation begins with the idea that the influences of global- 
and state institutional- factors on women’s employment must be conceptualized 
separately to fully understand their implications for the quality of that 
employment.  
Inconsistencies in existing theories are apparent. Those who argue that 
increased female labor force participation leads to increased women’s 
representation in high-status occupations suggest that certain state policies 
facilitate women's access to the labor market. This can happen in two ways: first, 
by providing services that help women combine employment and childrearing 
responsibilities (e.g., maternity leave) and, second, by promoting women's 
unrestricted access to all occupations (e.g., anti-discrimination laws) (Chang 
2000). Women's continuous labor force participation increases their human 
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capital, rendering women in a better position to compete with men for jobs 
broadly. Also, these policies provide legal and cultural justifications for seeking 
entry into all occupations and discourage employers from discriminating against 
women. The legal and cultural pressures are most strongly felt in the more 
prestigious professional and managerial occupations, where jobs are typically 
allocated on the basis of qualifications rather than ascriptive criteria.  
At the global level, the development and diffusion of a global women’s 
rights discourse also help bring legal and cultural changes needed to integrate 
more women into high-status occupations (Paxton et al. 2006). Further, some 
argue that global economic integration has a direct, positive impact on female 
workers and reduces gender discrimination because gender-based discrimination 
is a costly waste of women’s human capital (Fields 1985; Wood 1994). According 
to this perspective, in an export-oriented economy, not only should more women 
work but also norms and institutions should become more gender egalitarian, 
resulting in women’s eventual upgrade to better-paying, high-status, jobs. 
However, others suggest the exact opposite effects of global and state 
factors on women’s representation in high status occupations. They suggest a 
strong culling effect, in which women’s representation in higher-status 
occupations declines as the percentage of women in the labor force increases (see 
e.g., Charles and Grusky 2004). The core argument of these theories is that 
women-friendly state policies selectively recruit women into the labor force in 
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areas where women are already concentrated—sales, service, and production 
occupations—while decreasing women’s relative representation in professional 
and managerial occupations (Anker 1998). For example, maternity leave policies 
may make employers more reluctant to hire female workers because they perceive 
that women employees are more costly than male employees. Furthermore, even 
if women are allowed by law to pursue the occupation of their choice, patriarchal 
cultural assumptions still influence women to seek employment opportunities that 
are most compatible with family obligations. Low-paying sales and service jobs 
may be favored because they provide opportunities for flexible or part-time 
schedules and self-employment (Lee and Hirata 2001).  
With respect to economic globalization, many scholars have argued that 
the penetration of foreign capital as well as other characteristics of neoliberal 
economic globalization have had the effect of blocking women’s relative access 
to high-status occupations (Ward 1984; Ramirez and Weiss 1979; Marshall 1985; 
Clark 1991). These scholars further argue that the key mechanism of neoliberal 
economic globalization lies in patriarchal control, through which a balance is 
maintained between women’s roles as producers and reproducers for capitalist 
markets in goods and labor. 
Both global and state policy theories offer opposing explanations on the 
relationships between the increased female labor force participation and women’s 
representation in higher-status occupations. It is therefore somewhat surprising 
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that the global and state policy perspectives have been developed in nearly 
complete isolation of each other. The outcomes they predict are not only 
inconsistent but also incomplete because existing research on women’s 
employment in higher-status occupations considers either state or global factors, 
but never both. Those who are interested in the role of globalization rarely 
consider the state, assuming global economic and cultural processes bypass the 
state to directly affect the labor market and women’s position within it. Likewise, 
those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend not to consider 
global forces.  
Part of the discrepancy between state and global explanations arises 
because the empirical scope of the two groups of theories is different. The former 
focuses on the developed world while the latter focuses on developing countries. 
State theories implicitly suggest that state interventions are developed-world 
phenomena and that governments in the developing world are too weak to 
influence women’s work through legislation. On the other hand, global women’s 
rights theories assume that governments in the developing world are crucial in 
adopting and implementing international norms and institutions.  
This dissertation extends the literature on state policies by explicitly 
examining the role of state policies in both developed and less-developed 
countries. State policies may be particularly important to women in developing 
countries because of overt discrimination in recruitment and promotion and 
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unique difficulties combining work and family responsibilities (Blau, Brinton, and 
Grusky 2006). This dissertation research explicitly models the impact of such 
policies within and between the developed and less developed parts of the world. 
By extending the lens to all countries rather than just wealthy ones, conducting an 
over-time analysis, incorporating both global and national factors, and 
distinguishing between types of women-friendly policies, this dissertation 
identifies the circumstances under which women’s employment is associated with 
high quality employment. 
To this end, I have developed a study comprised of three empirical 
chapters that each address important questions about determinants of and 
implications of the quantity and quality of women’s employment across countries 
over the last several decades. Through each empirical chapter, I specify how the 
conditions under which the recent increase in the quantity of women’s 
employment gets translated into better quality women’s employment. To 
accomplish this, I integrate global and state institutional frameworks to fully 
understand women’s employment. These chapters include the following:  
 
Chapter 1: The Quality of Women’s Employment around the Globe: The Case of 
Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004 
As noted above, the world has experienced a surge of women in the labor 
force over the last several decades. While research shows that women-friendly 
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state policies and national integration into the global economy increase women’s 
employment (see, e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006), few studies 
have considered the crucial question of the extent to which either or both of these 
factors is linked to women getting good jobs. Furthermore, past research has 
rarely considered both global and state institutional factors to explain women’s 
employment.  
The first empirical chapter of my dissertation offers a cross-national, 
historical study integrating global and state institutional factors. The focus is on 
women’s share of the most powerful and influential occupation category in a 
society, that is, managerial and administrative occupations. I derive this data from 
the International Labor Organization, harmonizing the occupational categories 
across the years 1984 to 2004 for 78 countries (22 developed countries and 56 
developing countries). My statistical analysis thus broadens the empirical scope of 
state policy explanations into developing countries. This is a contrast to past 
studies where the link between state policies and women’s employment is 
imagined to occur only in affluent countries. In addition, this research is one of 
the first to examine women’s managerial employment over-time and across 
countries. Examining the impact of both global- and state institutional- factors on 
women’s share of managerial occupations over-time minimizes the danger of 
identifying spurious relationships.  
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While there are indeed differences across developed and developing 
countries, my findings do not entirely support preconceived notions. Importantly, 
I find that only in developing countries is an overall supportive legal environment 
critical for producing better women’s representation in managerial jobs. This runs 
counter to the idea that women-friendly policies will have no impact in poorer 
countries. In addition, I find that controlling for demographic and human capital, 
greater levels of female employment in wealthy countries are partly associated 
with some increase in the women’s share of managerial positions in wealthier 
countries. For both developed and developing countries, links to transnational 
women’s rights movements are critical in translating increased female labor force 
participation into better women’s representation in powerful positions.  
 
Chapter 2: Implications of Work-family Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies 
on Gender Occupational Inequality 
 In this chapter, I introduce the data I gathered on the different types of 
women-friendly policies around the world. After describing the nature and 
occurrence of such laws, I use the data in a panel regression model. My analysis 
explains the level of gender occupational inequality in 2004 in 35 countries 
through cross-national variations in particular state policies in 1984. I create an 
original indicator of two types of policies: laws designed to help women combine 
employment and childrearing responsibilities (measured by a paid maternity leave 
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policy) and laws that promote non-discrimination (measured by a policy that 
guarantees equal access to all occupations and a policy that guarantees equal 
remuneration). My data thus include three policies altogether: maternity-leave 
policies and two distinct forms of anti-discrimination policies. I find that state 
policies are the strongest determinants, compared to global and female human 
capital factors, of the gender occupational inequality but different types of 
policies have different impacts. Specifically, maternity leave is associated with a 
greater level of occupational gender inequality while anti-discrimination 
legislation is associated with less occupational inequality within countries. 
Although a panel analysis for a relatively small number of countries should not be 
overgeneralized, the results do introduce new information about policy-specific 
consequences for gender occupational inequality and provide a solid foundation 
for future research.  
 
Chapter 3: Implications of Women’s Employment Context on Gender Prejudice 
One way to understand the meaning of increased women’s employment in 
relation to women’s general empowerment is to assess its implication for the 
quality of women’s employment. However, scholars of gender stratification and 
gender relations emphasize that structures produce inequality, and gender 
differences are seen to follow from these structures. Such scholars criticize the 
tendency to conceptualize gender stratification as purely economic inequality. 
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Non-material aspects of stratification must also be considered to explain who has 
the autonomy to enter the labor market in the first place or the power to set the 
terms under which certain skills are recognized, rewarded, or marginalized 
(Ciancanelli and Berch 1987; Glazer 1993). To properly assess the meaning of the 
quantity and quality of women’s employment for the larger question of gender 
inequality, it is necessary to look at women’s employment in relation to gender 
norms.  
We know that there has been a rise in women’s labor force participation 
and there is a simultaneous development in state policies concerning women’s 
work. However, little research has examined if these macro changes in women’s 
employment are accompanied by concurrent changes in gender norms. 
Recognizing that gender inequality involves not only material aspects but also 
non-material aspects, this chapter asks to what extent the nature of women’s 
employment within a country is associated with gender prejudice in that country. 
In particular, it addresses the extent to which women’s overall employment 
participation and job quality affect gender prejudice. To answer these questions, 
this chapter specifies individual level, country level, and cross-level interaction 
hypotheses. I test the hypotheses by simultaneously studying the impact of 
individual gender, education, and working status, national women’s employment 
context, and their interplay on beliefs about men’s and women’s relative rights to 
economic, political, and educational resources. I simultaneously control for 
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possible confounding factors both at individual and country levels. Based on a 
multilevel, cross-national analysis of World Values Survey data from 52 
countries, I find, as expected, that women tend to hold more gender equitable 
beliefs than men. I also find that national context matters. More women 
participating in paid labor and national laws protecting women’s rights to work 
reduce gender prejudicial attitudes within countries over and beyond individual 
characteristics. Women-friendly laws and more women in paid labor are also 
associated with substantially smaller differences across men and women in 
attitudes toward women’s equality at work. Women’s equal employment laws 
have spillover effects as well; they are associated with less gender prejudice in 
non-employment areas such as politics and higher education.  
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Chapter 1: 
The Quality of Women’s Employment around the Globe: The Case of 
Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004 
 
Introduction 
In recent decades, the world has experienced an increase of women in the 
labor force. Between 1980 and 2008, the global female labor force participation 
rate increased from 50.2 to 51.7 percent while the male rate decreased slightly 
from 82.0 to 77.7 percent. As a result, the gender gap in labor force participation 
rates has narrowed from 32 to 26 percentage points (ILO 2010). While we know 
that women's labor force participation has increased worldwide since 1980, we do 
not know if this has led to a general empowerment of women with respect to men. 
To answer that question, we need to know, among other things, the positions 
women attain in the labor market. Specifically, are women getting good jobs? 
This is an important question because women’s presence in top positions may be 
a key factor in altering overall gender inequality in societies (see e.g., Chafetz 
1990). 
Theories of gender stratification make very different predictions regarding 
women’s employment in high-quality jobs. Some theorize that as more women 
enter the labor force women’s representation in higher-status positions will 
increase. Based on research findings that the rate of female labor force 
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participation is inversely related to overall occupational sex segregation, the rate 
of female labor force participation has been considered as an indicator of 
women’s labor force attachment and employment continuity (Jacobs and Lim 
1992; Anker 1998; Semyonov and Jones 1999). This line of argument emphasizes 
that as more women pursue employment outside the home, and work more 
continuously, women working in more powerful occupations, such as managerial 
positions, also increases.  
In contrast, others suggest that when more women are employed, they are 
mostly segregated into low-paying jobs (Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and 
Shenhav 1988; Clark 1991). Not all types of people can be employed in the most 
prestigious occupations. For example, managerial occupations require certain 
personal interests, skills, and resources – high levels of human capital. When 
female labor force participation is low, there is a selective recruitment of women 
where only either highly-educated women or economically-deprived women work. 
However, as female labor force participation increases, more women with diverse 
human capital enter into the labor market. This results in both more diffused 
female work across the occupation structure and a decline in the proportion of 
women employed in high status occupational positions among all women in the 
labor force (Chang 2004). 
Although researchers assume a similarity across countries in the link 
between female labor force participation and women’s representation in more 
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prestigious positions, empirical studies yield inconsistent results (Jacobs and Lim 
1992; Anker 1998; Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988; Semyonov 
and Jones 1999; Clark 1991). Clearly, the relationship between the quantity and 
quality of women’s employment is complex.  
In this chapter, I begin to unpack some of this complexity in my analysis 
of whether an increase in female employment globally is linked to women getting 
good jobs. Doing so, my research provides an integrative framework to study the 
relationship between labor force participation and prestigious employment by 
building on and integrating three groups of literature: theories of state policies and 
women’s labor force participation (see e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 
2006), theories of economic globalization and labor markets (see e.g., Krueger 
1983; Meyer 2006; Seguino 2006), and neo-institutional theories of international 
actors and transnational influences furthering women’s rights (see eg., Berkovitch 
1999). Research shows that women-friendly state policies, nations’ integration 
into the global economy, and global women’s rights discourses explain much of 
the increase in women’s labor force participation (see e.g., Chang 2004; Mandel 
and Semyonov 2006). Each of the related theories provides important insights into 
the mechanisms through which women’s labor force participation increases. None 
to date have considered how those mechanisms apply, if at all, to women getting 
good jobs.  
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In this chapter, I consider the impact of a range of theoretically-derived 
factors on women’s representation in good jobs. I focus on a particular higher-
status occupational group, managerial/administrative occupations, because there 
is cross-national, over-time data available for this group. I conduct an over-time 
analysis, which is important to rule out spurious relationships. I consider the 
effects over a two-decade period, from 1984 to 2004. The analysis includes both 
developed and developing countries, and I control for countries’ political, 
demographic, and economic structures and female human capital.  
 
Theories of Increased Women’s Labor Force Participation and the Quality of 
Employment 
 This section begins with a review of existing frameworks for 
understanding both the quantity and quality of women’s employment across 
countries that fall within three general categories: state policies, global women’s 
rights discourses and movements, and economic globalization. I then advocate an 
approach that integrates women’s employment with status and power. 
 
State Policies 
The literature that attends to cross-national variations in state policies as 
key determinants in shaping women’s position in the labor market generally 
agrees that women-friendly state policies increase overall female labor force 
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participation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Abu Sharkh 2009). 
These policies include required accommodations to help women combine 
employment and childrearing responsibilities (e.g., maternity leave) and  policies 
that directly address equality in access to all occupations and in treatment (e.g., 
anti-discrimination laws). 
Although prior studies have considered the effects of such policies on 
female labor force participation, their effects on the quality of women’s 
employment are far from clear. Women-friendly employment laws may 
encourage more gender egalitarian attitudes in the labor market, as employers and 
employees come to expect women's work to be free of overt discrimination as 
well as disadvantages associated with child bearing and rearing responsibilities 
(Charles 1992; Chang 2000, 2004; Goldin 1990). The legal and cultural pressures 
may be most strongly felt in the more prestigious managerial occupations, where 
jobs are typically allocated on the basis of qualifications rather than ascriptive 
criteria (Chang 2004). Also, as work-family policies help women remain in the 
labor force more continuously, they help women develop more human capital. 
This includes more years of work experience and greater labor force attachment, 
which in turn enable women to compete with men for high status positions. 
Increased human capital enables women to be in a better position to compete with 
men for jobs broadly but particularly for managerial occupations where labor 
force attachment is crucial (Chang 2004). Based on these arguments, I 
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hypothesize that the more women friendly state policies are, the higher women’s 
share in managerial occupations will be.    
However, others suggest the opposite effects of state policies. State 
theories suggest a winnowing effect, in which women-friendly state policies, such 
as maternity leave and anti-discrimination policies, selectively recruit women into 
the labor force in areas where women are already concentrated while decreasing 
women’s relative representation in high status occupations (Charles and Grusky 
2004). Given the near universal tendency for men and women to be employed in 
different occupations and women’s underrepresentation in more prestigious and 
powerful positions (Anker 1998), it is suggested that state policies are not 
effective in increasing women’s representation in managerial occupations. State 
policies may also be less effective in placing women in managerial occupations 
because they make women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the 
negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women’s work. For example, 
maternity leave policies may make employers more reluctant to hire female 
workers because they perceive that women employees are more costly than male 
employees. Furthermore, even if women are allowed by law to pursue the 
occupation of their choice, patriarchal cultural assumptions still influence women 
to seek employment opportunities that are most compatible with family 
obligations. Low-paying sales and service jobs may be favored because they 
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provide opportunities for flexible or part-time schedules and self-employment 
(Lee and Hirata 2001). If this is true, my hypothesis will not be supported.  
 
Global Context: Women’s Rights  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, in many places, a woman was 
not even considered as a “person” (Sachs and Wilson 1986). In stark contrast, by 
the end of the twentieth century, international law governed many aspects of 
women’s lives, and states were ever more involved in protecting and empowering 
women (see e.g., Berkovitch 1999; True and Mintrom 2001; Paxton et al. 2006). 
The international women’s movement grew substantially over-time (D’Itri 1999; 
Rupp and Taylor 1999). From just a few organizations in Western countries 
during the late 1800s, it grew to encompass more than 40,000 women and men 
from more than 180 countries who came together in Beijing for the Fourth Global 
Conference on Women in 1995 (Dutt 1996).  More importantly, the women’s 
rights movement cooperated with International Government Organizations (IGOs) 
promoting a discourse of gender inclusion, ensuring that norms about women’s 
rights, equality, and participation in the wage economy are diffused across 
countries. Through this global expansion and collaboration, the international 
women’s movement was increasingly able to transmit a discourse of substantial 
gender inclusion to nation-states overtime (Berkovitch 1999; Ramirez et al. 1997; 
True and Mintrom 2001). 
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From the beginning, the major foundation of women’s rights discourse has 
been the claim that women are entitled to equal rights, including labor policies 
that standardize individuals (in terms of making them comparable), which 
replaced gender-differentiated policies. By emphasizing women’s equality with 
men, more and more areas of social and economic life were targeted as possible 
sources of discrimination to be eliminated by introducing “sameness” (Berkovitch 
1999). Women’s underrepresentation in economic authority positions as well as 
the political sphere has become a focus because men’s predominance in powerful 
positions was recognized as a key factor maintaining gender inequality in 
societies (Wirth 2004).   
These tightened discourses and networks at the global level became 
expressed in the form of international laws. Two International Labor Organization 
conventions (1919 and 1952) require state governments to provide women 
workers with maternity leave and child care benefits. On the other hand, 
protective legislation that restricts women’s employment in certain industries or 
during night hours became stigmatized as having negative effects on women’s 
opportunities and was no longer respected or implemented. Legislation that 
prohibits women’s restricted access replaced earlier protective legislation. 
Together, international laws came to be expressed in guidelines for nation states 
to ensure that women’s incorporation into the economy would measure up to that 
of men.  
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 An intensification of international activity on gender equity issues 
occurred in the 1970s, with the United Nation’s dedication of year 1975 as “World 
Women’s Year”; the 1975 UN International Women’s Conference in Mexico City 
and subsequent world women’s conferences; and The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted 
in 1979 by the UN General Assembly. CEDAW explicitly required state 
governments to legislate anti-discrimination policies. CEDAW is one of the most 
widely ratified, by both developed and developing countries, international 
conventions.  
This new discourse provides "policy scripts" to nation-states and it has 
been theorized that state policies are deeply rooted in the evolution of global 
women’s rights. Berkovitch (1994) shows, through statistical analysis, that state 
policies, such as anti-discrimination and maternity leave legislation, are not 
internally generated within a country but are externally driven by the global 
women’s rights discourses. She points out that changes in states’ legislation can 
be accounted for by considering world level events (i.e., discourses, networks and 
organizations) and states’ linkages to “world polity” rather than the economic and 
political characteristics of the individual states. Similarly, the global expansion of 
women's rights discourse has also fostered changes in governmental organizations, 
such as the creation of gender mainstreaming offices (True and Mintrom 2001).  
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This literature provides valuable insights about the origin of national 
gender equality policies. However, it does not move beyond the global 
development and diffusion of international laws at the state policy level. It does 
not consider whether these international laws and transnational mobilization 
around women’s rights to work actually have an impact on women's experiences. 
In this research, I take one step forward and ask: “What effect do these 
international women rights discourses have above and beyond state policies on 
women’s labor force participation and access to high-status occupations?” I 
hypothesize that the same international pressures that led states to adopt more 
women-friendly policies may have direct positive impact on not only the volume of 
women in the labor market but also women’s relative access to managerial 
occupations. Research shows that the growth and influence of the international 
women’s movements, as well as national linkage to international women’s rights 
movements are positively related to women’s political representation (Paxton et al. 
2006). I test if the same relationship holds in the area of women’s economic 
representation.  
 
Neoliberal Economic Globalization 
The evolution of women’s rights has coincided with pressure for open 
national economies and neoliberal global economic integration. Neoliberal 
globalization is a term used to describe the worldwide spread of an economic 
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model emphasizing "free markets" and "free trade” (McMichael 1996; Evans 
1997). While these policies have not been consistently applied (e.g., First World 
nations continue to provide massive subsidies to their own farmers and maintain 
high barriers to some Third World products), neoliberal ideas have nonetheless 
dominated the rhetoric of global economic policy and much of its practice since 
the early 1980s (Evans 1997; McMichael 1996; Harvey 2005). The role of the 
state is minimized to “guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. 
It must also set up those military, defense, police, and legal structures and 
functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if 
need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist 
(in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or 
environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary” 
(Harvey 2005:2). The visible consequences of neoliberal economic globalization, 
thus, include not only the internationalization of economic activities but also 
increasing market deregulation and state retrenchment.  
How does this neoliberal economic globalization affect women’s 
employment in prestigious positions? As noted above, there are opposing 
arguments about whether countries’ integration into the global economy and the 
resulting increase in women’s labor force participation has upgraded women into 
higher-status jobs. Many scholars have argued that the penetration of foreign 
capital as well as other characteristics of neoliberal economic globalization have 
 23 
 
had the effect of blocking women’s relative access to high-status occupations 
(Ward 1984; Ramirez and Weiss 1979; Marshall 1985; Clark 1991). These 
scholars further argue that the key mechanism of neoliberal economic 
globalization lies in patriarchal control through which women still maintain 
unpaid role as reproducers for capitalist markets in goods and labor and it in turn 
is used as a justification for low-wage and poor working conditions in paid 
employment sectors. There is some evidence of increased feminization of low-
wage sectors and poor working conditions in those sectors in the developing 
world. Further, some suggest that economic stagnation and cuts in public 
expenditures on health, education, and food subsidies resulting from the adoption 
of economic neoliberalism negatively affect women’s access to high-status 
occupations because they are detrimental to their well-being (Elson 2002) and 
their ability to gain access to education and healthcare (Buchmann 1996). Based 
on these arguments, I hypothesize that economic globalization discourages 
women’s access to managerial occupations. 
However, others find that a greater penetration of foreign capital and 
goods are associated with more gender egalitarian practice in hiring and wages 
(Villarreal and Yu, 2007).  It is suggested that global economic integration has a 
direct, positive impact on female workers and reduces gender discrimination 
because gender-based discrimination is a costly waste of women’s human capital. 
According to this perspective, in an export-oriented economy, not only should 
 24 
 
more women work but also norms and institutions should become more gender 
egalitarian, resulting in women’s eventual upgrade to better-paying, high-status, 
jobs. If this is the case, my hypothesis will not be supported. 
One limitation of current research that links economic globalization and 
the quality of women’s employment is that it tends to look at women’s 
employment typically in low-wage sectors. This tendency to focus only on the 
worst job sectors in the poorer countries does not provide a whole picture of 
economic globalization and women’s position within labor markets. It is possible 
that, while exacerbating exploitive working conditions for women in low-paying 
manufacturing and service sectors, neoliberal economic globalization also 
promotes women’s access to high-status positions. In this chapter, I expand 
research on economic globalization and women’s position in the labor market by 
considering the impact of economic globalization on women in both developed 
and developing countries, and examining its impact on women’s employment in 
the most powerful and prestigious occupations. 
In addition to the direct effects of economic globalization on women’s 
employment in more prestigious occupations, global neoliberal principles also 
influence various national policies (see eg., Babb 2005; Goldman 2005; Makene 
2007; Babb and Carruthers 2008). State governments, especially in developing 
countries, are more likely to create a ‘profitable’ environment by limiting 
unwanted regulations against gender discrimination, which in turn affect the 
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enforcement of state policies regarding women’s work (London and Williams 
1988). Given the importance of state policies for women’s employment in high-
status occupations, it is important to consider the indirect effects of global 
neoliberalism through its impact on state policies.  
 
Gaps and Limitations of Existing Explanations  
Although both global and state policy theories suggest opposite 
explanations of the relationships between increased female labor force 
participation and women’s representation in higher-status occupations, these two 
perspectives have been developed in isolation from each other. The outcomes they 
predict are not only inconsistent but also incomplete because existing research on 
women’s employment in higher-status occupations considers either state or global 
factors, but never both. Those who are interested in the role of globalization rarely 
consider the state, assuming global economic and cultural processes bypass the 
state to directly affect the labor market and women’s position within it. Likewise, 
those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend not to consider 
global forces.  
Part of the discrepancy between state and global explanations arises 
because the empirical scope of the two groups of theories is different. The former 
focuses on the developed world while the latter focuses on developing countries. 
State theories implicitly suggest that state interventions are developed-world 
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phenomena and that governments in the developing world are too weak to 
influence women’s work through legislation. On the other hand, global women’s 
rights theories assume that governments in the developing world are crucial in 
adopting and implementing international norms and institutions. The current 
analysis extends the literature on state policies by explicitly examining the role of 
state policies in both developed and less-developed countries. State policies may 
be particularly important to women in developing countries because of overt 
discrimination in recruitment and promotion and unique difficulties combining 
work and family responsibilities (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006). My research 
explicitly models the impact of such policies within and between the developed 
and less developed parts of the world.  
This analysis not only extends globalization theory into more developed 
countries and state policy theories into less developed countries. I explicitly test 
whether labor process, state policy and globalization factors work differently 
across the developed and developing worlds.  
 
Research Design 
The goals of my analysis are to determine 1) if an increase in the female 
share of the labor force within countries is linked to an increase in the female 
share in one of the most prestigious occupational groups, 
managerial/administrative occupations, and 2) to determine the extent to which 
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the same mechanisms that increase female labor force participation also increase 
women’s placement in this occupational group. With respect to the latter goal, I 
consider levels of state legal and institutional protections of women’s rights at 
work, national acquiescence to global women’s rights discourses and movements, 
and economic integration. To determine how these factors have affected women’s 
employment in managerial positions, I utilize cross-national longitudinal data at 
yearly intervals for more than 71 countries between 1984 and 2004. The period 
under analysis covers those years in which women’s rights have become highly 
globalized. In addition, the time period incorporates considerable variation in 
national economic, political, and demographic circumstances. The unit of analysis 
is the country-year. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Women’s Employment in Managerial/Administrative 
Occupations  
To represent women’s employment in high-status occupations, I use a 
measure of women’s representation in managerial/administrative occupations. 
These occupations include legislators and senior government officials, and 
corporate managers (directors and chief executives, production and operations 
department managers, and other department managers). This occupational 
category is widely used by scholars of gender occupational inequality to indicate 
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the most powerful and prestigious occupations (see e.g., Semyonov 1980; Charles 
1992; Chang 2004).  
Data for female employment in these occupations come from the 
International Labour Office Database on Labor Statistics (LABORSTA) operated 
by the International Labor Organization, which provide detailed occupational data 
from the early 1980s for more than 100 countries. The datasets comprise, for each 
country-year, a set of occupational categories and the number of women and men 
in each category. Occupations are matched to a variety of national or international 
schemes. In order to maximize comparability of occupations across countries, I 
use occupational data based on two comparable international occupational 
classification schemes International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO)-68 or ISCO-88. The two occupational classification schemes are highly 
comparable with respect to sub-occupations in each occupational group, based on 
International Occupational Prestige Scale, International Socio-Economic Index of 
Occupational Status, and class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). 
Furthermore, there is considerable similarity between the two international 
occupational schemes and across countries in their actual occupations and the 
extent of their occupational hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and 
VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000). From this data, I 
utilize percent women of total managerial/administrative workers. This measure 
specifically indicates the extent of disparities between women and men within 
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managerial occupations and is not confounded by the distribution of occupations 
in societies.  
 
Independent Variables 
In addition to employment data, a series of country level data are included 
in the analyses in order to assess the degree and nature of state policies and the 
penetration of global women’s rights and economic globalization. All independent 
variables are lagged a year prior to the dependent variable to correct for potential 
reverse causality. Appendix 1-1 summarizes these variables and data sources.  
Female Share of the Total Labor Force: In order to consider the extent to 
which increased women’s share in the labor force is associated with women’s 
presence in managerial/administrative occupations, I include female share of the 
total labor force. This measure comes from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (2010). 
State Legal Protection of Women’s Rights: State policies and structures 
concerning women’s rights are measured by an index representing the degree to 
which women’s economic, social, and political rights and workers’ rights are 
protected in national laws. Data are from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights Database, which covers 195 countries annually from 1981-2008. The index 
represents the extent to which women’s economic rights, political rights, and 
social rights are reflected in national laws and enforced by the government. 
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Women’s economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free choice of 
profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative’s 
consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relative’s consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security 
(including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by 
employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right 
to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, the right 
to work in the military and the police force. Considering that women’s rights to 
work encompass not only economic areas but also political and social rights, I use 
an aggregated index of economic rights, political rights, and social rights.1 
Women’s Political Representation: Women’s political power may also 
influence gender equality and gender-sensitive policies and implementation. Also, 
women’s political representativeness captures women’s relative power within 
society, a concept that cannot be captured solely by looking at the law. Women’s 
empowerment could alter the nature of interaction between men and women by 
changing perceptions about women and by changing the attitudes and self-
confidence of women. In order to control for women’s relative empowerment 
within society, I include the percentage of women in the parliament. Data are 
from Paxton et al. (2008).  
                                                
1 Results were the same in the direction and significance of the coefficients when the index only 
included state legal protection of economic rights, not political or social rights. 
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Penetration of Global Women’s Rights: While women’s right to 
participate in the wage economy is a global phenomenon, countries vary greatly 
in incorporating the global ideas. Thus, assessing the degree to which global 
women's rights discourses are incorporated in different countries at different times 
is essential. In this chapter, I consider the ratification of 7 major women’s rights 
treaties concerning women’s managerial employment. The treaties include the 
1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social Security 
(Minimum Standards) Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection 
Convention, the 1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 
the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), and the 1985 ILO Occupational Health Services 
Convention. These represent states’ formal endorsement of global women’s rights 
concerning work.  
 Women’s Rights International Non-government Organizations (INGOs): 
While the ratification of treaties represents a formalized commitment to 
international law, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous 
support from the global civil society. Transnational networks and international 
nongovernmental organizations transmit the cultural models embodied in 
international laws to nation-states and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and 
Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear 
evidence suggests that ties to global human rights social movement networks 
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affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures 
(Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and 
Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women’s rights regime measured 
by memberships in international women’s rights NGOs. Women’s rights INGO 
membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).  
FDI and Trade: The amount of foreign direct investment as a percentage 
of GDP, and trade as a percentage of GDP are included as general measures of the 
economic openness of a country. The measure of trade follows the standard 
practice in the literature, which is to consider the sum of exports and imports as a 
share of GDP. Foreign direct investment is measured as net inflows of foreign 
direct investment as a percentage of GDP. Both measures are from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
Control Variables 
Lagged Dependent Variable: Female share of the total 
managerial/administrative occupations is changing only incrementally over time, 
so time-series models will exhibit high levels of serial autocorrelation (Ostrom 
1990; Baltagi 1995; Kennedy 1998). I address this by including a lagged term 
from the previous year. As my analysis covers the period 1984 to 2004, lagged 
terms include values from 1983 to 2003. Using lagged dependent variables is 
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appropriate in the current analysis for two reasons.2 First, the most serious 
consequence of this method is to discount the importance of variables that are 
actually influential (Achen 2000). Nevertheless, the results, while conservative, 
will still be unbiased. Second, substantively, this research focuses on factors 
influencing changes in the dependent variable over time rather than cross-
sectional differences across countries; thus controlling for previous levels of 
women’s relative representation in the managerial/administrative occupations is 
crucial for the analysis. The choice of a 1-year lagged term is based on 
minimizing the loss of observations with a longer lagged term. In a separate 
analysis (not shown), I tested if longer lagged terms such as 3-year or 5-year 
lagged term yielded different results. I found that the main findings in terms of 
global and state institutional effects still hold in the direction and significance of 
coefficients with longer lagged terms. Thus, results from this analysis are not 
affected by the choice of a 1-year lagged term.   
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita and Industrialization: In order 
to account for a country’s general level of economic development, I include 
logged GDP per capita and percent change in GDP per capita. When GDP 
increases, the supply of managerial/administrative positions may increase. 
However, this does not necessarily reflect increased relative odds for women to be 
                                                
2 Models without a lagged dependent variable were also tested and the effects of key variables 
were very similar. 
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employed in such positions. I also include agriculture as percent GDP to 
approximate the structure of the economy. Both measures come from the World 
Bank World Development Indicators (2010). 
Democracy: This indicator is derived from the institutionalized polity 
score created by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). The indicator ranges from 0 (full 
autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). The polity score is updated on a yearly basis 
and I use the 2007 version of it, which covers the period 1883 to 2007. (I use only 
the data relating to the time periods between 1984-2004).  
Other national demographic characteristics such as population size, 
proportion of population residing in urban areas, and agriculture as percent 
GDP, are also included as controls in the analyses (WDI 2010).  
Women’s Human Capital: In addition to the female share of the total labor 
force, I include gross female secondary school enrollment rates to control for 
women’s human capital (WDI 2010), which is particularly relevant in competing 
for more prestigious occupations.3  
 
Statistical Model  
                                                
3 Fertility rates, which indicate women’s childrearing responsibilities, are another measure to 
capture women’s human capital. However, this particular measure (WDI 2010) showed a high 
level of correlations with female secondary enrollment rates and could not be included in the final 
models.  
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This research utilizes a pooled time-series regression analysis from 1984 
to 2003. The unit of analysis is country-year. Pooled time-series analysis is an 
appropriate and accessible method for measuring dynamic historical trends such 
as the increase in globalization and its effects on women’s employment outcomes 
across many different states. It enables a test for relationships while, at the same 
time, modeling changes in these relationships over time. The basic model is: 
 
Female share of the total managerial/administrative workers
it
 = α + β1W 
Share of women in total employment
it-1  +  β2 State legal protection of 
women’s rights
it-1
 + β3 Linkage to global women’s rights law and 
movement
it-1
 + β4 Openness to global economy
it-1
 +  
β5 Controls
it-1
 + β6 Female human capital
it-1
 + β7 Lagged Term
it-1
 + ε
it
  
 
where female share of the total managerial/administrative workers in country i in 
year t is the dependent variable.  
In a pooled time-series data set, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is 
not appropriate, as this type of data violates at least two fundamental assumptions 
that underlie OLS estimation. First, the temporal structure of the data increases 
the chance of autocorrelation, violating the OLS assumption that the errors are 
independent of each other. Second, the cross-sectional structure of the data 
increases the chance that the variance in the error terms may differ across 
countries and that there will be spatial processes that affect different panels at the 
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same time. These violations result in unbiased but inefficient results (Greene 
1993). 
In the current analysis, I use fixed-effects generalized least squares (GLS) 
linear regression analysis with a lagged dependent variable to model women’s 
representation in the managerial/administrative positions for several reasons 
(Beck and Katz 2004).  First, in this research, I am most interested in over-time 
variation because we want to know how particular interventions in countries at 
particular times have affected women’s share of more powerful positions in those 
countries. In order to keep over-time analyses from being overwhelmed by cross-
country (spatial) differences, a fixed-effects model with a lagged dependent 
variable focuses on over time change while controlling for variations across 
countries (by including a "dummy" variable for each country in the analysis). For 
example, using a fixed-effects analysis, we can consider how changes in one 
country's state policy from year x to year y are related to changes in the female 
share of more powerful positions across the same time period, while controlling 
for the national differences in population size. Hausman’s Chi-Square Tests also 
indicated that fixed effects were preferable for these models. 
 
Statistical Results 
Figure 1-1 shows the trend for the female share of the total labor force and 
the total managerial/administrative workers in OECD and non-OECD countries. 
 37 
 
From the figure, it is clear that, although the female share of the total 
managerial/administrative workforce has increased over time, women are still 
underrepresented in these top positions. Surprisingly, the female share of 
managerial/administrative positions is not higher in OECD countries than that in 
non-OECD countries, suggesting that nations’ wealth does not necessarily lead to 
better representation of women in prestigious occupations.    
 
 
Figure 1-1. Women’s Employment Trend, 1980-2006 
 
Tables 1-1 and 1-2 present models of women’s share of the total 
managerial/administrative occupations for the periods 1984 to 2004 in developed 
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countries. Table 1-1 includes countries that are members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of the wealthiest 
countries in the world. Table 1-2 includes countries that are not in the OECD, that 
is, low- and middle-income countries. In each Table, Model 1 includes women’s 
share of the total labor force and the control variables. In Model 2, economic 
integration measures are added. In Model 3, state policy and women’s political 
representation measures are added. In Model 4, international law and INGO 
measures are added. In models 5 and 6, I specifically test if the results are robust 
after controlling for over-time global increases in women’s rights related 
international laws and INGOs.  
Analyzing the results, there is evidence that increased women’s 
employment share also encourages women’s share of good jobs in more 
developed countries (Table 1-1, all models). Results indicate that there is almost 
1:1 relationship between the increase of women’s share in the labor force and that 
of women’s share in managerial/administrative occupations (.96 ~1.15). This 
suggests that substantial parts of increased women’s employment since 1984 were 
translated into women’s better representation in powerful positions in more 
economically affluent countries.  
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Table 1-1. OECD Countries: Unstandardized Coefficients from Fixed-effects 
Regression of Various Indicators on Women’s Share of the 
Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Women's Share in the Labor Force       
 % Women of total labor force 0.959*** 0.970*** 0.997*** 0.934*** 1.130*** 1.152*** 
  (0.185) (0.188) (0.211) (0.210) (0.215) (0.213) 
Domestic Law       
 State legal protection of women's rights   0.284 0.344 0.224 0.261 
    (0.318) (0.315) (0.313) (0.310) 
 % Women in parliament   0.068 0.044 -0.019 -0.05 
    (0.064) (0.064) (0.066) (0.067) 
Globalization of Women's Rights (Country 
Linkage) 
      
 International women's employment rights 
law ratification (0-7) 
   0.611 0.123 0.466 
     (0.596) (0.605) (0.585) 
 Country’s women's rights INGO 
membership (logged) 
   3.572** -0.351 2.720* 
     (1.254) (1.713) (1.249) 
Globalization of Women's Rights (World-
Level) 
      
 Women’s rights INGOs (world-level)     9.971**  
      (3.018)  
 International women's employment rights 
law (world-level cumulative ratification) 
     11.880*** 
       (3.150) 
Economic Globalization       
 Foreign direct investment (% GDP)  -0.051 -0.055 -0.077 -0.052 -0.064 
   (0.056) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
 Trade (% GDP)  -0.007 -0.014 0.013 0.004 0.000 
   (0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Country Characteristics       
 GDP per capita (logged) -1.417 -0.409 -1.136 -0.573 -6.635+ -5.557 
  (2.574) (2.811) (3.204) (3.172) (3.622) (3.377) 
 Democracy (-10 - 10) -0.147 -0.171 -0.186 -0.1 -0.024 0.115 
  (0.177) (0.180) (0.202) (0.202) (0.200) (0.206) 
 Total population (logged) -9.702 -10.371 -11.836 -15.252* -29.739*** -31.169*** 
  (6.169) (6.350) (7.305) (7.499) (8.586) (8.471) 
 Urban population -0.03 -0.061 -0.104 -0.184 -0.056 -0.202 
  (0.140) (0.147) (0.176) (0.178) (0.179) (0.174) 
 Agriculture (% GDP) -0.415* -0.414* -0.563** -0.35 -0.34 -0.255 
  (0.191) (0.192) (0.213) (0.224) (0.221) (0.221) 
Female Human Capital       
 Female secondary enrollment (% gross) -0.004 -0.003 -0.015 -0.02 -0.026 -0.022 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 Lagged share of women in M/A 
occupations (previous year) 
0.618*** 0.620*** 0.584*** 0.550*** 0.514*** 0.510*** 
  (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) 
 Constant 150.702+ 154.406 188.334+ 234.295* 468.271*** 474.192*** 
  (90.742) (93.763) (112.521) (115.380) (133.852) (129.681) 
        
 Country-year observations 381 380 347 347 347 347 
 Number of countries 22 22 22 22 22 22 
  R-squared 0.757 0.757 0.734 0.742 0.75 0.753 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001. ** p<0.01. * p<0.05. + p<0.1. (two-tailed test) 
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Economic integration does not seem to have directly influenced women’s 
representation in managerial occupations in developed countries (Model 2). This 
is consistent with claims that foreign direct investment and increased trade in 
poorer countries tend to selectively create job opportunities in low-skill, low-
paying jobs, in low capital-intensive, small-scale plants resulting in the 
feminization of labor force (Catagay and Olzer 1995). Building on existing 
literature, my results seem to suggest that openness to the global economy affects 
different groups of women workers differently. On the one hand, it creates low-
level job opportunities for women. On the other hand, it did not affect the most 
powerful occupations in terms of gender representation. This polarizing effect of 
economic globalization suggests a more complex relationship between economic 
globalization and the quality of women’s work.  
Nation states with stronger legal and institutional protection of women’s 
rights were no more likely to increase the female share of the 
managerial/administrative workers (Table 1-1 all models). This null association 
pertains to the more developed countries. This finding supports previous research 
emphasizing paradoxical effects of state policy on women’s employment in which 
more women friendly state policies tend to increase overall female labor force 
participation but decrease women’s concentration in higher-status occupations 
(Chang 2004,  Mandel and Semyonov 2006). However, given the small sample 
size and the lower-level of variation in legal protection of women’ rights across 
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OECD countries compared to that of non-OECD countries, results should still be 
taken with caution. Further research is needed to confirm the lack of policy effects. 
Women’s political representation did not have statistically significant effects, 
either. 
With respect to the penetration of global norms concerning women’s work, 
international laws concerning women’s work had no effect on women’s share in 
managerial occupations (Model 4). Results provide some evidence that formal 
commitment to international norms surrounding women’s equal rights at work, 
through ratifying international laws and adopting national policies consistent with 
international law’s recommendations, are largely symbolic at least for women's 
representation in the most powerful occupations.  
Civil society linkages through international women’s rights NGOs, 
however, had significant positive effects on women’s share of 
managerial/administrative positions (Model 4). This suggests that, to be effective, 
international laws requiring states to better protect women’s rights to work 
through stronger anti-discrimination policies and work-family policies largely 
depend upon the existence of important intermediaries. Women's rights NGOs are 
likely to work toward translating international laws into state policies, penetrating 
global women’s rights movements into domestic civil society. While international 
and domestic laws can be used as states’ symbolic gesture without an intention or 
ability to effectively enforce them, penetration by the global women’s rights 
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movements into the state brings a real and significant impact on the quality of 
women’s employment by establishing and disseminating core global norms 
regarding women’s rights at work. Results from this analysis are consistent with 
the existing literature on various human rights outcomes resulting fromlinkages to 
global human rights movements in general (Hafter-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; 
Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and Boyle 2012) and women’s rights movements in 
particular (Paxton et al. 2006). Future research will need to attend to the specific 
activities and mechanisms through which international women’s rights 
movements influence and transform domestic civil society, the economy, and the 
state.  
Increase in total population was associated with a decrease in women’s 
share of managerial occupations in developed countries (Models 4-6). 
Urbanization was not associated with an increase in women’s share in managerial 
occupations. As a country becomes less dependent on agriculture, women’s share 
in managerial occupation increases (Models 1-3) but once globalization of 
women’s rights measures are considered, its effects disappear (Models 4-6). 
States’ economic, demographic, and political structures, as well as women’s 
human capital, did not have consistent effects on the female share in managerial 
occupations. 
Key findings from Table 1-1 remained even after controlling for over-time 
increases in women’s rights related INGOs and international laws globally 
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(Models 5 and 6). Women’s share in the labor force still showed a positive effect 
on women’s representation in managerial occupations (Models 5 and 6). The 
country-specific linkage to women’s rights INGOs had a positive effect after 
controlling for the world-level increase in the number of international treaties and 
cumulative ratifications (Model 6). However, once controlling for the world-level 
increase in the number of women’s rights INGOs as well as country memberships 
in those INGOs over-time, country’s relative place, compared to the rate of the 
world-level diffusion of women’s rights INGOs rate, did not matter much (Model 
5). 
Table 1-2 shows the same models in developing countries. First, results 
show there are major differences between developed countries and developing 
countries. While there is evidence that increased women’s employment share also 
encourages women’s share of good jobs in more developed countries (Table 1-1), 
such a relationship did not hold in developing countries (all models in Table 1-2). 
This suggests that in developing countries, women’s employment increase 
over the last two decades did not accompany an increase in women’s share in 
managerial occupations at all. The results have implications for theories of gender 
stratification in the labor market, which is traditionally based on wealthy countries.  
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Table 1-2. Non-OECD Countries: Unstandardized Coefficient from the Fixed-
effects Regression of Various Indicators on Women’s Share of the 
Managerial/Administrative Occupations, 1984-2004 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Women's Share in the Labor Force       
 % Women of total labor force 0.230 0.212 0.206 0.208 0.184 0.219 
  (0.146) (0.149) (0.176) (0.175) (0.179) (0.182) 
Domestic Law       
 State legal protection of women's rights   0.773* 0.843** 0.831** 0.846** 
    (0.319) (0.316) (0.317) (0.317) 
 % Women in parliament   -0.001 0.012 0.02 0.014 
    (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) 
Globalization of Women's Rights (Country 
Linkage) 
      
 International women's employment rights 
law ratification (0-7) 
   0.754 0.612 0.779 
     (0.634) (0.668) (0.646) 
 Country’s women's rights INGO 
membership (logged) 
   2.971** 2.437+ 3.040** 
     (1.047) (1.308) (1.094) 
Globalization of Women's Rights (World-
Level) 
      
 Women’s rights INGOs (world-level)     3.135  
      (4.594)  
 International women's employment rights 
law (world-level cumulative ratification) 
     -1.048 
       (4.772) 
Economic Globalization       
 Foreign direct investment (% GDP)  0.065 0.049 -0.012 -0.027 -0.007 
   (0.088) (0.100) (0.101) (0.104) (0.103) 
 Trade (% GDP)  0.013 0.012 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
   (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Country Characteristics       
 GDP per capita (logged) 2.041 1.565 2.146 -1.083 -1.382 -0.879 
  (1.878) (1.945) (2.368) (2.684) (2.721) (2.843) 
 Democracy (-10 - 10) 0.003 -0.01 -0.025 -0.039 -0.043 -0.038 
  (0.062) (0.063) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) 
 Total population (logged) -10.143* -10.328* -9.254 -13.131* -16.193* -12.725+ 
  (4.887) (4.916) (6.563) (6.607) (7.991) (6.870) 
 Urban population 0.634*** 0.600*** 0.558** 0.597*** 0.591** 0.600*** 
  (0.142) (0.146) (0.179) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
 Agriculture (% GDP) 0.131 0.151 0.14 0.185 0.172 0.18 
  (0.111) (0.120) (0.140) (0.141) (0.143) (0.144) 
Female Human Capital       
 Female secondary enrollment (% gross) 0.083* 0.094* 0.077 0.087+ 0.073 0.093+ 
  (0.040) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) 
 Lagged share of women in M/A occupations 
(previous year) 
0.554*** 0.558*** 0.577*** 0.567*** 0.568*** 0.567*** 
  (0.041) (0.041) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
 Constant 108.039 115.16 91.214 168.081+ 203.478+ 165.102+ 
  (69.863) (70.756) (93.638) (95.970) (109.161) (97.062) 
        
 Country-year observations 478 475 390 390 390 390 
 Number of countries 56 56 48 48 48 48 
  R-squared 0.583 0.584 0.592 0.603 0.604 0.603 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p<0.001. ** p<0.01. * p<0.05. + p<0.1. (two-tailed test) 
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Although both women’s share in the labor force and women’s share in managerial 
occupations descriptively show a similar increase over the last two decades 
(Figure 1-1), labor processes in developing countries are distinct from those in 
wealthy ones in many ways and the circumstances under which women are 
employed are even more crucial in the developing country context. On the supply 
side, increases in women’s labor force participation are often considered 
indications of women’s increasing attachment and employment continuity, which 
in turn indicates higher levels of human capital. However, results suggest that 
women’s labor force participation, as a source of human capital, is not 
consistently associated with women’s share in managerial occupations in the 
developed and the developing countries. In developing countries, accumulated 
female human capital, resulting from more women entering into the labor force, 
did not result in fewer disadvantages in getting managerial jobs. On the demand 
side, in developing countries, job opportunities created for women may mostly be 
in low-wage, low-skill, labor-intensive manufacturing or service sector jobs.  
In fact, much of the increase in the volume of trade since 1970 is in 
manufacturing. Manufactured items increased from 59 percent of world 
merchandise exports in 1984 to 74 percent in 1995 (World Bank 1995). 
Developing countries’ share of manufactures in their exports tripled between 1970 
and 1990 from 20 percent to 60 percent (World Bank 1995). Technological 
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changes allowed for the fragmentation of production processes, international 
wage differentials encouraged the relocation of labor-intensive production from 
highly paid enclaves of organized labor in the North to low-paid, less well 
organized, and largely female labor forces in the South. On the one hand, as cheap 
labor is a critical comparative advantage for peripheral countries when they 
participate in global trade, more trade increases female labor force participation. 
However, the increase comes from increasingly marginal workers. On the demand 
side, since female labor is usually cheaper than male labor, labor-intensive 
industries such as textiles, garment making and electronics look for inexpensive 
female workers, particularly those who are young, single and semi-skilled 
(Grossman 1979). On the supply side, the adverse economic effects of 
globalization on developing countries may encourage women to seek non-
domestic work to subsidize the family income as transnational corporations and 
foreign direct investments continuously drive wages to less than a living wage 
(Wallerstein 1984). As women in developing countries occupy the worst jobs of 
the global capitalist system, increased female labor force participation may not 
lead to women’s increased access to high status occupations.  
Domestic laws protecting women’s rights also had a different effect in 
developing countries. Contrary to no effects of laws in developed countries, legal 
protection was an important factor in explaining women’s share in managerial 
occupations in developing countries (Models 3-6). Women’s representation in one 
 47 
 
of the highest status occupations increases as state policies become more women 
friendly. Whereas previous research assumed that state policy in a developing 
country context is too weak to have an impact, results suggest the opposite. State 
policies are even more important in explaining women’s representation in 
managerial and administrative occupations in the developing world. Women in 
developing countries are facing more overt discrimination and state policies need 
to counter such pressures. Also, it should be noted that on average, legal 
protection of women’s employment rights were higher in developed countries 
than developing countries.4 This might suggest that up to a certain point, state 
policies protecting women’s employment rights have a desired effect but  the 
marginal effects diminish as they pass certain points. For example, a change in 
state policy score from 3 to 5 will increase women’s managerial and 
administrative employment while an increase from 6 to 8 will not have as much 
power to increase women’s managerial employment. Like developed countries, 
women’s political representation was not associated with a managerial and 
administrative employment outcome in developing countries. 
With respect to country linkage to global women’s rights, results did not 
suggest substantial differences between the two worlds. Like developed countries, 
                                                
4 I checked to see if the results are driven by different levels of variables (e.g., most developed 
countries reach the highest level of legal protection) in state policies between developed and 
developing countries. However, data did not show significant ceiling effects of state policies in 
developed countries.   
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developing countries' women’s rights INGO membership was positively 
associated with women’s share of managerial employment. Results do not suggest 
that international laws are adopted and enforced differently, at least with respect 
to women’s share in powerful positions, in developing countries. Problems 
associated with the weak impact of international laws, such as weak government 
commitment, government incapacity to enforce, and poor enforcement 
mechanisms, seem to apply for both worlds, not just developing countries.5 
Key findings from Table 1-2 remained even after controlling for over-time 
increases in women’s rights related INGOs and international laws globally 
(Models 5 and 6). Domestic laws still showed a positive effect on women’s 
representation in managerial occupations (Models 5 and 6). Country linkage to 
women’s rights INGOs also had a positive effect after controlling for the world-
level increase in the number of international treaties and cumulative ratifications 
(Model 6). It is notable that even after controlling for the world-level increase in 
the number of women’s rights INGOs as well as country memberships in those 
INGOs over-time, a country’s WINGO membership was positively associated 
                                                
5 In addition to testing the independent effects of the key variables, I tested the effects of a series 
of interaction terms between women's share in the total employment and each of the key variables.  
None of the interactions, except interaction terms between female secondary enrollment rates and 
women’s share in the total labor force, had a significant effect (results not shown). Positive 
interaction effects between female secondary enrollment rates and women’s share in the total labor 
force suggest that as women become more highly educated, the increase in women’s total 
employment tends to be less concentrated in non-managerial occupations. 
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with women’s share in managerial occupations (at p > .1 in Model 5). This 
suggests not only an increase (or decrease) in the number of country’s WINGO 
membership over-time but also relative rate of that increase (or decrease), 
compared to the number of women’s rights INGOs in the world in any given year, 
matter in developing countries (Model 5).  
In sum, findings from this research suggest that the way women are 
incorporated into the labor force is critical in determining if increased female 
labor force participation is linked to women’s representation in more powerful 
positions. 
 
Conclusions 
More women are entering the workforce, but this analysis shows that more 
jobs do not necessarily mean better jobs. There are notable differences between 
developed and developing countries. Women’s employment appears to signal a 
different process in the two types of countries. Increases in the quantity of 
women’s employment brought some gains in terms of women’s share in 
managerial occupations in developed countries; however, they resulted in no 
gains for women in developing countries.  
The results are consistent with the argument that men and women are 
entering highly sex segregated labor markets in developing countries (Charles and 
Grusky 2004). Over the years, women have entered various traditionally male-
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dominated occupations. However, half of the world’s workers are in gender-
stereotyped occupations, with women dominating those occupations that are the 
lowest paying and least protected (ILO 2001). Women are still rarely employed in 
jobs with status, power and authority or in traditionally male blue-collar 
occupations. Relative to their overall share of total employment, women are 
significantly underrepresented among legislators, senior officials and managers; 
they are heavily overrepresented among clerks, professionals, and service and 
sales workers. 
Three points from the current analysis are worth further discussion. First, 
just as a change toward gender parity in the quantity of employment has largely 
been influenced by exogenous factors (i.e., state policies and globalization), the 
quality of employment has been affected by exogenous factors. Not all factors 
that help explain the increase in women’s share in the labor force had the same 
explanatory power in understanding women’s share in managerial occupations. 
Economic globalization, for example, did not explain women’s share of 
managerial occupations at all. 
Second, some argue that cultural gender inequality traditions in 
developing countries are more resistant to change than those in developed 
countries because gender equality is a Western rather than universal value (see 
e.g., Ingelhart and Norris 2003). However, the robust positive impact of linkage to 
global women’s rights movements on female managerial employment provides 
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little support for this argument. Instead, the gap between the developed and 
developing world should be seen in terms the context in which women enter into 
the labor market. Robust positive effects of state laws protecting women’s rights 
also support this point.  
Third, there are complexities that are beyond the scope of this analysis to 
address. National policies, women’s rights, and economic globalization are 
interrelated and each is an aggregate measure of numerous more specific factors. 
For example, the overall level of legal protection of women’s rights may mask the 
unique effects of specific policies on women’s employment in managerial 
occupations. In the next chapter, I develop this particular possibility in more detail. 
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Chapter 2: 
Implications of Work-family Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies on 
Gender Occupational Inequality 
In recent decades, scholars have increasingly studied the role played by 
the state in affecting women’s work. The nation state may shape the provision of 
employment opportunities for female labor and affect the structure of the labor 
market through various macroeconomic policies. It can also spark the supply of 
female labor by improving female human capital or through its family and 
employment policies. Particularly, whether and how the generous and expansive 
welfare state in general and particular policies, which provide services that help 
women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities, facilitate women’s 
access to the labor market and improve their position in the labor market have 
long interested welfare state scholars. The general question that has been asked is 
how the structure of welfare states as well as specific work and family policies 
have affected women’s access to the labor market. Scholars emphasize the role of 
the state as legislator and implementer of social and family services as well as the 
role of welfare state as an employer, both of which are expected to affect 
women’s labor force participation and other opportunities for women in the labor 
market. Scholars generally agree that progressive social policies and a large 
public service sector are likely to provide women with better opportunities to join 
the economically active labor force (Rein 1985; Esping-Anderson 1990; Alestalo, 
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Bislev, and Furaker 1991; Kolberg and Esping-Anderson 1991; Daly 2000; Korpi 
2000; Orloff 2002; Gornick and Meyers 2003). 
 Increasingly, scholars have investigated the role of the state not only in 
women’s labor force participation but also women’s occupational opportunities to 
attain powerful and elite occupational positions. The growing literature on this 
topic has focused on the welfare state in general and particular policies that 
provide services that help women combine employment and childbearing 
responsibilities. However, it is not clear how these policies that help women 
combine motherhood and employment affect women’s employment high-status 
jobs. Under the premise of the welfare state, the state facilitates both the supply of 
and demand for women in the labor market. Doing so, a group of scholars argue, 
generous benefits that facilitate mothers’ employment exacerbate gender 
occupational inequality as many new public, care jobs are created by generous 
welfare benefits (Esping-Anderson 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001; Klausen 
1999). Scholars also point out that even when policies like paid maternity leave 
enable women to combine family and work responsibilities, women still hold 
preferences to traditionally female jobs in an attempt to reconcile their dual roles 
as mothers and workers (Hakim 1997). However, others find paid maternity leave 
is associated with a decrease in sex occupational inequality by increasing 
women’s representation in high-status occupations such as managerial jobs and 
women’s entrance into traditionally male-dominated occupations (Chang 2004).    
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Whereas the impact of the welfare state on the quantity and quality of 
women’s employment is widely studied, little research has further investigated the 
ways other types of policies affect women’s occupational opportunities. The 
welfare state is only part of the mechanisms through which state policies impact 
women’s work. With the exception of Chang’s (2004) study focusing on the role 
of occupational access laws on explaining sex occupational segregation in 
developing countries6, few studies have accounted for the implications of state 
policies beyond welfare policies such as maternity leave and child-care support. 
Other types of policies include equal treatment legislation and equal access 
legislation. Although the welfare state approach has focused on women’s 
employment policies as a configuration of multiple provisions, its emphasis has 
been limited to policies that provide services that help women combine 
employment and childrearing responsibilities. It has rarely been attempted to 
explore the ways in which other (non-welfare state) policies affect women’s 
opportunities to obtain powerful positions in the labor market. For example, anti-
discrimination polices provide equally important contexts in which women are 
employed in different occupations.  
 Based on previous literature, this chapter identifies and tests the effects of 
different types of policies on sex occupational inequality. In the theory section, I 
                                                
6 While Chang (2004) differentiates work-family policies from occupational access policies, she 
utilizes countries’ international law ratification as a proxy for actual policies in countries. 
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attempt to describe two mechanisms through which state policies could impact 
occupational inequality. 
The gendered labor market refers to different patterns of employment between 
men and women. There is a nearly universal tendency for men and women to be 
employed in different occupations (Anker 1998). This differentiation includes 
both nominal segregation (e.g., women’s overrepresentation in the service sector 
and men’s overrepresentation in labor-intensive jobs) and hierarchical inequality 
(e.g., women concentrated in low-wage, and/or part-time marginal jobs) 
(Semynov and Jones 1999; Daly 2000; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999). 
While occupational segregation by sex itself has many implications for gender 
relations (Anker 1998), sex occupational inequality refers to the more direct 
aspect of gender inequality in the labor market. It is estimated that about one third 
of all employed women in developed countries are working part-time (Blossfeld 
and Hakim 1997; Orloff 2002). In both developed and developing countries, 
women tend to occupy more non-managerial, non-professional positions than men 
(Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). Also, women are much more likely 
than men to work in the informal, home-based, and agricultural sectors, which are 
not counted in most labor statistics. Following other studies that have dealt with 
sex occupational inequality, in this chapter, I define hierarchical dimensions of 
gender occupational segregation according to the prestige associated with an 
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occupation (Fossett 1984). I empirically define “high-status” “powerful” 
occupations as managerial and professional positions.  
  
Theories of State Policies on the Quality of Women’s Employment 
Investigators  who attend to cross-national variations in state policies as 
key determinants in shaping women’s position in the labor market generally agree 
that various women-friendly state policies increase overall female labor force 
participation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006; Abu Sharkh 2009). Yet, 
the effects of policies on the quality of women’s employment are far from clear. 
Women-friendly employment laws include many different types with varying 
mechanisms and the ways in which these policies help women enter into the 
formal labor force are different.  They may encourage more gender egalitarian 
attitudes in the labor market. They may make sure that women's work is free of 
overt discrimination. These laws also include ways to reduce disadvantages 
associated with child bearing and child rearing responsibilities (Charles 1992; 
Chang 2000, 2004; Goldin 1990). 
Among others, anti-discrimination policies and work/family policies such 
as maternity or parental leave and the provision of child care have been identified 
as key mechanisms through which states reduce women’s labor market 
disadvantages. While policies, such as anti-discrimination, officially prohibit 
overt discrimination, they do not provide support to minimize women’s dual roles 
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as mothers and workers. Policies such as maternity leave, on the other hand, help 
strengthen mothers’ long-term labor-market attachment, which is necessary in 
managerial and professional occupations. In addition to types of policies, policy 
enforcement is another important consideration needed to assess a policy’s 
effectiveness. Countries draft laws in ways that signal their willingness to tolerate 
behavior inconsistent with those laws (see e.g., Perry-Smith and Blum 2000). For 
example, countries with legislation that specifies more generous length and wage 
replacement for a paid maternity leave, as well as securing the position upon a 
return from the paid leave, will be more effective in achieving goals from the 
legislation compared to countries with legislation that does not specify length or 
wage replacement for a paid maternity leave. In this chapter, I assess the strength 
of each type of state policy as well. 
 
Theories of policies that provide services that help women combine employment 
and childrearing responsibilities 
Welfare-type of women’s employment policies provide services that help 
women combine employment and childrearing responsibilities and facilitate 
women’s access to the labor market (Rein 1985; Esping-Anderson 1990). Among 
others policies of this kind, maternity leave policies are the most wide spread 
mechanism through which states help women combine women’s dual roles as 
mothers and workers. Many international studies demonstrate that women 
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increase their labor force participation when the opportunity to take paid leave is 
guaranteed by the state law (Pylkkanen and Smith 2003, Ruhm and Teague 1997, 
Waldfogel et al. 1999). Maternity leave policy may also reduce gender 
occupational inequality.  
First, generous maternity leave provisions strengthen mothers' long-term 
labor-market attachment, which prevents women from exiting paid work (Gornick 
et al 1997). This way, maternity leave policies enable women to remain in the 
labor force more continuously, allowing them to develop more years of work 
experience and greater labor force attachment. As women’s labor force 
attachment and job-related human capital increases, they are more likely to be 
able to compete with men at work. As labor market attachment is critical, 
especially in high status occupations, it could facilitate women’s representation in 
more elite male-dominated occupations. Also, maternity leave and child care 
services may encourage more gender egalitarian attitudes in the formal economy 
(Sjoberg 2004). As ideals of gender egalitarianism increase, women are more 
likely to seek entrance into the labor market and into occupations beyond those 
traditionally open to them and employers should be more willing to hire women 
workers for a wider range of occupations including high-status occupations.  
H1: Generous maternity leave policies are associated with less sex 
occupational inequality. 
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However, there are also reasons to believe that that the existence of maternity 
leave policies may  impede women’s entry into high-status occupations by 
rendering female workers more costly than male workers, especially if employers 
bear the cost of maternity leave rather than the state (Anker 1998; Boserup 1970; 
Safa 1983). Also, maternity leave benefits can exacerbate the negative perceptions 
that surround the reliability of women’s work (Kaar 2000). Indeed, even generous 
state-provided maternity and childcare benefits can adversely affect women’s 
occupational opportunities and patterns. While paid maternity leave serves as a 
device through which women’s employment rights are protected, a long absence 
from paid employment may discourage employers from hiring women to 
positions of authority and power and thus threaten women’s ability to compete 
successfully with men for elite positions (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).  
H2: Generous maternity leave policies are associated with a greater sex 
occupational inequality. 
 
Theories of policies that promote equal opportunities and treatment of women 
While policies such as maternity leave may help women access high-status 
positions, such as managerial and professional jobs, by enabling women’s dual 
roles as mother and workers, anti-discrimination policies attempt to reduce gender 
inequality in employment through a different mechanism. Two types of anti-
discrimination policies are especially relevant: equal opportunity policies that 
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provide women with unrestricted access to all occupations regardless of fertility 
status and equal pay policies that provide equal treatment of women and men in 
the same position.  
Anti-discrimination policies open up employment opportunities for women by 
providing them with a legal justification for seeking entry into all sectors of the 
labor market and by discouraging employers from discriminating against women 
(Goldin 1990). They may also contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms, 
further legitimating women’s access to and position in the labor market and their 
entrance into male-dominated sectors and occupational positions. The legal and 
cultural pressures associated with these types of policies may have stronger 
effects in the formal labor market and in the more prestigious professional and 
managerial occupations than in the informal sectors (Chang 2004). 
H3: Anti-discrimination policies are associated with less sex occupational 
inequality. 
 
Although anti-discrimination policies prohibit overt discrimination, they do 
not provide support to minimize women’s dual roles as mothers and workers. 
Anti-discrimination legislation is an important symbolic first step to facilitate 
women’s incorporation into the labor market, but it may not have a direct effect 
on occupational gender inequality. 
 61 
 
It is important to note that such legislation, without changes in cultural 
assumptions about women’s role as wives and mothers and social services that 
lessen women’s family responsibilities, may contribute to exacerbating gendered 
occupational inequality while facilitating women’s labor force participation 
(Chang 2004). Under these circumstances, married women in less developed 
countries, while allowed by law to pursue economic activities, will exercise their 
improved access to the labor market by seeking employment that allows them to 
combine their work and family responsibilities, including flexible hours and part-
time jobs.  Work in sectors traditionally associated with females, such as sales and 
service sectors, may still be preferred by women (Lee and Hirata 2001). If this is 
the case, most of the new women’s employment induced by anti-discrimination 
policies will be concentrated in non-managerial or non-professional jobs, making 
sex occupational inequality greater. 
H4:  Anti-discrimination policies are not associated with a greater sex occupation 
inequality. 
 
Global Effects on Sex Occupational Inequality 
Whereas those who are interested in the role of state interventions tend to 
consider the impact of state policies on women’s employment, others consider the 
role and power of international actors (e.g., Ramirez, Soyal, and Shanahan 1997; 
Simmons 2009). Relevant global contexts include 1) the circumstances in which 
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women’s employment rights are accepted as part of human rights globally and 2) 
ever-widening global markets for goods, services, and capital that influence labor 
market and state provisions (Stryker 1998). Did global women’s rights and global 
economic integration reduce sex occupational inequality? 
Gender inequality is a global problem. In employment, women face 
important disadvantages worldwide including the quantity and quality of jobs 
women have (WHO 2000). Attempts to address these inequalities have also been 
made globally. Global mobilization on behalf of women’s rights has been steadily 
increasing in size and strength (Berkovitch 1999; D’Itri 1999; Rupp and Taylor 
1999). Through this global expansion and collaboration, the international 
organizations and transnational networks have increasingly been able to 
strengthen a discourse of substantial gender inclusion in the economy and other 
areas and to ensure that norms about women’s rights, equality, and participation 
in paid labor are shared by international actors and nation states (Berkovitch 1999; 
Ramirez et al. 1997; True and Mintrom 2001).   
Incorporation of women’s rights in international employment laws 
exemplifies this process. Prior to World War II, the goal of social progress was 
translated into policies in major UN and ILO international conventions that aimed 
at setting international standards for the better protection of women and children. 
During the 1970s, it came to be expressed in guidelines for nation states to ensure 
that women’s incorporation into the economy would be equal to that of men 
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(Berkovitch 1999). On the other hand, protective legislation that restricts 
women’s employment in certain dangerous industries, during night hours, or 
during pregnancy was stigmatized as having negative effects on women’s 
opportunities and, as a consequence of such criticism, has declined. Maternity 
protection was seen as an essential device for anti-discrimination and has 
expanded. The replacement of the notion of “working mothers” with that of 
“workers with family responsibilities” contributed in yet another way to the 
diminishing association of women with the domestic sphere. All three policies 
reflected and enacted the new world model of women, which was articulated and 
promoted as the model for nation states to follow. Women's incorporation into 
employment was to be compared and equalized with that of men (equal pay and 
equal treatment) and not be affected by their familial responsibilities (maternity 
leave). Legally binding treaties accompanied by formal treaty monitoring 
mechanisms and reporting obligations have been created in order to mobilize 
nation states to take action against various kinds of discrimination women face. 
CEDAW, established in 1979, is the most important convention with respect to 
women’s rights in general and women’s employment issues in particular. It 
incorporates most of the provisions in previous women’s rights conventions and 
added new issues, reflecting the global theme of women's issues in the 70s, 
women in development. Once drafted, it became widely ratified worldwide. By 
2007, it was ratified by 185 countries (UN DAW 2007). Jacobson (1992) notes 
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that “many countries that had focused little if any attention on women’s rights in 
the past do so today in large part because of the treaty” (444). 
What do these global contexts mean to gender occupational inequality and 
what implications do they have for state policies on inequality? First, these 
contexts can affect gender occupational inequality by making states adopt and 
enforce policies. In addition to my own research, Frank et al. (2009), for example, 
find that countries with dense linkages to world society through transnational 
social movements tend to more strongly enforce rape laws. Furthermore, the same 
normative discourses that facilitated adoption of maternity leave policies and anti-
discrimination policies also empower non-state actors, which in turn influence 
gender occupational inequality. Global women’s rights discourses created by 
world polity also penetrate disparate actors: individuals, associations, and firms 
within nations, through various carriers including international organizations 
education systems, popular culture, and tourism (Frank et al. 2000; Boyle et al. 
2002; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). These multiple penetration effects collectively 
put pressures on states and change cultural norms about women’s work. 
However, if both state policies and outcomes are seen as institutional 
effects of global women’s rights discourse, state policies may be epiphenomenal 
representations of larger global structures. State policies may not have an impact 
on gender occupational inequality independent of the structure, penetration, and 
persistence of global civil society in a particular issue area (Schofer and Hironaka 
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2005). In an area of education, Benavot and Resnick (2006) find that the 
worldwide standard of compulsory education brought social expectations and 
practices about compulsory education as well as an increase of educational 
enrollment rates across countries whether or not compulsory attendance laws are 
present in a country.  Still, countries may adopt maternity leave and anti-
discrimination laws to look good or in response to pressures from powerful 
international actors but have no ability or intention to implement them. For these 
reasons, it is appropriate to assess the effects of state policies independent of 
global women’s rights discourses. 
The evolution of women’s rights has coincided with increasing pressure 
for open national economies and neoliberal global economic integration. There 
are opposing arguments about whether countries’ integration into the global 
economy has upgraded women’s position in the labor market. One group of 
scholars interested in the impact of global economic integration, particularly on 
the labor market, highlight the direct, positive impact of economic globalization 
on female workers as well as on the reduction of gender discrimination (Fields 
1985; Krueger 1983; Wood 1990, 1994). Particularly in the export-orientated 
economy, the increased female labor force participation induced by economic 
globalization eventually upgrades women to better-paying, high status-jobs. 
Gender norms and institutions become more gender egalitarian on the grounds 
that gender based discrimination is costly by wasting women’s human capital 
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(Alder and Izraeli 1994; Gothaskar 1995). Another group of globalization 
scholars oppose the above perspective, pointing out that the key mechanism of 
global economic integration lies in the international division of labor and the 
feminization of the low-paying manufacturing jobs (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006). 
While differing in the direction of impact of global economic integration on sex 
occupational inequality, both perspectives contend that a country’s integration 
into the global economy is an important factor to consider to understand sex 
occupational inequality.  
 
Methods 
Data and Measure 
Dependent Variable: Gender Occupational Inequality  
 The dependent variable used in this analysis is gender occupational 
inequality. It is measured by the logged odds that women relative to men are 
employed in “administrative/managerial" occupations and 
"professional/technical" occupations versus all other occupations. These two 
major occupational categories are widely used by scholars of gender occupational 
inequality to indicate the most powerful and prestigious occupations (see eg., 
Semyonov 1980; Charles 1992; Chang 2004).  
It is notable that this measure of sex occupational inequality is different 
from the direct percentage of women in administrative/managerial occupations, 
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which is used in Chapter 1. Administrative/managerial occupations are the most 
powerful and prestigious occupations in which women have been 
underrepresented (Semyonov 1980). The proportion of women within that 
particular occupation group illustrates women’s relative representation in 
important decision-making in the economy and the state. In addition, the 
proportion of women in administrative/managerial occupations in Chapter 1 is 
examined in terms of its explicit relationship to women’s labor force participation, 
which has its own merit. In this chapter, because I am more interested in the 
overall structure of sex occupational inequality beyond this particular occupation 
group, a measure that takes into account unequal sex representation in a broader 
hierarchical occupation system is more appropriate. The proportion of women in 
administrative/managerial occupations does not provide information about 
hierarchical inequality between sexes beyond that particular occupation group. 
One needs a measure that indicates the probability that a woman would, on 
average, be ranked at a higher (or lower) level occupation category than a man. 
This requires comparing women workers in a higher ranked occupation versus 
women workers in a lower ranked occupation as well as comparing the pattern 
against that of men.    
For the reasons above, I utilize the odds of women relative to men being 
employed in managerial and professional occupations versus all other occupations 
to measure the structure of gender occupational inequality in 1984 and 2004 
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(Semyonov 1980).7 This illustrates the differential placement of the two gender 
groups in a higher-status occupational category versus lower-status occupational 
grouping (i.e., the number of women in the two highest-status occupational 
groups divided by the number of women in lower-status positions, divided by the 
number of men in the two highest-status occupational groups divided by the 
number of men in lower-status positions). These odds ratios provide a margin-free 
indicator of gender inequality. This measure specifically indicates the extent of 
disparities between women and men within societies and is not confounded by the 
distribution of occupations in societies or by rates of labor force participation 
(Symyonov 1980; Clark 1991). The logarithm is used to make the relationship 
more linear. In a situation of perfect gender parity, the value of the logarithm 
would be 0 (since parity is equivalent to an odds ratio of 1 and the logarithm of 1 
is 0). As the value changes in a negative direction, gender inequality in favor of 
men grows larger; as it changes in a positive direction, inequality in favor of 
women grows. It should be noted that this indicator of ordinal gender 
                                                
7 An alternative way to measure gender ordinal occupational inequality is Liberson’s index of net 
differences (ND). ND provides information on inequality beyond managerial and professional 
occupations by ranking these non-managerial, non-professional positions according to prestige. 
However, it requires that definitions of occupation groups with different ranking are consistent 
and comparable across countries and between the two occupation standards, ISCO-68 and ISCO-
88. Unfortunately, beyond managerial and professional occupations, definitions of a major 
occupational group tend to vary across countries and between the two occupation standards. For 
this reason, I chose the managerial plus professional occupations vs.  lower status occupations to 
indicate ordinal gender occupational inequality.   
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occupational inequality pertains only to status or prestige. This does not mean that 
other dimensions of occupational gender inequality, such as occupational wage 
inequality or part-time work versus full-time employment, are less important. 
Such data are simply not available.   
Employment data come from the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
LABORSTA, which provides detailed, comparable, occupational data from the 
early 1980s. The dataset comprises, for each country-year, a set of occupational 
categories and the number of women and men in each category. The full set 
includes data for more than 100 countries. Occupations are matched to a variety 
of national or international schemes. In order to maximize comparability of 
occupational classifications, I use occupational data based on two comparable 
international occupational classification schemes ISCO-68 or ISCO-88. Table 2-1 
lists the composition of the two occupational groups from ISCO-68 and ISCO-88.  
The two occupational classification schemes are highly comparable with 
respect to sub-occupations in each occupational group, based on the International 
Occupational Prestige Scale, the International Socio-Economic Index of 
Occupational Status, and class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). 
Furthermore, there is considerable similarity between the two international 
occupational schemes and across countries in their actual occupations and the 
extent of their occupational hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and 
VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, Jarman, and Brooks 2000).   
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Table 2-1. Occupational Classifications of ISCO-68 and ISCO-88 
  ISCO-68   ISCO-88 
Managerial/administra
tive occupational 
group 
Administrative and managerial 
workers 
 Legislators, senior officials and managers 
 Legislative officials and government 
administrators 
  Legislators and senior officials 
 Managers    Legislators 
     Senior government officials 
     Traditional chiefs and heads of villages 
     Senior Officials of special-interest organization 
    Corporate managers 
     Directors and chief executives 
     Production and operations department managers 
     Other department managers 
    General managers 
     General managers 
Professional/technical 
occupational group 
Professional, technical and related 
workers 
 Professionals 
 Physical scientists and related 
technicians 
  Physical, mathematical and engineering science 
professionals 
 Architects, engineers and related 
technicians 
   Physicists, chemists and related professionals 
 Aircraft and ships' officers    Computing professionals 
 Life scientists and related technicians    Architects, engineers and related professionals 
 Medical, dental, veterinary and 
related workers 
  Life science and health professional 
 Statisticians, mathematicians, systems 
analysts and related technicians 
   Life science professionals 
 Economists    Health professional (except nursing) 
 Accountants    Nursing and midwifery professionals 
 Jurists   Teaching professionals 
 Teachers    College, university and higher education teaching 
professionals 
 Workers in Religion    Secondary education teaching professionals 
 Authors, journalists and related 
writers 
   Primary and pre-primary education teaching 
professionals 
 Sculptors, painters, photographers 
and related creative artists 
   Special education teaching professionals 
 Composers and performing artists    Other teaching professionals 
 Athletes, sportsmen and related 
workers 
  Other professionals 
 Professional, technical and related 
workers not elsewhere classified 
   Business professionals 
     Legal professionals 
     Archivists, librarians and related information 
professionals 
     Social science and related professionals 
     Writers and creative or performing artists 
     Religious professionals 
   Technicians and associate professionals 
    Physical and engineering science associate 
professionals 
     Physical and engineering science technicians 
     Computer associate professionals 
     Optical and electronic equipment operators 
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     Ship and aircraft controllers and technicians 
     Safety and quality inspectors 
    Life science and health associate professionals 
     Life science technicians and related associate 
professionals 
     Modern health associate professionals (except 
nursing) 
     Nursing and midwifery associate professionals 
     Traditional medicine practitioners and faith healers 
    Teaching associate professionals 
     Primary education teaching associate professionals 
     Special education teaching associate professionals 
     Other teaching associate professionals 
    Other associate professionals 
     Finance and sales associate professionals 
     Business service agents and trade brokers 
     Administrative associate professionals 
     Custom, tax and related government associate 
professionals 
     Police inspectors and detectives 
     Social work associate professionals 
     Artistic, entertainment and sports associate 
professionals 
          Religious associate professionals 
 
 
Independent Variables 
 The key independent variables utilized in this analysis include different 
types of state policies. The first state policy dimension is the provision of 
substantive benefits that facilitate combining motherhood with work. Maternity 
leave policies are used to measure this. The second type of policies refer to equal 
opportunity policies that provide women with unrestricted access to all 
occupations regardless of fertility status and equal pay policies that provide equal 
treatment of women and men with the same or comparable work.    
I gathered a wide range of publicly available data on maternity leave 
policies across countries.  I first relied most heavily on primary data sources 
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including national-level legislation.  I collected national legislation including acts 
and decrees governing maternity leave, occupational access, and equal pay. These 
legislative documents were obtained from several sources including the 
International Labour Organization NATLEX database, the International Labour 
Organization library in Geneva, and government websites. The ILO is the world’s 
single most comprehensive source of labor legislation and particularly ILO’s 
NATLEX database contains legislation related to labor, social security, and 
human rights for 186 countries. I accessed NATLEX online database during 2010 
and reviewed every available legislation text indexed under the category 
“maternity protection” or “equality of opportunity and treatment.”  
I coded these laws in terms of 1) the length of maternity leave and the 
percentage of compensation in regular pay, 2) presence of equal pay laws, 3) laws 
regarding women’s access to night work, work regardless of industry, and work 
while pregnant. During the process, I realized that some of the legislation was 
available only in hard copy at the ILO library in Geneva. I went to Geneva in 
January 2011 and spent twenty days searching the archive and photocopying the 
legislation. I also conducted additional internet searches for the government 
websites of specific countries and searched government websites for the most 
current versions of legislation. 
Some legislation was available in English but others laws were only in the 
official language of a country. I coded all legislation in English or Korean and 
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legislation that can be translated into English using Google translation. Research 
assistants coded legislation in French or Spanish. Most legislation relating to 
maternity leave was in the form of labor law or social security law. Most anti-
discrimination legislation was part of labor laws or constitutions. Coding schemes 
of legislation in terms of the three dimensions are listed in Appendix 2-1 through 
2-3.   
There were difficulties in the process of coding legislation. I initially 
planned to code changes in these laws over-time within countries because the 
NATLAX database contains not only the most current legislation but also earlier 
legislation texts and amendments on the same issues. While the NATLEX and the 
ILO library are the most expansive source of such legislation, not all amendments 
were indexed in the NATLAX database nor was the full-text of such legislation 
available. In some cases, primary legislative sources were not included in the 
NATLAX database. There was also difficulty obtaining information about 
amendments through government websites as in many cases the government 
website contains only the most current legislation. For these reasons, I was not 
able to code over-time changes of maternity leave policies and anti-discrimination 
policies. Instead, whenever possible, I identified the year when these policies 
were adopted into legislation.   
Building on the primary information I obtained, I clarified and 
supplemented it with various secondary data sources. This includes Social 
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Security Programs Throughout the World 
(http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/) and the ILO/UN Report (2000, 
2005), and Raising the Global Floor: A World Legal Rights Database, 
Berkovitch's (1998) information on the year of the first law on maternity leave 
and equal pay laws. For equal access policies, I could not obtain good secondary 
data to clarify the limited information I had through primary source surveys. Thus, 
I was able to construct data on the year of first maternity leave and equal pay law 
adoption, but not the first year of equal access policies. Appendix 2-4 lists 
information on maternity leave, equal pay, and equal access policies.  
Maternity Leave. Using the policy data, the key independent variables are 
constructed. First, in order to measure the scope of work-family policies, 4 
dummy variables representing the level of maternity leave are included.  Policies 
guaranteeing twenty-six weeks or longer of maternity leave with 75% of regular 
pay or higher are considered as a high-level maternity leave policy. This is above 
the international standard for maternity leave. When paid maternity leave is 
granted for 14 to 25 weeks with 75% of regular pay or higher, these policies are 
considered as a mid-level maternity leave policy. This is consistent with the 
international standard for maternity leave. When paid maternity leave is granted 
for less than 14 weeks or with a wage replacement of less than 75% of regular 
wage, these policies are considered as a low-level maternity leave policy. When 
there is no maternity leave policy, countries are coded as not having a maternity 
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leave policy. For the multivariate analysis, all 35 countries had a paid maternity 
leave. As a result, for the multivariate analysis, higher-level of maternity 
protection is compared with low-level maternity leave policy not a lack of 
maternity leave policy.   
Equal Pay Laws. The second state policy variable is equal pay legislation. 
These laws demand “equal pay for work of equal value” and prohibit different 
remuneration based on gender in most sectors of the workforce. If a country has 
an equal pay law in a given year, it is coded as 1. 
Equal Access Laws. The third state policy consists of legislation that 
promotes women’s unrestricted access to all occupations. As early as the 
nineteenth century, many countries had employment regulations based on gender. 
Although these gender specific laws did not prohibit women’s paid work 
altogether, they created a gender-differentiated workforce in which women’s 
work was restricted to certain types, forms, and hours of works. Furthermore, 
women’s fertility status (particularly when pregnant) was a legal justification for 
not hiring women even in the industries where women were allowed to work. 
Over the years, however, as global discourse on women’s work became centered 
around “equality” over “protection,” these laws came to be viewed as 
discriminatory (Berkovitch 1999). Many countries have replaced these laws with 
ones that guarantee women’s equal access to all industries, night hour 
employment, and while pregnant, while other countries still have restrictions in 
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employment based on gender. If women are allowed to work in all industries, 
during the night, and while pregnant in a country, it is coded as 1 (others as 0).  
Overall Level of Legal Protection of Women’s Rights. The three specific 
state policies discussed above represent key dimensions of women’s work and are 
expected to influence gender occupational inequality in unique ways. However, 
women’s work is being influenced by numerous other laws and regulations 
encompassing not only women’s employment rights but also larger gender 
relations in economic, social, and political areas. Furthermore, these legal rights 
may work together in altering gender relations and conditions of women’s work.  
In order to contrast the effects of the three specific policies with the 
overall level of state legal protection of women’s rights laws, two measures are 
included. First, state policies and structures concerning women’s economic rights 
are measured by an index representing the degree to which women’s economic 
rights are protected in national laws. Data are from the Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Database, which covers 195 countries annually from 1981-
2008 providing information on the extent to which women’s economic rights are 
reflected in national laws and enforced by the government.  
Women’s economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free choice of 
profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative’s 
consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relative’s consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security 
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(including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by 
employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right 
to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, the right 
to work in the military and the police force. This measure is a 4 point scale 
(ranging from 0 to 3). Considering that women’s rights to work encompass not 
only economic areas but also political and social areas, I also include an 
aggregated index of economic rights, political rights, and social rights protected in 
law. This measure is a 10 point scale (0 – 9). Due to the fact that the different 
types of state policies outlined above are all components of these aggregate 
indices, I compare the effects of an aggregate index in a separate model from ones 
including different types of state policies.    
Penetration of Global Women’s Rights: As women’s rights to participate 
in the wage economy are global phenomena, I consider the ratification of five 
treaties concerning women’s work.  The treaties include the 1951 ILO Equal 
Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection Convention, the 1962 ILO 
Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, and the 1979 UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
The 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention was the first international 
treaty to focus exclusively on women’s rights in employment and to express the 
notion of equality between men and women. These five treaties represent states’ 
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formal endorsement of global women’s rights concerning work. The 1952 ILO 
Maternity Protection Convention revised the earlier ILO Maternity Convention 
(1919), which focused more on the protection of newborns and motherhood. The 
1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention expanded equal 
treatment from “equal pay for equal work” to “equal pay for work of equal value.” 
The 1952 ILO Maternity Protection Convention was the first treaty to 
conceptualize maternity benefits as a way for the state to facilitate the reentry of 
mothers into paid employment and as a device to guarantee women’s rights to 
work. The 1952 ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention specified 
the minimum mandatory length of maternity leave, the protection from dismissal, 
and the rate of cash benefits to be paid. The 1979 UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was the 
most comprehensive international treaty on the issues of gender inequality and 
gender discrimination. It mandated not only the equal rights of women but also 
the elimination of all forms of gender discrimination against women. It prohibited 
all measures that are discriminatory against women even when the governments 
did not intend them to be (Article 2). Furthermore, it obligates the state to 
“modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women… with the 
view to achieving the elimination of … practices which are based on the idea of 
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for 
men and women” (Article 5). It explicitly protects women’s rights to non-
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discrimination in employment as it mandates the state to ensure that women have 
the right to the same employment opportunities, the rights to a free choice of 
profession and employment, the rights to promotion, training, job security and 
benefits, equal pay for work of equal value, and equal access to unemployment, 
retirement, and sick benefits (Article II(I)).  
 
Figure 2-1. Cumulative Ratification of International Treaties concerning 
Women’s Work, 1952-2011 
 
Figure 2-1 shows the ratification trend for these five child rights treaties. 
The 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention and the 1979 CEDAW are 
ratified by most countries in the World by 2011. The primary variation for these 
two treaties relates to the timing of ratification, which ranges from 1952 (or 1990 
0	  
20	  
40	  
60	  
80	  
100	  
120	  
140	  
160	  
180	  
200	  
19
52
	  
19
55
	  
19
58
	  
19
61
	  
19
64
	  
19
67
	  
19
70
	  
19
73
	  
19
76
	  
19
79
	  
19
82
	  
19
85
	  
19
88
	  
19
91
	  
19
94
	  
19
97
	  
20
00
	  
20
03
	  
20
06
	  
20
09
	  
Cu
m
ul
a+
ve
	  ra
+ﬁ
ca
+o
n	  
Year	  
ILO	  Equal	  RemuneraFon	  (1951)	   ILO	  Social	  Security	  (1952)	  
ILO	  Equal	  Treatment	  (1962)	   CEDAW	  (1979)	  
ILO	  Maternity	  ProtecFon	  (1952)	  
 80 
 
for the CEDAW) to 2010 (or 2011 for the CEDAW). The Equal Remuneration 
treaty had a steady stream of ratifications. The CEDAW was ratified at a much 
faster rate as more than half of all countries in the world ratified it within a decade 
since it became available in 1979. The Minimum Age Convention had a steady 
stream of ratifications when it was first proposed. As the CEDAW became widely 
ratified, the Equal Remuneration Convention also picked up the rate of ratification 
during the 1990-2000 periods. This suggests that intensification of global concern 
over gender equality since the CEDAW and the late adopters of the Equal 
Remuneration treaty are part of the more recent “norm cascade.” The other three 
ILO treaties had a much slower stream of ratifications and, in some sense, 
whether a country ratified these treaties capture the varying commitment to 
women’s employment rights.    
Women’s Rights INGOs: While international laws represent a formalized 
commitment, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous 
support from global civil society. Transnational networks and international 
nongovernmental organizations transmit cultural models embodied in 
international laws to nation-states and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and 
Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear 
evidence suggests that ties to the global human rights social movement networks 
affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures 
(Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and 
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Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women’s rights regime measured 
by memberships in international women’s rights NGOs. Women’s rights INGO 
membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).  
Control variables: This analysis includes a number of control variables that 
prior research has identified as key determinants of gender occupational 
inequality. Integration into the global economy has influenced women’s work. 
Particularly, export promotion and trade liberalization, which involve increased 
labor market flexibility and openness to the world economy tend to generate an 
increase in female employment, especially in the tradable sector. This increase is 
partly due to the lower labor costs of women compared to men (Standing 1989; 
Stichter 1990; Fernandez-Kelly 1994), but also to more gender egalitarian 
practices of foreign-owned and export-oriented firms in terms of hiring 
preferences and the pay gap between sexes (Villarreal and Yu 2007). In order to 
account for the effects of economic openness, I include a measure of trade as 
percent of GDP (World Bank 2010). In order to account for countries’ different 
economic and political circumstances, I include a logged measure of GDP per 
capita (World Bank 2010) and level of democracy, measured in a 21 point scale (-
10 to 10) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). Women’s Human Capital is another 
important determinant of gender occupational inequality.  In order to capture 
women’s human capital, I include two measures: female labor force participation 
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rates (World Bank 2010) and female gross enrollment rates in higher education 
institutions (Schofer and Meyer 2005).  
 
Research Design 
The goal of my analysis is to determine if there are unique effects of specific 
policies on gender occupational inequality, which the overall level of legal 
protection of women’s rights may mask.  To this end, I first examine the 
distribution of the three state policies across countries and over-time and the 
relationship between particular policies and overall indices of legal protection of 
women’s economic rights and women’s rights based on all countries (N = 195). 
Then, I utilize panel regression analysis in which gender occupational inequality, 
measured in 2004, is regressed upon itself and other independent variables 
measured 20 years ago in 1984 for 35 countries. The unit of analysis is a country. 
This time period covers approximately the entire period examined in Chapter 1 
and accommodates the analysis’s focus on change in gender occupational 
inequality. The choice of countries included in the panel regression analysis is 
driven by availability of information, mostly the availability of employment 
information in both 1984 and 2004. Results from this analytical sample of 35 
countries may not be generalizable to all countries in the world. A separate 
analysis (not shown) suggests that countries not included in the regression 
analysis on average tend to be economically less developed and less democratic 
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than countries included in the regression analysis. Particularly, it should be noted 
that some countries with a high-level of population and a large volume of paid 
labor such as India and China are not included in the regression analysis. 
Nevertheless, the sample contains countries from various regions and levels of 
economic development. Although there is no apparent reason to expect the sample 
differs substantially from countries not included in the analysis in terms of sex 
occupational inequality and explanations for that inequality, further research is 
needed to know for sure. Thus, results from this analysis should still be taken with 
caution.  
Panel regression analysis provides estimates of the effects of the independent 
variables on change in the dependent variable. However, these estimates are likely 
to be conservative because of the high correlation between the dependent variable 
and the lagged dependent variables (Hannan and Quinn 1979). The panel 
regression analysis presented here is likely to yield especially conservative 
estimates since only 35 countries provide data that could be used in the 
calculation of the dependent variable in both 1984 and 2004. Accordingly, a 
significance level of .10 can be interpreted as fully significant (as opposed to 
marginally) (Pedhazur 1982). Operationalization of variables and descriptive 
statistics for the panel regression analysis can be found in Appendix 2-5. 
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Results 
Descriptive Information on State Policies 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Cumulative Number of Countries Having a Paid Maternity Leave 
Policy and an Equal Pay Policy, by Year, 1883-2009 
 
Countries vary in the timing of adoption and the content of policies for the 
three particular policies. Figure 2-2 presents world patterns in the adoption of 
state policies on paid maternity leave and equal pay policy. Information on the 
timing of the equal access policy is not available and not included in the figure. It 
shows the cumulative number of countries that passed the relevant legislation 
based on the policy information I gathered. For the paid maternity leave policy, 
countries in the world have steadily incorporated paid maternity leave into their 
legislation from five countries in 1883 to 177 countries in 2009. For the equal pay 
policy, it is clear that the late 1950s serve as a turning point. This period 
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corresponds to the years when the ILO Equal Remuneration treaty and the ILO 
Equal Treatment treaty were created at the global level. Until then less than 
twenty countries adopted equal pay laws but since then there has been a sharp and 
steady increase. By 1986, 110 countries in the world adopted a policy granting 
women’s economic rights to equal pay. By 2009, 138 countries had incorporated 
the principle of equal pay into their national legislation.         
 
 
Figure 2-3. Paid Maternity Leave Policies in 1984 and 2004 
 
Figure 2-3 breaks down maternity leave policies by benefit level in 1984 
and 2004. Out of 186 countries for which maternity leave policy information is 
available, forty countries did not offer any paid maternity leave in 1984 whereas 
in 2004 only twelve countries were left without a paid leave policy. This means 
that twenty-seven countries adopted a paid maternity leave policy between 1985 
and 2004. Regardless of when a country adopted the first maternity leave policy, 
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about half of these countries with a paid maternity leave policy offered less than 
14 weeks or less than 75% of normal wage, which is below the international 
standard (the 1952 ILO Maternity Protection Convention). Of those countries that 
had a paid maternity leave policy by 1984, forty countries offered 14-25 weeks of 
paid maternity leave with a 75% or higher wage replacement rate and twenty-six 
countries offered 26 weeks or more paid maternity leave at a 75% or higher wage 
replacement rate. Of those twenty-seven countries that adopted a paid maternity 
leave policy between 1985 and 2004, fourteen countries did not meet the 
international standard; twelve met the standard; and one surpassed the standard.   
 
Figure 2-4. Equal Pay Policies in 1984 and 2004 
 
Figure 2-4 shows equal pay policies in 1984 and 2004. Out of 166 
countries for which equal pay policy information is available, 107 countries had 
equal pay legislation in 1984 whereas by 2004 133 countries had one.   
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Figure 2-5. Equal Access Policies 
 
Figure 2-5 breaks down equal access policies by conditions under which 
women’s equal opportunity to be employed applies. Out of 136 countries for 
which maternity leave policy information is available, 93 countries have 
legislation that women should be able to choose to work during night hours where 
men have such choice. For the equal opportunity to be employed in any industries, 
67 out of 136 countries guarantee the right. Eighty out of 136 countries have 
legislation that prohibits restrictions or dismissal of pregnant women from work. 
The following three charts examine the relationship between these three 
types of policies and the overall index of women’s rights reflected in national 
laws. 
  
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
Working	  night	  hours	   Working	  any	  industries	   Working	  while	  pregnant	  
N
um
be
r	  o
f	  c
ou
nt
rie
s	  
Women	  having	  equal	  access	   RestricFons	  
 88 
 
 
Figure 2-6. Average Women’s Economic Rights and Overall Women’s Rights 
Score by the Level of Maternity Leave Benefits in 1984 and 2004 
 
Figure 2-6 shows the average women’s economic rights and overall women’s 
rights score by the level of maternity leave benefits in 1984 and 2004. The first 
two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women’s economic 
rights scores by maternity leave policies in 1984 and 2004, respectively. The last 
two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women’s rights scores 
by maternity leave policies in 1984 and 2004, respectively. Overall, the level of 
maternity leave benefits corresponds to the aggregated women’s economic rights 
and overall women’s rights scores in 1984 as well as in 2004. The mean scores for 
the economic rights and overall rights are the lowest for countries with no or low-
level paid maternity leave policies and the highest for countries with a high-level 
0	  
1	  
2	  
3	  
4	  
5	  
6	  
7	  
Legal	  protecFon	  of	  
women's	  economic	  
rights	  in	  1984	  
legal	  protecFon	  of	  
women's	  economic	  
rights	  in	  2004	  
Legal	  protecFon	  of	  
women's	  rights	  in	  
1984	  
Legal	  protecFon	  of	  
women's	  rights	  in	  
2004	  
Le
ga
l	  p
ro
te
c+
on
	  sc
or
e	  
No	  paid	  maternity	  leave	  
less	  than	  14	  weeks	  or	  less	  than	  75%	  wage	  replacement	  
14-­‐25	  weeks	  with	  75-­‐100%	  wage	  replacement	  
26	  weeks	  or	  more	  with	  75-­‐100%	  wage	  replacement	  
 89 
 
maternity leave policy. Interestingly, countries with less than 14 weeks of paid 
maternity leave benefits did not score any higher in their economic rights or 
overall rights scores than countries without paid maternity leave benefits. Figure 
2-6 suggests that countries with high-level maternity leave benefits also do better 
in other policies related to women’s employment rights and women’s rights in 
general. 
 
 
Figure 2-7. Average Women’s Economic Rights and Overall Women’s Rights 
Score by the Equal Pay Policy in 1984 and 2004 
 
Figure 2-7 shows the average women’s economic rights and overall 
women’s rights score by the equal pay legislation in 1984 and 2004. The first two 
sets of bars represent average state legal protection of women’s economic rights 
scores by presence or absence of equal pay legislation in 1984 and 2004, 
respectively. The last two sets of bars represent average state legal protection of 
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women’s rights scores by presence or absence of equal pay legislation in 1984 
and 2004, respectively. In 1984, having an equal pay policy corresponds to the 
aggregated women’s economic rights and overall women’s rights scores. 
However, in 2004 the gap narrows down making the two groups of countries 
indistinguishable. This could have resulted from the fact that by 2004 about 80% 
of countries have equal pay legislation whereas 64% of the countries had it in 
1984.  
 
Figure 2-8. Average Women’s Economic Rights and Overall Women’s Rights 
Score by the Equal Access Policy 
 
Figure 2-8 shows the average women’s economic rights and overall 
women’s rights score by the equal access legislation: women’s rights to work 
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during night hours, women’s rights to work in any industries, and women’s rights 
to work during pregnancy. From the figure, it is clear that equal access policies in 
terms of working during night hours and in any industries are associated with a 
higher index scores. However, equal access to work during pregnancy is not 
clearly associated with the two index scores. Overall, while varying in the 
mechanisms through which women’s employment is facilitated, all of the three 
policies contribute to the aggregated indices of state protection of women’s 
economic rights or the overall women’s rights.   
 
Results from Panel Regression 
 The results of panel regression analysis of the odds of women to be 
employed into managerial and professional occupations under conditions of 
various combinations of independent and control variables for a sample of 
countries (N = 35) are presented in Table 2-2. Descriptive information on the 
three state policies as well as women’s representation relative to men in 
managerial and professional occupations is presented in Appendix 2-6.  
Although specified in the methods section, female tertiary education 
enrollment rate, ratification of international treaties, women’s INGO membership, 
and a non-OECD country dummy had no significant effects. Therefore, I present 
results omitting these variables. Model 1 includes control variables and maternity 
leave policies. First, the odds of women employed in managerial and professional 
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occupations in 1984 are highly significant in predicting the odds 20 years later. 
This suggests that there are significant cross-national differences in the odds of 
women to be employed to managerial and professional occupations. By 
controlling the odds of women to be employed to managerial and professional 
occupations in 1984, the focus of this analysis is on changes from 1984 based on 
the level of independent variables in 1984. Control variables are largely 
insignificant partly due to a small sample size. However, these findings also 
suggest that a country’s economic and political circumstances as well as women’s 
human capital alone cannot explain gender occupational inequality. GDP per 
capita shows a significant, positive effect. Although not significant, the directions 
of coefficients are largely consistent with the prior literature. Democracy shows a 
negative sign. Women’s labor force participation shows a negative sign, 
consistent with prior literature, suggesting a winnowing effect, in which women 
are selectively recruited into the labor force in areas where women are already 
concentrated (Charles and Grusky 2004). This decreases women’s relative 
representation in professional and managerial occupations by increasing newly 
added women’s employment into non-professional and non-managerial 
occupations.  
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Table 2-2. Panel Regression Predicting Women’s Relative Access to High-status Positions (measured by log odds of 
women to men in high-status occupations) in 2004  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Controls 
       GDP per capita (logged) in 1984 0.157* 0.072  0.101  0.130+ 0.135+ 0.134* 0.088  
 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.063) (0.068) (0.071) (0.058) (0.056) 
Democracy in 1984 -0.024+ -0.02 -0.022 -0.024+ -0.024 -0.033* -0.032* 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) 
Female labor force participation in 1984 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
State Policies 
       High-level maternity leave in 1984 -0.299+ 
  
-0.302+ -0.290+ 
  
 
-0.164 
  
-0.159 -0.165 
  Mid-level maternity leave in 1984 (0.053) 
  
(0.025) (0.021) 
  
 
-0.135 
  
-0.132 -0.135 
  (reference: low-level or no maternity leave) 
       Equal pay law in 1984 
 
0.295+ 
 
0.309+ 0.294+ 
  
  
(0.164) 
 
(0.163) (0.172) 
  Equal access law 
  
0.027  0.029  0.026  
  
   
(0.148) (0.138) (0.141) 
  Overall legal protection of women's rights in 1984 
     
0.240* 
 
      
(0.088) 
 Overall legal protection of women's employment rights in 1984 
      
0.110** 
       
(0.035) 
Trade (%GDP) 
    
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003+ 
     
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log odds women's employment in high status occupations in 1984 0.585*** 0.568*** 0.574*** 0.564*** 0.574*** 0.606*** 0.563*** 
 
(0.123) (0.122) (0.134) (0.125) (0.131) (0.116) (0.113) 
Constant -1.008+ -0.583 -0.581 -1.042+ -1.045+ -1.001+ -0.691 
 
(0.565) (0.507) (0.537) (0.552) (0.562) (0.495) (0.459) 
        Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.625 0.621 0.580 0.671 0.673 0.681 0.704 
+p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests); standard errors in parentheses. 
Notes: The following variables had no significant effect in any of the models and were therefore omitted: female tertiary education enrollment, 
ratification of international treaties, women’s INGO membership, and a non-OECD country dummy. 
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 Model 1 also includes maternity leave benefits. Generous maternity leave 
benefits are associated with lower-level of women’s representation in managerial 
and professional occupations. However, mid-level maternity leave benefits are not 
different from low-level or no paid maternity benefits. The negative effect of 
high-level of maternity leave policy on women’s relative odds of attaining 
managerial or professional positions provides support for H2.  
Results suggest that highly generous maternity leave programs make sex 
occupational inequality deeper not because they are not enforced or nominal but 
because they have an actual impact on women’s employment conditions. Highly 
generous maternity leave programs may be successful to recruit women into paid 
employment. However, such increase in women’s employment through maternity 
leave programs tend not to happen in high-status positions, resulting in more sex 
occupational inequality. This could be explained in several ways. First, it may be 
because women who are qualified for high-paying jobs are already in the paid 
labor market whereas those women workers who otherwise would have not 
worked in a social context in which maternity leave programs are absent have 
more diverse human capital that does not necessarily meet required qualification 
in more prestigious jobs.  
Second, this also provides support that institutional arrangements which 
allow long absence from paid work encourage discrimination against women by 
employers. Paid maternity leaves pave the way for mothers back to the labor 
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market and strengthen women’s attachment to the labor market. However, they 
also remove mothers from workplaces for several months. Although paid 
maternity leave programs are presumed to enable women to remain in the labor 
force more continuously, a long absence from paid employment can be interpreted 
as an interference of work continuity at the firm level. This absence may make 
women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the negative perceptions 
that surround the reliability of women’s work (Hansen 1997). It discourages 
employers from hiring women to positions of authority and power. 
Cultural assumptions about women’s role as wives and mothers are also 
important. Under circumstances in which paid maternity leave programs operate 
without a change in cultural assumptions about men’s and women’s family 
responsibilities, married women will exercise their improved access to the labor 
market through maternity leave policies by seeking employment that allows them 
to combine their work and family responsibilities, such as flexible hours and part-
time work, as opposed to highly intensive managerial or professional jobs.   
Model 2 includes equal pay law. Contrary to maternity leave laws, equal 
pay laws are associated positively with women’s relative odds of attaining 
managerial and professional jobs, providing support for H3. It is notable that 
equal pay laws, while not providing substantial support to minimize conflicts 
arising from women’s dual roles as mothers and workers, do provide some 
substantial benefits (in wages) compared to men. These laws contribute to more 
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equal treatment of men and women within managerial and professional 
occupations, which in turn may contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms, 
further legitimating women’s access to and position in the labor market and their 
entrance into male-dominated sectors and occupational positions. 
 Model 3 includes equal access laws. Unlike equal pay laws, equal access 
laws are not associated with the odds of women relative to men having 
managerial and professional jobs. These laws, like equal pay laws, officially 
prohibit overt discrimination but without substantial benefits.  Although equal 
access legislation opens up employment opportunities for women by providing 
them with a legal justification for seeking entry into all sectors of the labor market 
and by discouraging employers from discriminating against women, the kind of 
industries and occupations that are most directly affected by equal access 
legislation (i.e., “dangerous” occupations and occupations involving night work) 
tend to be in non-managerial and non-professional positions.  
 Model 4 includes all three state policies. Policy effects are robust when 
considered separately or together. Both the negative effects of high-level of 
maternity leave policies and the positive effects of equal pay laws remain the 
same.8 Policy effects remain the same after trade is controlled for in model 5. 
Trade does not have significant association with the odds.9 
                                                
8 In a separate analysis not shown, I checked if the duration of policy implementation mattered. 
Cumulative years of equal pay laws enforced had a positive effect on the odds of women to be 
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 Models 6 and 7 include overall indexes of women’s employment rights 
laws and women’s rights laws. Even after controlling for countries’ economic and 
political circumstances, and global contexts, both women’s employment rights 
laws and women’s rights laws are significant and positive. This suggests that 
although different types of specific policies have different mechanisms to recruit 
women into high-status positions in the labor market, gender occupational 
inequality is, after all, part of larger gender inequality in a society.   
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
This analysis finds that state policies regarding women’s employment are 
highly relevant to gender occupational inequality. Two types of policies, paid 
maternity leave legislation and anti-discrimination legislation, have opposite 
effects. Maternity leave policies are associated with a greater inequality while 
anti-discrimination policies are associated with a less inequality.  
Nevertheless, results should not be seen as dichotomizing state policies 
into the good and the bad.  Gender relations and gender inequality are complex 
phenomena. Institutionalized systems assign people into different categories and 
organized social relations of inequality develop on the basis of that difference 
                                                                                                                                
employed in managerial and professional occupations. However, cumulative years of maternity 
leave laws or equal access laws did not have significant effects. 
9 I also checked if state policy effects are contingent on the global context variables (trade, 
ratification of international laws, and linkage to global women’s rights movement). None of the 
interaction terms between state policy and global context was significant. 
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(Ferree, Lorber, and Hess 1999). Like class or race relations, gender relations and 
inequality involve cultural beliefs and distributions of resources at the macro level, 
patterns of behavior, organizational practices, and identities at the individual level. 
Like class or race inequality, particular efforts to promote one dimension of 
gender equality may inhibit another dimension of gender equality. For example, 
generous maternity leave policies are effective in attracting more women into 
employment and also make women’s dual roles as mothers and workers more 
compatible. However, they also come with a codification of child-rearing 
responsibilities as women’s job and make women more “costly” to hire. Likewise, 
anti-discrimination laws also have certain limitations in terms of not being able to 
address societal allocation of family responsibilities to women, which is real in 
everyday lives. The very complexity of gender relations and gender inequality, 
however, also suggests that there are many potential fronts available to alter the 
relations. When particular policy efforts are put together, state interventions seem 
to be making the difference. Also, although state interventions might have their 
own limitations, after all, state policies (whether considered individually or 
collectively) are the only factor that has significant influence in this analysis on 
women’s relative odds of managerial and professional employment.     
I would like to address the limitations of this research. The sample of 35 
countries included in the panel regression analysis is driven by data availability 
and therefore results may not be generalizable to other countries in the world. 
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Nevertheless, the sample contains broad regional and economic representation. 
There is no reason to expect the sample differs dramatically from other countries 
with respect to gender occupational inequality and its relationship to state policies. 
However, I cannot know for sure until data are available for more countries. 
Due to the lack of time-varying detailed state policy data for most 
countries, this chapter incorporates state policy information with an assumption 
that once adopted a policy does not change in contents or level of benefits. This 
assumption is made not because I believe it is the case but because data are not 
available. Consequently, this analysis examines if the level (as opposed to 
subsequent changes) of state policies in 1984 is associated with the level of 
gender occupational inequality in 2004. By including the level of gender 
occupational inequality in 1984 in the equation, it enables us to focus on changes 
in gender occupational inequality from 1984 and 2004 and the influence of state 
policies at an earlier year on the dependent variable at a later year. Nevertheless, it 
is impossible to truly test causal relationships or to observe how simultaneous 
changes in the state policies impact gender occupational inequality. Despite these 
limitations, the richness of the data on state policies enables a more detailed 
analysis of particular state policies and their differing effects on gender 
occupational inequality than was possible with either welfare-type of policies (e.g., 
maternity leave policies) alone or highly aggregated state policy indexes.  
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The odds of women relative to men having higher-status positions are only 
part of gender occupational inequality. Future research should look at how state 
policies with different mechanisms to influence women’s employment are 
associated with other forms of gender occupational inequality such as wage and 
job security.  
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Chapter 3: 
Implications of Women’s Employment Context on Gender Prejudice 
Scholars have increasingly paid attention to the implications of increased 
women’s employment. They have discovered diverse dimensions of women’s 
employment, such as gender segregation (Chang 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 
2006), gender pay gaps, and gender disparities in high status occupations as well 
as in the low-paying manufacturing jobs (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006; see also 
Chapter 2). However, a potentially important implication of women’s 
employment for gender norms and institutions has been neglected by most 
research (for an exception, see e.g., Seguino 2007). Women’s material power is 
not the sole, or even the dominant, dimension of gender inequality. Gender norms 
and institutions constitute another important dimension. Although the entry of 
women into wage labor may have created an opportunity to address gender 
inequality, real change is possible only if the cultural/ideological dimensions of 
gender inequality are also addressed. It is thus critically important to understand 
how levels of women’s employment, and specifically women’s employment in 
good jobs, affect overall levels of gender bias in attitudes within societies.  
In addition, while the impact of globalization on women’s employment 
has flourished, research on the impact of globalization on attitudes around the 
world has been ignored. Previous studies have made great strides in explaining 
the relationship between personal characteristics and gender-biased outlooks (see 
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e.g., Lippa and Arad 1999). Some work has also considered variation in attitudes 
across countries (see e.g., Treas and Widmer 2000). In this chapter, I move 
beyond previous work to consider national contextual factors in greater detail and 
the impact of forces of globalization on gender beliefs.   
Based on multilevel analyses of data from 52 countries, this research finds 
that women tend to hold more gender equitable beliefs in a national context in 
which more women are participating in the paid labor market. Furthermore, 
national laws that better protect women’s rights to work have positive effects over 
and above individual characteristics. In addition, in countries where more women 
are in the labor force and have higher representation in high status positions, and 
where laws better protect women’s rights, the differences in beliefs between men 
and women are substantially smaller. As for women’s employment context, 
women’s equal employment laws have spillover effects in reducing gender 
prejudice in non-employment areas such as politics and higher education. This 
study finds limited support for the impact of global economic integration or 
linkage to global women’s rights movements on gender prejudice. They matter for 
gender prejudice only in higher education. 
 
Relevance of gender norms  
Scholars of gender stratification and gender relations emphasize structures 
producing inequality, and gender differences are seen to follow from these 
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structures. Such scholars criticize the tendency to conceptualize gender 
stratification as purely economic inequality.10 Non-material aspects of 
stratification must also be considered to explain who has the autonomy to enter 
the labor market in the first place or the power to set the terms under which 
certain skills are recognized, rewarded, or marginalized (Ciancanelli and Berch 
1987; Glazer 1993). The stratified gender structure that results in material 
inequality between men and women is supported by gender norms and institutions. 
In many countries, men are considered more capable of breadwinning and women 
specialize in homemaking and childrearing; this advantages men in the labor 
market (see e.g., Connelly, DeGraff, and Levison 1996).  Thus, cultural 
dimensions produce social climates that reinforce, or promote resistance to gender 
stratification in favor of men. As social norms and institutions instill the 
acceptance of gender gaps in everyday behavior, material dimensions of gender 
inequality are maintained without employing overt forms of power. 
However, gender norms do not merely sustain existing gender inequality. 
Rather material inequality and cultural dimensions of gender inequality constitute 
a dynamic cultural terrain wherein forms of domination may be contested, 
reworked, and even potentially transformed. This suggests the importance of 
                                                
10 Economic inequality refers to differences between men and women in economic resources such 
as income or wealth and on factors conceptualized in term of their relation to such economic 
resources as occupation, education, and prestige (Ferree and Hall 1996). 
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looking at both women’s position in the labor market and gender norms and 
institutions simultaneously while not assuming one determines the other. 
Notwithstanding the reciprocal relationship between women’s material 
power and gender norms, scholars have emphasized the importance of gender 
norms as a determinant of women’s employment but have given less attention to 
the potential effects of women’s employment and state policies on gender norms. 
When gender norms are considered in the context of women’s material power, 
studies tend to regard gender norms as given rather than as moving targets. These 
scholars emphasize that female workers’ worth (i.e., productivity and costs) and 
the nature of the job distribution in the labor market are culturally constructed and 
vary over time and place. For example, Morrison and Jutting (2005) find that 
social norms and institutions surrounding gender are the most important 
determinants of female employment. Similarly, according to scholars of gender 
segregation in the labor market (Reskin and Roos 1990; Anker 1998; Padavic and 
Reskin 2002), male and female workers in the labor market are matched to jobs 
based on their estimated productivity and costs. The process of matching closely 
corresponds to typical stereotypes of women and their supposed abilities and the 
characteristics of “female” jobs. However, there is little explanation as to how and 
why gender norms vary over time and places. 
In fact, there has been increasing acceptance of gender-egalitarian norms 
in most places in the world (see e.g., Thornton and Freedman 1979; Cherlin and 
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Walters 1981; Dex 1988; Lu and Mason 1988; Scott et al. 1996). Also, changes in 
gender norms have varied between countries and differences still exist between 
countries (Alwin et al. 1992; Scott et al. 1998; Knudsen and Waerness 2001). 
However, there have been little efforts made to explain these differences in a 
systemic way.    
Women’s participation in the paid labor market has increased considerably 
over the last several decades, and this increase challenges the traditional division 
of labor between men and women. Parallel to the increase of women’s 
employment, many countries have introduced or strengthened family-friendly 
employment. Does this development help to explain the cross-national and over-
time variations in gender norms? In this chapter, I address this question. This is 
not to deny simultaneous relationships between gender norms and women’s 
material power but to understand the implications of women’s employment and 
state policies for the non-material domain. 
While various changes in the characteristics of occupations and industries, 
market conditions, technological advances, and male and female workers’ 
characteristics may contribute to variations in gender norms, we do not know if 
and how women’s employment contexts influence prejudice against women. 
More importantly, as gender beliefs are about women’s and men’s relative rights 
to various resources, it is not surprising that men tend to adhere more strongly to 
gender inequitable beliefs. In addition to the overall level of gender prejudice in a 
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society, this gender gap in gender prejudice deserves attention because an 
increasing gender gap implies heightened conflicts between men and women, 
which might be hostile for women regardless of the overall level of prejudice. 
Would women’s employment context reduce or increase this gender gap? 
This chapter uses multi-level modeling techniques to uncover the 
importance of women’s employment context in explaining prejudice against 
women’s equal rights to economic activities, political activities, and educational 
access in 52 countries. More specifically, I argue that three sets of women’s 
employment contexts are particularly important: 1) women’s labor force 
participation; 2) women’s representation in high status occupations; and 3) 
national laws that protect women’s rights to equal employment. I focus on the 
implications of these three factors on 1) the level of prejudice, 2) the gender gap 
in prejudice, and 3) differences by individuals’ labor market status. This chapter 
also tests if women’s employment context influences prejudice against women in 
paid employment as well as non-employment areas including politics and 
education. 
 
Theory and Hypothesis 
The non-material aspect of gender inequality refers to a set of beliefs in 
the form of ideology, norms, stereotypes, and prejudice that serve to devalue 
women and reinforce the gender division of labor and men’s dominance. On the 
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one hand, women are excluded from various public spheres including economy 
and politics. On the other hand, what is considered as women’s role and women’s 
qualities, such as caring for the family, is devalued. As it is a system of shared 
beliefs, prejudice about women’s entitlement and qualifications outside the home 
exists not only among men but also among women. However, at the same time, 
men tend to adhere much more strongly to gender inequitable beliefs. To explain 
this gap, some argue that men are more likely to adhere to all forms of social 
dominance, including gender inequality, but also to other forms of social 
dominance by class, race, and ethnicity (Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 
2000). Others point out that the gender gap in gender prejudice should be 
understood by considering the differential implications that gender inequality has 
for men and women (Schmitt et al. 2003). Men tend to hold a higher level of 
patriarchal beliefs against women because those beliefs privilege men while 
disadvantaging women, and gender prejudice depends on specific social contexts. 
Moreover, within the same sex, specific forms of gender prejudice have different 
implications to members of different social groups. Women’s interests are not 
always the same. Being able to participate in the formal economy and politics is 
one thing and making caring work more valuable is another thing. Housewives’ 
beliefs about women’s work might be very different from those of women in paid 
employment.    
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Women’s employment contexts and gender prejudice: Quantity 
Gender prejudice is not only a mechanism to maintain gender inequality 
but it is also an important target through which to leverage changes for greater 
gender equality. One way to influence gender prejudice is through women’s 
access to paid employment. Some scholars argue that industrialization and 
economic growth first bring increased female labor force participation and more 
gender egalitarian norms and institutions (Dollar and Gatti 1999; World Bank 
2001; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Iverson and Rosenbluth 2006). Female labor 
force participation is particularly closely related to values and norms about the 
correct gender division of labor (Clark 1991).  Women’s increased access to jobs 
raise women’s income absolutely and indirectly, which in turn increases their 
bargaining power to negotiate gender roles and division of labor within the 
household. Increased women’s labor force participation may shift gender norms 
in more egalitarian directions because it is families’ rational choice to raise 
daughters in more gender-neutral ways to assist them in securing a stable 
livelihood. Thus, I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Female labor force participation will be negatively associated with 
gender prejudice. 
Hypothesis 2: Female labor force participation will be negatively associated with 
gender gap in gender prejudice.  
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Women’s employment contexts and gender prejudice: Quality 
However, there is reason to believe that increased female labor force 
participation alone is not sufficient to bring changes in gender prejudice. Some 
scholars point out that when more women are employed, they are mostly 
segregated into low-paying jobs (Semyonov 1980; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988; 
Clark 1991). The gender pay gap persists despite increased female labor force 
participation. There is empirical evidence that recent increase in the quantity of 
women’s employment has some deleterious effect on women’s income 
opportunities and conditions of work (Benería 2003; Petersen 2003; Seguino 
2006). There is, for example, an increased use of home workers, primarily women 
(Hsiung 1996; Prügl 1999; Petersen 2003) as a response to greater competitive 
pressures on firms to reduce costs. The lower wages paid to home workers and the 
reduction in overhead costs, while beneficial to firms, reinforces gender norms 
and stereotypes of women whose work is linked to the home and their role as 
caretakers, perpetuating women’s designation as secondary wage earners. This 
type of work limits women’s ability to bargain in the household for better 
distribution of work and labor. These factors suggest that as long as the majority 
of women are employed in marginalized, traditionally female positions, female 
labor force participation alone may not promote a movement to reduce gender 
prejudice. If this is the case, Hypothesis 1 would not hold. In addition, it can 
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widen the gender gap in gender prejudice. As more women enter into the paid 
labor market, women with double duties as workers and caretakers feel more need 
to change the patriarchal breadwinner model. Men may not recognize the value of 
women’s work. In this case, Hypothesis 2 will not hold.    
 
Then, women’s entrance into high status positions may have greater impact on 
gender prejudice because it conveys a set of more women friendly social 
definitions. Women’s representation in managerial or administrative positions can 
act as a leverage to change gender prejudice. Thus, I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Women’s share in high status positions will be negatively 
associated with gender prejudice. 
Hypothesis 4: Women’s share in high status positions will be negatively 
associated with gender gap in gender prejudice.  
 
However, women’s employment in high status positions could lead to a backlash 
in men’s attitudes calling for women’s return to their patriarchal role as caretakers 
(Fleck 1998). If that is the case, Hypotheses 4 will not hold. 
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Women’s employment contexts and gender prejudice: Law  
In addition to the quantity and quality of women’s employment, a 
country’s legal protection of women’s rights to work constitutes another 
important dimension of women’s work. Various laws and policies ensure 
women’s economic rights including equal pay for equal work, free choice of 
profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative’s 
consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband or 
male relative’s consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, job security 
(including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-discrimination by 
employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace, the right 
to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as dangerous, and the 
right to work in the military and the police force.  
These laws not only help more women participate in the labor force but 
also contribute to a cultural shift in gender norms further legitimating women’s 
access to and position in the labor market and their entrance into male-dominated 
sectors and occupational positions (Goldin 1990). These laws facilitate women’s 
employment by altering the opportunity structure for women regarding 
participation in paid work. These laws intend to reconcile women’s work and 
family obligations. As the cost for working outside the home is decreasing and as 
the benefits of it is increasing, the more women enter the labor force and express 
views toward more egalitarian gender roles.  
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In addition, these laws may have more direct influence on gender 
prejudice. These laws constitute normative orders which influence and structure 
world views and views regarding the appropriate role of women in society. More 
gender-egalitarian employment laws may strengthen the degree to which 
participation of women in the paid labor market on equal terms with men is 
considered something to be desired. Also, official legal rights constitute women 
as legitimate workers with equal rights and as actors who are legitimately 
mobilized and empowered to mobilize others. Indeed, it has been pointed out that 
one of the key mechanisms through which laws protecting women’s economic 
rights are encouraging women’s labor force participation is by encouraging more 
gender egalitarian attitudes on the ground. Of course, I allow for the possibility of 
a country’s existing policies to reflect overall gender prejudice. What is important 
is the association between the two. Thus, I expect: 
 
Hypothesis 5: State legal protection of women’s economic rights will be 
negatively associated with gender prejudice. 
Hypothesis 6: State legal protection of women’s economic rights will be 
negatively associated with gender gap in gender prejudice.  
 
However, others are doubtful if laws are effective in challenging existing 
gender norms and prejudice. Organizational research shows that policies and 
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actual practices or outcomes are sometimes disconnected from each other, in a 
process known as “decoupling” (Orton and Weick 1990; Weick 1976). 
Constitutional equal rights of men and women in the labor market can and do 
coexist with institutionalized male privilege (Parpart and Staudt 1989). 
Decoupling policy and implementation, legislation and action, allows countries to 
adopt progressive programs and structures and at the same time to continue male 
privilege on the ground (Meyer et al. 1997). Furthermore, it has been argued that 
if laws are effective in increasing women’s labor force participation, it is through 
maintaining a gendered division of labor without changing it. While allowed by 
law to pursue economic activities, women tend to exercise their improved access 
to the labor market by seeking employment that allows them to combine their 
work and family responsibilities such as flexible hours and part-time work. Jobs 
in sectors traditionally associated with females, such as sales and service sectors, 
may still be preferred by women precisely because gender biased norms about 
care work do not change (Lee and Hirata 2001). These laws can also exacerbate 
negative perceptions about women’s qualification as workers. For example, the 
existence of maternity leave policies may render employers more reluctant to hire 
female workers because they are potentially more costly, especially if employers 
bear the cost of maternity leave rather than the state (Anker 1998; Boserup 1970; 
Safa 1983). Kaar (2000) finds that as maternity leave benefits are not given to 
men, they make women less competitive in the workplace and exacerbate the 
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negative perceptions that surround the reliability of women’s work. These laws 
can also backfire by increasing men’s concern about reverse discrimination, 
increasing tensions between men and women. In this case, Hypotheses 5-6 will 
not hold. 
 
Globalization: Trade 
In addition to women’s employment contexts, global economic integration 
and global women’s rights have influenced many aspects of gender relations. 
Scholars of economic globalization have considered how trade, foreign direct 
investment, and the spread of economic neoliberalism affect women’s work (e.g., 
Semyonov and Shenhav 1988). One group of scholars interested in the impact of 
global economic integration, particularly in the labor market, highlight the direct, 
positive impact of economic globalization on female workers as well as on the 
reduction of gender discrimination (Fields 1985; Krueger 1983; Lim 1990; Wood 
1990, 1994). It is argued that participation in the global economy leads to 
economic growth and increased opportunities in paid employment for women, 
and this economic growth in turn increases women’s labor force participation rate 
and reduces gender segregation, gender gap in earnings, and gender 
discriminatory norms and institutions, thus, empowering women in family and 
society (Fields 1985; Krueger 1983; Lim 1990; Wood 1990, 1994). These 
scholars contend not only that in an export-orientated economy the increased 
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female labor force participation induced by economic globalization eventually 
upgrades women to better-paying, high status, jobs, but also that gender norms 
and institutions become more gender egalitarian on the grounds that gender based 
discrimination is costly by wasting women’s human capital (Alder and Izraeli 
1994; Gothaskar 1995; Sim and Yong 1995). 
Another group of globalization scholars oppose the above perspective, 
pointing out that the key mechanism of global economic integration lies in the 
international division of labor and the feminization of the low-paying 
manufacturing sector (Kabeer 2004; Meyer 2006). Much of the increase in the 
volume of trade since 1970 is in manufacturing. Manufactured items increased 
from 59 percent of world merchandise exports in 1984 to 74 percent in 1995 
(World Bank 1995). Developing countries’ share of manufactures in their exports 
tripled between 1970 and 1990 from 20 percent to 60 percent (World Bank 1995). 
Based on this trend, these scholars argue that technological changes allowed for 
the fragmentation of production processes, international wage differentials 
encouraged the relocation of labor-intensive production from highly paid enclaves 
of organized labor in the North to low-paid, less well organized, and largely 
female labor forces in the South. As women in developing countries occupy the 
worst jobs of the global capitalist system, increased female labor force 
participation does not lead to empowerment of women. If women are more 
segregated in the lowest wage jobs, it may not facilitate a revision of gender 
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norms in favor of women, as women’s under-employment may be compatible 
with dominant gender norms, male breadwinner norms, and compatible 
institutions. Many scholars find evidence that the current economic globalization 
has indeed had a deleterious effect on women’s income opportunities and 
conditions of work in both developed and developing countries (Peterson 2003; 
Seguino 2006). More importantly, it has been pointed out that economic crises, 
which many developing countries have been experiencing, may provoke a return 
to norms and prejudice that undermine gender equality. In supporting this 
possibility, scholars find that economic crisis or structural adjustment programs, 
which lead to economic stagnation and cuts in public expenditures on health, 
education, and food subsidies, have negatively affected women’s well-being 
(Elson 2002). Women bear more burdens when the role of the state is reduced and 
macroeconomic volatility is heightened. Periods of economic crisis may in fact 
exacerbate gender tensions by reducing men’s income-generating possibilities, 
undermining masculine “male breadwinner” norms. Women who take on paid 
employment during economic crises feel even more pressure to accede to male-
dominant norms in the household as a way to assuage men’s perceptions of their 
diminished status in the workplace (Kabeer 2000). Larrain (1999) finds that 
during implementation of structural adjustment programs, women in Latin 
America experienced increases in domestic violence due to the loss of male 
income and status associated with structural adjustment programs. 
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Globalization: Women’s Rights 
Whereas scholars of economic globalization have focused on the impact of 
global economic integration on economic aspects of gender inequality in the labor 
market, globalization as a socio-cultural process and the variety of responses to it 
locally have been widely discussed in recent literature. Neo-institutionalist 
scholars emphasize that some of the key institutional changes concerning 
women’s work and family responsibilities are rooted in global cultural processes 
(see e.g., Berkovitch 1999). These scholars see as most important the diffusion of 
global cultural ideas about women and work (Berkovitch 1999). Berkovitch (1999) 
has shown that working through the world polity, the international women’s 
movement has actively promoted a discourse of gender inclusion, ensuring that 
norms about female rights, equality, and participation in economies are 
transmitted to nation-states. From 1885 to 1970, Women’s International Non-
governmental Organizations (women’s INGOs) were founded steadily except for 
breaks during wartime. But the number of WINGOs exploded in the 1970s, 
changing from steady to exponential growth (Berkovitch 1999).  
These scholars argue that it is the strength of and country linkage to the 
world polity in the area of women’s rights that makes a real difference. According 
to this perspective, both countries’ laws and gender beliefs on the ground are seen 
as the result of "institutional effects" linked to the structure, penetration, and 
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persistence of global civil society in a particular issue area (Schofer and Hironaka 
2005). Case studies provide support for this view. For example, Berkovitch (1994) 
shows, through statistical analysis, that indeed work family policies are not 
internally generated but are externally driven. She points out that changes in states’ 
legislation can be accounted for by considering world level events (i.e., discourse 
networks and organizations) and states’ linkages to world polity rather than the 
economic and political characteristics of the individual states. Similarly, there is 
reason to believe that gender prejudice on the ground is more directly linked to 
the world polity rather than state laws. Benavot and Resnick (2006) cite countries 
without compulsory education laws that have high enrollment rates and, vice 
versa, countries with such laws where enrollment rates are very low (see also 
Meyer 2004). They infer that compulsory attendance laws “are only indirectly 
related to the actual (and future) expansion of a country’s education system (13).”  
 
Data and Measures 
My analysis of the impact of women’s employment context on gender 
prejudice relies on data from several sources at the individual and country levels. 
Individual-level data on gender prejudice as well as important individual 
characteristics such as gender, income, education, age, marital status, and religion 
come from the World Values Surveys (WVS) rounds 3–5, conducted in the 1994-
1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2007 waves, respectively. WVS provides information 
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on values regarding various social, cultural, political, and economic issues as well 
as basic demographic information. This particular survey spans five waves, 
conducted over a 26 year period from 1981 to 2007. The first wave (1981-1984) 
only covered 22 countries, the second (1990-1993) 42 countries, the third (1994-
1999) 54 countries, the fourth (1999-2004) 60 countries, and the fifth (2005-2007) 
52 countries. All together, more than 97 countries and 300,000 individuals are 
included. The WVS data are collected through face-to-face interviews and used 
stratified multistage random probability sampling to obtain representative national 
samples as well as cluster sampling, multistage sampling utilizing the Kish-grid 
method, purposive sampling, and quota sampling (Inglehart et al. 2004).  
 
Dependent variables  
The dependent variables of this study capture gender prejudice at the individual 
level. There are three questions asked in most countries in all three waves:  
• “When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women” 
(1=agree, 2=disagree, 3= neither) 
• “Men make better political leaders than women” (1=agree strongly , 
2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree) 
• “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl” 
(1=agree strongly , 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree).   
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The first question directly deals with women’s relative rights to have a paid job 
while the other two questions deal with women’s relative qualities and rights in 
politics and higher education. For each question, I construct a dichotomous 
measure in which respondents who strongly agree or agree with the statement are 
assigned with a score 1 while those who strongly disagree, disagree, or neither 
agree nor disagree with the statement are assigned with a score 0.  
I select only those countries/waves for which valid scores on all dependent 
and independent variables are available. These selections result in a dataset of 
95,677 individuals from 54 countries (81 country/waves because some of the 
countries included in the analysis were surveys in multiple waves) and the three 
waves (3-5) for gender prejudice in employment, 91,389 individuals from 80 
country/waves in 54 countries for gender prejudice in politics, 93,345 individuals 
from 80 country/waves in 54 countries for gender prejudice in education. Table 3-
1 lists the percentage that agreed with each of the three statements, providing an 
idea of the distribution of these variables across countries and waves by gender. 
While the overall pattern is quite complex, some interesting trends are 
present. It is easily seen that men adhere more strongly to gender prejudice than 
women. However, the size of the gender gap varies by country and over time. In 
most cases, temporal changes in responses to these questions indicate a decline of 
patriarchal ideas.  
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Table 3-1. Descriptive Statistics of Gender Prejudice by Country and Gender (% 
in agreement) 
    When Job scarce, men 
have more rights to job. 
  Men Make Better 
Political Leaders than 
Women. 
  A University Education is 
More Important for a Boy 
than for a Girl. 
Country   1994-
1999 
1999-
2004 
2005-
2007 
  1994-
1999 
1999-
2004 
2005-
2007 
  1994-
1999 
1999-
2004 
2005-
2007 
             Algeria Men  78.3    80.6    39.7  
Women  56.0    56.1    16.2  
Argentina Men  28.4    37.4    17.8  
Women  22.3    25.7    12.5  
Australia Men 28.5  16.8  31.4  33.7  15.3  11.2 
Women 24.5  8.2  18.1  15.0  7.4  3.7 
Bangladesh Men 67.9 76.7   60.1 71.7   47.6 66.5  
Women 45.6 59.7   51.5 65.5   33.1 60.2  
Brazil Men   25.5    40.2    15.5 
Women   19.2    24.7    8.5 
Bulgaria Men   32.6    62.4    14.7 
Women   16.6    35.0    8.4 
Canada Men  14.5 13.6   24.5 19.2   7.2 7.1 
Women  16.4 12.5   15.5 12.9   4.4 2.8 
Chile Men 34.1 32.0 31.6  49.4 50.0 57.2  24.9 38.8 36.3 
Women 26.2 20.1 24.4  37.6 30.7 33.5  24.0 25.0 22.0 
Colombia Men 30.3    38.5    13.0   
Women 28.0    26.4    9.4   
Cyprus Men   37.1    45.5    13.2 
Women   29.7    25.7    6.8 
Czech Republic Men 31.7    61.2    38.3   
Women 30.8    45.2    31.1   
Dominican 
Republic 
Men 23.9    56.3    22.4   
Women 10.2    32.3    16.2   
El Salvador Men 27.3    36.8    12.3   
Women 25.4    36.8    16.3   
Estonia Men 39.6    76.6    41.3   
Women 30.3    63.1    28.8   
Finland Men 16.5  13.3  25.6  22.8  14.1  7.8 
Women 12.4  8.1  16.0  15.1  13.9  6.6 
France Men   17.3    25.5    8.6 
Women   19.8    18.7    4.9 
Germany Men 23.5  21.6  18.4  27.7  12.5  22.8 
Women 22.6  18.1  12.8  14.1  9.8  12.2 
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Indonesia Men  60.8 66.0   69.8 70.0   19.5 21.4 
Women  44.4 42.0   55.2 49.3   15.3 17.6 
Iran Men  79.3 74.8   73.8 85.0   41.6 63.1 
Women  64.1 63.6   58.5 71.5   32.5 46.7 
Italy Men   25.2    25.0    8.5 
Women   20.3    10.9    6.4 
Japan Men  33.0 29.2   48.5 52.0   25.3 30.1 
Women  31.9 26.8   39.2 36.8   20.0 19.6 
South Korea Men  44.4 40.6   58.4 62.9   28.6 34.6 
Women  33.1 28.1   38.0 46.4   19.2 15.4 
Kyrgyzstan Men  56.7    64.8    35.0  
Women  44.0    50.9    21.3  
Latvia Men 33.4    70.9    29.5   
Women 19.6    61.4    25.4   
Lithuania Men 42.7    65.3    26.2   
Women 22.7    47.0    20.3   
Malaysia Men   59.7    77.5    56.1 
Women   38.5    59.2    35.6 
Mexico Men 26.7 32.3 25.9  48.5 42.5 31.1  35.1 31.7 25.5 
Women 20.7 26.7 21.6  36.5 33.7 22.5  29.5 30.0 22.1 
Moldova Men  47.3 42.4   75.1 60.5   29.3 21.5 
Women  43.6 34.2   50.9 45.3   20.4 13.0 
Morocco Men  84.0 66.0   80.1 75.3   31.0 40.8 
Women  64.8 40.4   62.2 48.0   19.3 20.8 
Netherlands Men   11.8    18.7    5.0 
Women   13.5    13.9    4.6 
New Zealand Men 12.7    23.3    11.2   
Women 13.1    13.0    4.9   
Norway Men 14.3    15.5    10.7   
Women 14.1    15.7    11.8   
Pakistan Men  71.4    53.2    29.2  
Women  63.7    46.8    16.3  
Peru Men 25.1 17.8   41.6 31.2   32.7 25.2  
Women 15.1 12.4   18.1 16.0   23.2 16.0  
Philippines Men  70.7    67.1    38.8  
Women  64.0    59.0    35.1  
Poland Men   30.6    49.6    19.0 
Women   31.3    39.7    12.3 
Romania Men 47.5  36.7  72.0  62.4  37.1  23.8 
Women 29.8  35.7  61.4  49.3  28.8  15.2 
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Russian 
Federation 
Men   39.4    73.7    33.4 
Women   31.7    51.1    21.5 
Saudi Arabia Men  77.3    81.6    67.2  
Women  65.1    67.2    55.4  
Slovakia Men 41.7    72.4    41.2   
Women 39.3    61.8    35.9   
Vietnam Men  54.0    58.8    22.0  
Women  41.7    54.5    26.2  
Slovenia Men   12.9    32.5    13.5 
Women   14.5    28.2    9.8 
South Africa Men   47.4    62.2    22.6 
Women   24.8    41.1    17.5 
Spain Men 27.7 17.0 22.1  33.6 23.7 25.4  20.4 16.2 14.7 
Women 29.4 19.9 14.6  20.5 16.6 17.1  16.6 12.7 12.9 
Sweden Men 7.2 2.8 1.9  17.1 18.1 8.0  9.2 7.0 1.5 
Women 7.5 1.7 2.0  15.3 19.1 8.4  7.8 6.1 0.9 
Switzerland Men 30.4  17.5    12.8    11.8 
Women 27.3  25.0    16.2    6.0 
Thailand Men   34.6    57.2    31.2 
Women   29.6    45.1    23.1 
Turkey Men 66.3 64.9 60.0  57.9 65.5 66.5  31.6 30.4 22.3 
Women 54.8 52.7 47.1  59.0 55.9 54.4  22.8 21.9 16.5 
Ukraine Men   38.9    70.5    42.3 
Women   26.8    41.4    28.8 
Egypt Men  93.4    90.4    39.5  
Women  86.7    79.0    21.7  
United Kingdom Men   19.0    26.9    9.1 
Women   12.8    14.1    5.0 
United States Men 23.3 11.3   39.4 27.4   21.5 7.6  
Women 19.0 8.5   27.2 17.4   13.9 7.0  
Uruguay Men 31.8  25.0  42.0  25.5  13.0  7.7 
Women 21.3  19.3  32.0  16.3  9.8  6.0 
Venezuela Men 34.4 36.9   47.3 48.7   22.5 17.2  
Women 30.6 26.8     34.4 32.2     18.7 13.5   
 
For example, the percentage of people who agree with the statement, “When jobs 
are scarce, men have more right to a job than women,” decreases in most 
countries for both men and women. However, some Asian and Latin American 
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countries show a reverse trend. In Bangladesh and Mexico, both women’s and 
men’s agreement rose.  
One of the commonalities among these countries is that they went through 
economic crises during the 90’s; many of them underwent structural adjustment 
programs offered by multilateral neoliberal organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and unemployment rose sharply. Apparently, 
economic crisis has the potential to foster the resurgence of patriarchal norms. 
The gender gap in response is interesting. In Indonesia and Venezuela, the 
percentage of women who agree with the statement significantly decreased while 
that of men increased sharply. In contrast, in Chile, the percentage of women who 
agree with the statement increased while that of men stayed the same or decreased. 
The remaining two questions in Table 3-1 refer to gender prejudice in politics and 
higher education. While the overall pattern is again rather complex, the gender 
gap is also apparent in these questions.  
 
 
Independent variables 
Individual-level Variables: At the individual-level, I introduce respondents’ 
age, gender, household income, education, labor market status, marital status, and 
religion (See Appendix 3-1 for descriptive statistics for the main variables). All 
individual-level variables are from the WVS. Age is coded as the actual age of a 
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person in years. Research shows that older people and men tend to be more 
prejudicial (Quillian 1995). The WVS measures income using a 1 to 10 scale; and 
education with a 1 (no formal education or incomplete primary school education) 
to 8 (university level education with a degree) scale. Being religious tends to be 
associated with more traditional and patriarchal values (Hertel and Hughes 1987; 
Peek, Lowe, and Williams 1991; Lehrer 1995; Sherkat 2000). Religion (religious 
= 1; non-religious = 0) is included as a dichotomous variable. In order to capture 
respondents’ labor market status, part-time employed, self-employed, labor 
market outsiders (further divided into retired, student, and housewife), and 
unemployed are included as dichotomous variables with full-time employed as the 
reference category.   
Female Labor Force Participation: In order to consider the extent to 
which increased women’s share in the labor force is associated with women’s 
presence in managerial/administrative occupations, I include female share of the 
total labor force. This measure comes from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators (2010). 
Percent Women of Managerial/Administrative occupations: To represent 
women’s employment in high-status occupations, I use a measure of women’s 
representation in managerial/administrative occupations. These occupations 
include legislators and senior government officials, and corporate managers 
(directors and chief executives, production and operations department managers, 
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and other department managers). This occupational category is widely used by 
scholars of gender occupational inequality to indicate the most powerful and 
prestigious occupations (see e.g., Semyonov 1980; Charles 1992; Chang 2004). 
Data for female employment in these occupations come from the ILO 
LABORSTA, which provides detailed, comparable, occupational data from the 
early 1980s. The dataset comprises, for each country-year, a set of occupational 
categories and the number of women and men in each category. The full set 
includes data for more than 100 countries. Occupations are matched to a variety 
of national or international schemes. In order to maximize comparability of 
occupational classifications, I use occupational data based on two comparable 
international occupational classification schemes ISCO-68 or ISCO-88. The two 
occupational classification schemes are highly comparable with respect to sub-
occupations in each occupational group, based on International Occupational 
Prestige Scale, International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, and 
class categories (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). Furthermore, there is 
considerable similarity between the two international occupational schemes and 
across countries in their actual occupations and the extent of their occupational 
hierarchies (Stewart et al. 1980; Grusky and VanRompaey 1992; Blackburn, 
Jarman, and Brooks 2000). With this data, I utilize percent women of total 
managerial/administrative workers. This measure specifically indicates the extent 
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of disparities between women and men within managerial occupations and is not 
confounded by the distribution of occupations in societies.  
State Legal Protection of Women’s Economic Rights: State policies and 
structures concerning women’s rights are measured by an index representing the 
degree to which women’s economic rights are protected in national laws. Data are 
from the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Database, which covers 195 
countries annually from 1981-2008 providing information on the extent to which 
women’s economic rights are reflected in national laws and enforced by the 
government. Women’s economic rights include equal pay for equal work, free 
choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male 
relative’s consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a 
husband or male relative’s consent, equality of hiring and promotion practices, 
job security (including maternity leave and unemployment benefits), non-
discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the 
workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as 
dangerous, the right to work in the military and the police force. This measure is a 
4 point scale (ranging from 0 to 3).  
Trade: I include, as a measure of economic globalization, trade openness 
(exports as percent of GDP + imports as percent of GDP). Data on trade openness 
come from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI 2010).  
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Women’s Rights INGOs: While international laws represent a formalized 
commitment, the diffusion of policies across countries requires continuous 
support from the global civil society. Transnational networks and international 
nongovernmental organizations transmit cultural models embodied in 
international laws to countries and communities (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and 
Thomas 1999; see also Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the case of human rights, clear 
evidence suggests that ties to global human rights social movement networks 
affect the adoption and implementation of national laws and structures 
(Finnemore 1996; Frank et al. 2000; Boyle 2001; Boyle and Kim 2009; Kim and 
Boyle 2012). Thus, I include ties to the global women’s rights regime measured 
by memberships in international women’s rights NGOs. Women’s rights INGO 
membership data come from Paxton et al. (2006).  
GDP per capita: I include as a control variable the GDP per capita, 
measured with constant US dollars (WDI 2010). Inglehart and his colleagues have 
rigorously examined the links between economic development and cultural shifts, 
including changes in gender attitudes, defining culture as “the social norms, 
beliefs, and values existing in any society, which in turn rest on levels of societal 
modernization and religious traditions” (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 8). 
Acknowledging that the relationship between cultural gender values and the 
economic, social, and political positions of men and women in a society is 
complex and deeply interconnected, Inglehart and Norris (2003) posit 
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nevertheless that economic development level and political system are most 
significant determinants of gender values. 
Democracy: Democracies facilitate a social environment in which people 
in diverse social locations interact with each other as "equals." As a result, the 
persistence and quality of democracy increases the level of civic culture that could 
affect gender equality beliefs (Muller and Seligson 1994). To test this, I add the 
level of democracy measured by Polity score, which is a 21 point scale raining 
from -10 to +10, as a control (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). 
Time: I add wave into the models. This allows me to control if any of the 
effects in the models are due to changes in the historical context. In addition, this 
variable will also help assess if gender prejudice increased during the period of 
1994-2007. 
 
Method 
Since I hypothesize individual and contextual level effects, as well as 
cross-level interaction effects, I utilize multilevel analysis techniques (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Because the data consist of 
repeated cross-sectional surveys, I distinguish three levels (cf. Duncan, Jones and 
Moon 1996; Subramanian, Jones, and Duncan 2003). Multi-level models allow 
accounting for the nature of the relationship between individual and country-level 
factors and simultaneous control for individual and contextual level variables 
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(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). In the dataset, both individual-level and country-
level variables vary across time and country. In my models, given that individuals 
are nested in country-years and country-years are nested in countries, I adopt 
three-level models for estimation: level 1 is the lowest level and consists of the 
individual respondents; level 2 comprises the survey waves within countries, and 
level 3 is composed of the countries.  
Using dummy variables in Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to assess the 
impact of national-level contextual variables would result in under-estimation of 
the standard errors of the coefficients. OLS assumes that individual level errors 
are uncorrelated with others in a given country, which causes a Type I error 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Given that the dependent variables are binary, I 
estimate a hierarchical generalized linear model that employs a logit link. All 
individual-level, non-dummy variables are centered on the country/wave mean.  
As the level-1 model shows below, the individual belief about men’s and 
women’s relative rights and equality in job, politics, and education, respectively, 
depends on the intercept specific to the country-wave, π 0jk, country-wave 
specific factors (π 1jk, π 2jk, π 3jk, π 4jk, π 5jk) and residual eijk. 
 
Gender Prejudice ijk =  π0jk + π1jk Ageijk + π2jk Menijk  + π3jk Incomeijk   + π4jk 
Educationijk  +  π5jk Marriedijk  + π6jk Separated, divorced, or widowedijk  + π7jk 
Having no childijk   + π8jk Number of childrenijk  + π9jk Religiousijk  + π10jk Part-time 
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employedijk + π11jk Self employedijk + π12jk Retiredijk + π13jk Studentijk + π14jk 
Housewifeijk + π15jk Unemployedijk  + eijk 
 
I add the country-wave covariate to the model at Level-2: 
 
π0jk  =  β00k + β01k GDPpercapitajk + β02k Democracyjk + β03k Tradejk + β04k 
WINGOjk + β05k FLFPjk + β06k Women in MAjk + β07k Lawjk +  β08k W4jk + β09k 
W5jk + r0jk 
 
Given that repeated cross-sectional surveys are nested within countries, I specify 
level-3 as: 
 
β00k = γ000 + u00k 
 
In this 3-level modeling, the country-specific intercepts depend on the overall 
fixed effect, γ000, and random effect u00k associated with the country K. 
In order to test my hypothesis on the relationship between women’s 
employment context and gender gap. I include the following cross-level 
interaction variables to the model in which gender gap in attitude is specified as a 
function of female labor force participation, women’s share of managerial and 
administrative occupations, or state legal protection of women’s economic rights: 
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π2jk = β20k + β21k FLFP +  r02k (Model 2)  
π2jk = β20k + β21k Women in MA +  r02k (Model 3)  
π2jk = β20k + β21k Law +  r02k (Model 4)  
 
Results 
Table 3-2 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as odds ratios 
for four models of gender prejudice regarding job opportunities. The first model 
considers both individual-level and country/wave-level effects. Age has strong 
positive effects on gender prejudice in job opportunities; older people have more 
prejudice. Men are 1.74 times more likely to express gender prejudice about job 
opportunities. Income and education both have negative effects on gender 
prejudice in job opportunities. An increase of a standard deviation of income and 
education are associated with a decrease in holding a prejudicial belief by 5% and 
12%, respectively. Married people are 10% more likely to be prejudicial 
compared to people never married. There is no significant difference between 
separated, divorced, or widowed and never married. There is not a significant 
difference between parents and non-parents. However, each increase in the 
number of children living with respondents increases the likelihood of holding a 
gender prejudice in employment opportunities by 3%. Religious people are 28% 
more likely to hold gender prejudice than non-religious people.  
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Table 3-2. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for “When Jobs Are Scarce, 
Men Have More Right to a Job than Women.” 
  Model 1 Odds  Model 2 Odds  Model 3 Odds  Model 4 Odds 
Individual-level Variables 
(Level-1) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Age 0.007*** 1.007  0.007*** 1.007  0.007*** 1.007  0.007*** 1.007 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 Men 0.556*** 1.744  0.938*** 2.556  0.845*** 2.328  0.799*** 2.224 
 (0.046) 
 
 (0.142) 
 
 (0.079) 
 
 (0.081) 
 Income -0.048*** 0.953  -0.047*** 0.954  -0.047*** 0.954  -0.047*** 0.954 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.009) 
 Education -0.124*** 0.883  -0.124*** 0.883  -0.126*** 0.882  -0.124*** 0.883 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 Marital status (ref. = never 
married) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Married 0.095*** 1.099  0.097 1.101  0.099*** 1.104  0.098*** 1.103 
 (0.028) 
 
 (0.028) 
 
 (0.028) 
 
 (0.028) 
 Separated, divorced, or widowed -0.036 0.965  -0.036 0.964  -0.036 0.965  -0.038 0.962 
 (0.037) 
 
 (0.037) 
 
 (0.037) 
 
 (0.037) 
 Not having a child 0.027 1.027  0.028 1.029  0.030 1.031  0.028 1.028 
 (0.036) 
 
 (0.036) 
 
 (0.036) 
 
 (0.036) 
 Number of children living with 0.026* 1.026  0.025* 1.026  0.024* 1.025  0.026* 1.026 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.010) 
 
 (0.010) 
 
 (0.011) 
 Religious 0.247*** 1.280  0.244*** 1.276  0.243*** 1.275  0.243*** 1.276 
 (0.046) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.046) 
 Labor market status (ref. = full-
time employed) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Part-time employed 0.125** 1.134  0.126** 1.134  0.127** 1.135  0.118** 1.125 
 (0.040) 
 
 (0.040) 
 
 (0.041) 
 
 (0.040) 
 Self-employed 0.179*** 1.196  0.175*** 1.191  0.172*** 1.187  0.178*** 1.195 
 (0.032) 
 
 (0.032) 
 
 (0.033) 
 
 (0.033) 
 Retired 0.218*** 1.244  0.225*** 1.252  0.220*** 1.246  0.227*** 1.255 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.040) 
 Student 0.113* 1.120  0.117* 1.124  0.119* 1.126  0.115* 1.121 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.054) 
 
 (0.054) 
 
 (0.054) 
 Housewife 0.319*** 1.376  0.354*** 1.425  0.356*** 1.427  0.338*** 1.403 
 (0.043) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.040) 
 
 (0.048) 
 Unemployed 0.192*** 1.212  0.197*** 1.218  0.196*** 1.217  0.199*** 1.220 
 (0.046) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.045) 
 Country/Wave-level Variables 
(Level-2) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  GDP per capita (logged) -0.233*** 0.792  -0.232*** 0.793  -0.231 0.793  -0.231*** 0.794 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.052) 
 Democracy -0.025* 0.975  -0.025* 0.975  -0.025* 0.975  -0.026* 0.975 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 Trade (% GDP) 0.001 1.001  0.001 1.001  0.001 1.001  0.001 1.001 
 (0.001) 
 
 (0.001) 
 
 (0.001) 
 
 (0.001) 
 Women's INGO membership -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 Female labor force participation -0.020*** 0.981  -0.015** 0.985  -0.020*** 0.981  -0.020*** 0.981 
 (0.005) 
 
 (0.005) 
 
 (0.005) 
 
 (0.005) 
 % Women of M/A employment -0.007 0.993  -0.008 0.992  -0.002 0.998  -0.007 0.993 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.007) 
 
 (0.008) 
 Legal protection of women's -0.333*** 0.717  -0.332*** 0.717  -0.331*** 0.718  -0.243** 0.784 
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economic rights 
 (0.078) 
 
 (0.078) 
 
 (0.078) 
 
 (0.079) 
 Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-1999) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  1999-2004 -0.039 0.961  -0.040 0.961  -0.040 0.961  -0.040 0.961 
 (0.094) 
 
 (0.095) 
 
 (0.095) 
 
 (0.094) 
 2005-2007 -0.192* 0.826  -0.192* 0.825  -0.192* 0.825  -0.192* 0.826 
 (0.095) 
 
 (0.095) 
 
 (0.095) 
 
 (0.094) 
 Cross-level Interaction Terms 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  FLFP*Men 
  
 -0.008** 0.992  
  
 
   
  
 (0.003) 
 
 
  
 
  %M/A*Men 
  
 
  
 -0.011*** 0.989  
   
  
 
  
 (0.003) 
 
 
  Law*Men 
  
 
  
 
  
 -0.177*** 0.838 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 (0.054) 
 Constant 
2.404*** 
11.07
2 
 
2.193 8.962 
 
2.241*** 9.404 
 
2.265*** 9.627 
 (0.515) 
 
 (0.515) 
 
 (0.515) 
 
 (0.516) 
 Variance Components 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Level-2 0.047 
 
 0.047 
 
 0.047 
 
 0.047 
 Level-3 0.234    0.234    0.234    0.233   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. N1 = 95677; N2 = 81; N3 = 54. 
+p < 0.1; *p< 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 Importantly, compared to those employed full-time, people in all other 
labor market statuses are more likely to hold gender prejudice in employment 
opportunities. Part-time employed (by 13%) and self-employed (by 20%) show 
higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market outsiders such as retired 
(by 24%), students (by 12%), and housewives (by 38%) are also more likely to 
agree to men’s priority over women for job opportunities. Importantly, 
housewives, mostly women, show a high level of attachment to the traditional 
male breadwinner model, suggesting that women’s interests are divided. The 
unemployed also show a higher likelihood of being prejudicial with respect to job 
market opportunities by 21% compared to the full-time employed. 
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Model 1 also includes country/wave-level control variables (Level 2). 
Among these country-level control variables, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a 
negative, significant effect on gender prejudice at the .05 level. Compared to the 
1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice in job opportunities 
decreases by 17% in the 2005-2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not 
significantly different from the 1994-1999 period. This suggests that gender 
prejudice decreased over-time in the countries in this analysis and provides some 
evidence that gender norms do change on the ground. Consistent with the existing 
literature, I also find that both GDP per capita and democracy are negatively 
associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities.  
Two globalization variables, trade and women’s INGO membership, are 
not associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities. Together, this suggests 
that global economic integration or linkage to global women’s rights norms do not 
directly influence individuals’ gender prejudice. This finding is striking given the 
large literature on the effects of globalization and global women’s rights on 
various aspects of gender relations and gender inequality. 
Model 1 also tests the hypotheses that women’s employment contexts will 
be associated with gender prejudice. Three variables, women’s labor force 
participation, women’s share of managerial/administrative occupations, and 
country law protecting women’s equal rights to work are included in the model. 
First, a one percent increase in female labor force participation in a country 
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decreases the odds of having gender prejudice in job opportunities by 2%. Second, 
however, women’s share of managerial and administrative positions does not 
have a significant effect on gender prejudice in job opportunities. Lastly, laws 
protecting women’s equal rights to paid work are effective in decreasing gender 
prejudice. One point increase in the degree to which a country’s law guarantees 
women’s equal employment rights decreases gender prejudice in job opportunities 
by 28%.   
Models 2-4 test if employment contexts influence both genders differently. 
Model 2 includes an interaction term, female labor force participation and men. 
Results indicate that female labor force participation not only reduces the overall 
level of gender prejudice but also reduces it particularly for men. One percent 
increase in female labor force participation in a country is associated with 
reducing the gender gap by 1%. Model 3 includes an interaction term, women’s 
share of managerial and administrative occupations X men. Results indicate that a 
one percent increase in women’s share of the M/A positions are associated with 
reducing the gender gap by 1 percent as well. Model 4 includes a cross-level 
interaction term between women’s equal rights to work laws and men. A one 
point increase in the degree to which laws protect women’s rights to work is 
associated with a 16% decrease in the gender gap in gender prejudice. 
Next, I explore if women’s employment contexts influence other areas of 
gender prejudice that are related to but distinct from women’s equal employment 
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rights: elite politics and male domain and men’s and women’s relative rights to 
higher education. Table 3-3 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as 
odds ratios for seven models of gender prejudice on qualifications as a political 
leader.  
Effects of individual-level determinants are nearly identical to those in the 
gender prejudice in employment opportunity models. Like gender prejudice in job 
opportunities, age has strong negative effects on gender prejudice in qualification 
as a political leader. Men are 1.99 times more likely to have gender prejudice 
about women’s qualifications as political leaders. Like prejudice about women’s 
entitlement to paid work, income and education both have negative effects on 
gender prejudice about women’s qualification as political leaders. An increase of 
a standard deviation of income and education are associated with a decrease of 
holding a prejudicial belief by 2% and 8%, respectively. Unlike prejudice about 
women’s entitlement to paid work, marital status is not associated with gender 
prejudice in politics. Like prejudice about women’s paid work, there is no 
significant difference between parents and non-parents but each increase in the 
number of children living with respondents increases the likelihood of holding a 
gender prejudice in politics by 4%. Religious people are 12% more likely to hold 
gender prejudice than non-religious people. 
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Table 3-3. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for “Men Make Better 
Political Leaders than Women.” 
  Model 1 Odds  Model 2 Odds  Model 3 Odds  Model 4 Odds 
Individual-level Variables (Level-
1) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Age 0.004** 1.004  0.004** 1.004  0.004** 1.004  0.004** 1.004 
 (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Men 0.689*** 1.992  0.870*** 2.386  0.690*** 1.993  0.736*** 2.087 
 (0.034)   (0.161)   (0.086)   (0.082)  
Income -0.024*** 0.976  -0.023*** 0.977  -0.024*** 0.976  -0.024*** 0.977 
 (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)  
Education -0.083*** 0.920  -0.084*** 0.920  -0.083*** 0.920  -0.083*** 0.920 
 (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)  
Marital status (ref. = never 
married) 
           
Married 0.010 1.010  0.011 1.011  0.010 1.010  0.010 1.010 
 (0.028)   (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.029)  
Separated, divorced, or widowed 0.038 1.039  0.038 1.039  0.038 1.039  0.038 1.039 
 (0.043)   (0.043)   (0.043)   (0.043)  
Not having a child 0.053 1.055  0.054 1.055  0.053 1.055  0.054 1.055 
 (0.034)   (0.035)   (0.035)   (0.035)  
Number of children living with 0.034*** 1.035  0.034*** 1.035  0.034*** 1.035  0.034*** 1.035 
 (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.009)  
Religious 0.110** 1.117  0.109** 1.115  0.110** 1.117  0.110** 1.116 
 (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.042)   (0.041)  
Labor market status (ref. = full-
time employed) 
           
Part-time employed 0.079* 1.082  0.079* 1.083  0.079* 1.082  0.078* 1.081 
 (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032)   (0.032)  
Self-employed 0.073** 1.075  0.071** 1.073  0.073** 1.075  0.072** 1.075 
 (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.028)   (0.028)  
Retired 0.105* 1.111  0.108** 1.114  0.105* 1.111  0.107** 1.112 
 (0.041)   (0.041)   (0.041)   (0.041)  
Student 0.121*** 1.129  0.123*** 1.131  0.121*** 1.129  0.121*** 1.129 
 (0.034)   (0.035)   (0.034)   (0.034)  
Housewife 0.264*** 1.302  0.282*** 1.325  0.264*** 1.302  0.268*** 1.307 
 (0.043)   (0.040)   (0.041)   (0.043)  
Unemployed 0.077* 1.080  0.079* 1.082  0.077* 1.080  0.078* 1.081 
 (0.037)   (0.036)   (0.036)   (0.036)  
Country/Wave-level Variables 
(Level-2) 
           
GDP per capita (logged) -0.255*** 0.775  -0.254*** 0.776  -0.255*** 0.775  -0.254*** 0.775 
 (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.058)   (0.058)  
Democracy -0.025+ 0.976  -0.025+ 0.975  -0.025+ 0.976  -0.025+ 0.976 
 (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.014)   (0.014)  
Trade (% GDP) 0.004* 1.004  0.004* 1.005  0.004* 1.004  0.004* 1.004 
 (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)  
Women's INGO membership -0.025* 0.975  -0.025* 0.975  -0.025* 0.975  -0.025* 0.975 
 (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)  
Female labor force participation -0.011 0.989  -0.009 0.991  -0.011 0.989  -0.011 0.989 
 (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)  
% Women of M/A employment -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994  -0.006 0.994 
 (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)   (0.008)  
Legal protection of women's -0.164* 0.849  -0.162* 0.850  -0.164* 0.849  -0.147* 0.864 
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economic rights 
 (0.070)   (0.070)   (0.070)   (0.071)  
Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-1999)            
1999-2004 -0.067 0.935  -0.067 0.935  -0.067 0.935  -0.067 0.935 
 (0.086)   (0.086)   (0.086)   (0.086)  
2005-2007 -0.252* 0.777  -0.252* 0.777  -0.252* 0.777  -0.252* 0.777 
 (0.118)   (0.118)   (0.118)   (0.118)  
Cross-level Interaction Terms            
FLFP*Men    -0.004 0.996       
    (0.003)        
%M/A*Men       0.000 1.000    
       (0.003)     
Law*Men          -0.033 0.967 
          (0.055)  
Constant 2.481*** 11.949  2.376*** 10.75
7 
 2.480*** 11.94
4 
 2.451*** 11.60
0 
 (0.630)   (0.590)   (0.618)   (0.606)  
Variance Components            
Level-2 0.068***   0.068***   0.068***   0.068***  
Level-3 0.192***    0.193***    0.192***    0.192***   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. N1 = 91389; N2 = 80; N3 = 54. 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
 
Like gender prejudice in paid work, compared to those employed full-time, 
people with all other labor market statuses are more likely to hold gender 
prejudice in politics. However, differences by labor market status are smaller than 
those of gender prejudice in work. Part-time employed (by 8%) and self-
employed (by 8%) show higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market 
outsiders such as retired (by 11%), students (by 13%), and housewives (by 30%) 
are also more likely to agree to the men’s priority over women for job 
opportunities. Importantly, housewives, mostly women, show a high level of 
attachment to politics as a male domain model, suggesting that women’s interests 
are divided. Unemployed also show higher likelihood of being prejudicial about 
women’s qualification as a political leader by 8% compared to full-time employed. 
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With respect to country-level control variables, like gender prejudice 
about women’s entitlement to paid work, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a 
negative, significant effect on gender prejudice in politics at the .05 level. 
Compared to the 1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice 
about women’s qualification as a political leader decreases by 22% in the 2005-
2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not significantly different from the 1994-
1999 period. Again, this suggests that gender norms do change on the ground. 
Like prejudice about women’s job entitlement, I also find that GDP per capita is 
negatively associated with gender prejudice in job opportunities. Democracy has a 
negative but marginally significant effect on gender prejudice in politics. 
Among globalization variables, trade has a positive association with 
gender prejudice in politics. However, the effect size is rather small. A 10 percent 
point increase in trade is associated with 4% increase in the likelihood of having a 
gender prejudice in politics. Women’s INGO membership has a negative 
association with gender prejudice in politics. An increase of 10 memberships in 
women’s INGOs is associated with a 20% decrease in the odds. This suggests that 
ties to global women’s rights movements reduce prejudice against women 
politicians.  This may be due to the diffusion of moral claims about gender 
equality or it may reflect the strength of the networks through which local 
women’s rights movements operate; that is, a country with more local women’s 
rights movement organizations may simply have more women’s INGO 
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memberships. Together, this suggests that while global economic integration 
poses some challenges to more equitable gender norms in politics, ties to the 
global women’s rights movements lead to more equitable gender norm in politics.  
 Unlike gender prejudice in job entitlement, employment contexts have 
limited influence on gender prejudice in politics. Neither female labor force 
participation nor women’s share of managerial and administrative positions has 
significant associations with gender prejudice in politics. This suggests women’s 
employment alone does not have a spillover effect to other areas of gender norms.  
However, legal protection of women’s economic rights influences not only gender 
prejudice in the paid job market but also in politics. One unit increase in women’s 
equal employment rights laws reduces gender prejudice in politics by 15%.  
 Results from models 2-4 suggest that unlike gender prejudice about 
women’s entitlement to paid work, the three women’s employment context 
variables are not associated with gender gap in gender prejudice against women’s 
qualification as a political leader. Female labor force participation and women’s 
share of managerial and administrative occupations are associated with neither 
overall level of prejudice in politics nor gender gap in the prejudice. Women’s 
employment laws, while significantly reducing overall level of gender prejudice 
in politics, is not associated with the gender gap.  
Table 3-4 includes coefficients and standard errors as well as odds ratios 
for seven models of gender prejudice in higher education. Effects of individual-
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level determinants are nearly identical to those in the gender prejudice in 
employment opportunity models. Like gender prejudice in job opportunities, age 
has strong negative effects on gender prejudice in higher education. Men are 1.78 
times more likely to agree to the statement “A university education is more 
important for a boy than for a girl.” Like prejudice about women’s entitlement to 
paid work, income and education both have negative effects on gender prejudice 
in higher education. An increase of a standard deviation of income and education 
are associated with a decrease of holding a prejudicial belief by 3% and 11%, 
respectively. Unlike prejudice about women’s entitlement to paid work, marital 
status or having a child is not associated with gender prejudice in higher 
education. Unlike gender prejudice in job opportunities and in politics, religious 
people show no difference from non-religious people. 
Like gender prejudice in paid work and in politics, compared to those 
employed full-time, people with other labor market status are more likely to hold 
gender prejudice in politics. Part-time employed (by 14%) and self-employed (by 
14%) show higher prejudice than full-time employed. Labor market outsiders 
such as the retired (by 16%), housewives (by 29%), and unemployed (by 12%) 
are more likely to agree to the importance of a university education for men over 
women. Again, housewives, show a high level of attachment to higher education 
as a male domain. 
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Table 3-4. Multi-level Logistic Regression Models for “A University Education is 
More Important for a Boy than for a Girl.” 
  Model 1 Odds  Model 2 Odds  Model 3 Odds  Model 4 Odds 
Individual-level Variables 
(Level-1) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Age 0.006* 1.006  0.006* 1.006  0.006* 1.006  0.006* 1.006 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 
 (0.002) 
 Men 0.578*** 1.783  0.932*** 2.541  0.789*** 2.202  0.583*** 1.791 
 (0.042) 
 
 (0.113) 
 
 (0.078) 
 
 (0.067) 
 Income -0.034** 0.967  -0.033** 0.968  -0.033** 0.968  -0.034** 0.967 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 
 (0.011) 
 Education 
-0.124*** 0.883 
 
-0.125*** 0.883 
 
-0.126*** 0.882 
 -
0.124*** 0.883 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 Marital status (ref. = never 
married) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Married 0.018 1.018  0.019 1.019  0.020 1.020  0.018 1.018 
 (0.035) 
 
 (0.035) 
 
 (0.035) 
 
 (0.035) 
 Separated, divorced, or widowed 0.057 1.059  0.057 1.058  0.057 1.058  0.057 1.059 
 (0.047) 
 
 (0.047) 
 
 (0.047) 
 
 (0.047) 
 Not having a child 0.040 1.041  0.042 1.043  0.042 1.043  0.040 1.041 
 (0.050) 
 
 (0.050) 
 
 (0.050) 
 
 (0.050) 
 Number of children living with 0.015 1.015  0.015 1.015  0.014 1.014  0.015 1.015 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 Religious 0.064 1.066  0.060 1.062  0.060 1.062  0.064 1.066 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.053) 
 
 (0.053) 
 Labor market status (ref. = full-
time employed) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Part-time employed 0.127** 1.136  0.130*** 1.138  0.129** 1.137  0.127** 1.136 
 (0.040) 
 
 (0.040) 
 
 (0.041) 
 
 (0.040) 
 Self-employed 0.129*** 1.138  0.128*** 1.136  0.124*** 1.132  0.129*** 1.138 
 (0.035) 
 
 (0.034) 
 
 (0.035) 
 
 (0.035) 
 Retired 0.164*** 1.178  0.171*** 1.187  0.165*** 1.179  0.164*** 1.179 
 (0.048) 
 
 (0.048) 
 
 (0.048) 
 
 (0.047) 
 Student 0.063 1.065  0.069 1.071  0.068 1.070  0.063 1.065 
 (0.052) 
 
 (0.052) 
 
 (0.052) 
 
 (0.051) 
 Housewife 0.251*** 1.285  0.292*** 1.339  0.286*** 1.332  0.251*** 1.286 
 (0.050) 
 
 (0.045) 
 
 (0.049) 
 
 (0.048) 
 Unemployed 0.115** 1.122  0.122** 1.129  0.119** 1.126  0.115** 1.122 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.039) 
 
 (0.039) 
 Country/Wave-level Variables 
(Level-2) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  GDP per capita (logged) -0.183* 0.833  -0.181* 0.834  -0.181* 0.835  -0.183* 0.833 
 (0.089) 
 
 (0.089) 
 
 (0.089) 
 
 (0.089) 
 Democracy -0.024 0.976  -0.024 0.976  -0.024 0.976  -0.024 0.976 
 (0.018) 
 
 (0.018) 
 
 (0.018) 
 
 (0.018) 
 Trade (% GDP) 0.004 1.004  0.004 1.004  0.004 1.004  0.004 1.004 
 (0.003) 
 
 (0.003) 
 
 (0.003) 
 
 (0.003) 
 Women's INGO membership -0.012 0.988  -0.012 0.988  -0.012 0.988  -0.012 0.988 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 
 (0.014) 
 Female labor force participation -0.007 0.993  -0.002 0.998  -0.007 0.993  -0.007 0.993 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 
 (0.008) 
 % Women of M/A employment -0.008 0.992  -0.008 0.992  -0.003 0.997  -0.008 0.992 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
 
 (0.009) 
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Legal protection of women's 
economic rights -0.213* 0.808 
 
-0.212* 0.809 
 
-0.212* 0.809 
 
-0.210* 0.810 
 (0.101) 
 
 (0.101) 
 
 (0.101) 
 
 (0.096) 
 Wave indicator (ref. = 1994-
1999) 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  1999-2004 -0.174 0.840  -0.176 0.839  -0.176 0.839  -0.174 0.840 
 (0.134) 
 
 (0.134) 
 
 (0.135) 
 
 (0.134) 
 2005-2007 -0.331* 0.718  -0.332 0.717  -0.333* 0.717  -0.331* 0.718 
 (0.155) 
 
 (0.155) 
 
 (0.155) 
 
 (0.155) 
 Cross-level Interaction Terms 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  FLFP*Men 
  
 -0.008*** 
 
 
  
 
   
  
 (0.002) 
 
 
  
 
  %M/A*Men 
  
 
  
 -0.008*** 0.992  
   
  
 
  
 (0.002) 
 
 
  Law*Men 
  
 
  
 
  
 -0.004 0.996 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 (0.039) 
 Constant 0.686 1.985  0.462 1.587  0.548 1.729  0.682 1.978 
 (0.604) 
 
 (0.607) 
 
 (0.611) 
 
 (0.608) 
 Variance Components 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  Level-2 0.144*** 
 
 0.144*** 
 
 0.145*** 
 
 0.144*** 
 Level-3 0.174***    0.174***    0.172***    0.174***   
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. N1 = 93345; N2 = 80; N3 = 54. 
+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; *** p< 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 
 
However, unlike gender prejudice in employment or politics, students are not 
different from the full-time employed in the likelihood of believing that higher 
education is more important for men than women. This can be explained by the 
fact that students are the most directly involved in higher education, which 
enables both men and women to interact with each other as equal peers. 
With respect to country-level control variables, like gender prejudice in 
employment and in politics, the latest wave (2005-2007) has a negative, 
significant effect on gender prejudice in higher education at the .05 level. 
Compared to the 1994-1999 period, the probability of having gender prejudice 
about the relative importance of higher education for men and women decreases 
by 28% in the 2005-2007 period. The 1999-2004 period is not significantly 
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different from the 1994-1999 period. Again, this suggests that gender norms do 
change on the ground. Like gender prejudice in employment and politics, I find 
that GDP per capita is negatively associated with gender prejudice in higher 
education. However, democracy has no significant effect in gender prejudice in 
politics. Like gender prejudice in employment, neither global economic 
integration nor linkage to global women’s rights movements influences gender 
prejudice in higher education. 
Unlike gender prejudice in job entitlement, employment contexts have 
limited influence on gender prejudice in higher education. Like gender prejudice 
in politics, neither female labor force participation nor women’s share of 
managerial and administrative positions has significant associations with gender 
prejudice in higher education. Like gender prejudice in employment and politics, 
legal protection of women’s economic rights, however, is negatively associated 
with gender prejudice in higher education. One unit increase in women’s equal 
employment rights laws reduces gender prejudice in higher education by 20%.  
 Results from models 2-4 suggest that like gender prejudice in 
employment, the three women’s employment context variables are associated 
with reducing the gender gap in gender prejudice in higher education. Ten percent 
point increase in female labor force participation or women’s share of managerial 
and administrative occupations is associated with a 10% decrease in the odds of 
believing that university education is more important for women than men. 
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Women’s employment laws, while significantly reducing the overall level of 
gender prejudice in higher education is not associated with the gender gap.  
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
This chapter contributes to the literature on gender equality by developing 
a theoretical model that highlights the importance of women’s employment 
contexts on an individual’s gender prejudice in employment, politics, and 
education. First of all, results from this analysis suggest that individuals’ gender 
prejudice does change in the direction of a more gender-equitable perspective. 
This is true for both men and women.  
Evidence from this research also suggests that women’s employment 
context is an important factor in shaping individuals’ gender prejudice. Previous 
investigators have argued that economic and political modernization are the major 
factors influencing gender norms and institutions (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
Results from this research show that women’s labor force participation and laws 
that help women to have equal employment rights have an independent effect on 
gender prejudice in employment, even after controlling for a country’s economic 
and political conditions and globalization measures, although economic 
development also explains individuals’ gender prejudice in employment. 
To achieve a more gender equitable society, gender norms need to change 
in a more gender equitable direction not only among women but also among men. 
 147 
 
Women’s employment context influences not only the level of gender prejudice in 
employment in a society but also the gender gap in prejudice. Quantity, quality, 
and laws concerning women’s employment all are associated with reducing the 
gender gap in prejudice against women’s equal entitlement to paid work.  
Furthermore, the impact of women’s employment contexts is strongest 
among those who are fully involved in the labor market. Although this research is 
not a causal analysis, this finding suggests a way women’s material power 
influences gender norms. When people interact with women workers on a regular 
basis, their gender prejudice might diminish significantly. Gender prejudice in 
higher education also supports this. Students are more likely to have gender 
prejudice than full-time employed in other areas of gender prejudice but not in the 
setting of higher education. Students’ gender prejudice level is the same as the 
full-time employed, which is the least among all groups by labor market status. 
However, there is limited evidence for the spillover effects of women’s 
employment to gender prejudice in non-employment areas. Women’s labor force 
participation and women’s share of managerial and administrative positions are 
not associated with gender prejudice in non-employment areas. However, laws 
protecting women’s employment rights have a clear spillover effect on gender 
prejudice in non-employment areas. The policy implications of these results are 
significant. Policies that enable women to enter into the labor market are essential 
not only for improving women’s employment quantity and quality but also for 
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changing gender norms on the ground. On the other hand, policies that glorify 
women’s caretaker role and keep them out of the labor market will undermine the 
possibilities for a more gender equitable society (Bergmann 2001). Also, the 
findings suggest that women’s labor force participation, if not accompanied by 
more gender equitable employment policies, will have limited reach in changing 
gender relations. 
This chapter also contributes to the literature on neo-institutionalism that 
has focused on the origin of national policies and less on the implications of such 
national policies. It is somewhat challenging to interpret the results regarding the 
effects of Women’s INGO membership linkages. Women’s INGO linkage is 
associated with only gender prejudice in politics, not in employment or higher 
education. Discourses and international laws as well as networks of people have 
been dedicated to women’s rights issues over the last several decades. Linkages to 
global women’s rights INGOs have been influential in countries’ adoption of 
more women friendly employment policies. Because of this, some scholars have 
considered law to be epiphenomenal of global forces or a form of window-
dressing. I do not find evidence to support this claim. Quite contrary, Women’s 
INGO linkage does not have significant effects on gender prejudice on the ground 
over and beyond its national policy impact. My findings suggest that in order for 
global norms to influence norms on the ground, state policies are one of the most 
important mechanisms. In addition, my findings suggest that the state does have 
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autonomy in the degree to which it reflects global women’s rights in their laws. 
Laws that more closely adhere to the global women’s rights movement have 
stronger influence on gender norms on the ground.   
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Conclusion 
This dissertation has explored whether increased women’s labor force 
participation is accompanied by better positions for women in the labor market. It 
also considered the impact of macro levels of women’s employment on more 
gender egalitarian gender norms. I addressed these issues through the lens of an 
integrative framework that incorporates the importance of state policies and 
globalization. This dissertation research fills gaps between state-centered and 
more global lines of research to better explain mechanisms generating cross-
national and over-time differences and similarities between developed countries 
and developing countries. I created new data to address these issues, and some of 
my statistical analyses went beyond cross-sectional analysis to test the 
implications of state policies and global contexts on the quality of women’s 
employment within countries over-time.  
In the first empirical chapter, using cross-national, longitudinal data on 78 
countries, I showed that, just as a change toward gender parity in the quantity of 
employment has largely been influenced by global- and state institutional- factors, 
women’s share of managerial occupations has been affected by these factors. Not 
all factors that help explain the increase in women’s share in the labor force had 
the same explanatory power in understanding women’s share in managerial 
occupations, however. State legal protection of women’s rights is highly 
significant in increasing women’s share of managerial occupations. So is linkage 
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to the global women’s rights movement. However, a country’s integration into the 
global economy did not explain women’s share of managerial occupations.  
This chapter also contributed to a better understanding of similarities and 
differences between developed and developing countries. The analyses suggested 
that there are different processes at work in developed and developing countries. 
Increases in the quantity of women’s employment brought some gains in terms of 
women’s share in managerial occupations in developed countries, but these were 
offset by no gains for women in developing countries. Global- and state 
institutional- factors are particularly relevant to explain women’s share of 
managerial employment in developing countries. Some might expect that cultural 
traditions in developing countries are more resistant to change with respect to 
women's rights, as gender equality reflects largely Western values (see e.g., 
Ingelhart and Norris 2003). My results do not support this expectation. I find that 
women-friendly policies matter more in developing countries than in developed 
countries. Instead, the gap between the developed and developing world should be 
seen in terms of the context in which women enter into the labor market in 
developing countries. In addition, I find a robust positive impact on female 
managerial share of links to global women’s rights organizations.  
This chapter also contributed to the literature on the globalization of 
women’s rights and the literature on state policies by providing a better 
understanding of the relationship between international laws, state policies, and 
 152 
 
employment outcomes. It has been suggested that world cultural accounts have 
led to a decline in the power of nation-states (Frank and Meyer 2002) and that 
gender egalitarian state employment policies are largely driven by this world 
culture embodied in international laws (Berkovitch 1999). However, results 
suggest that state governments vary in implementing and enforcing ideas 
embedded in international laws though state policies, and state policies continue 
to be an important factor in explaining the quality of women’s employment.  
The second empirical chapter made progress toward better understanding 
the implications of state policies on gender occupational inequality. In it, I 
examined different types of state policies. I find that two types of policies, paid 
maternity leave legislation and anti-discrimination legislation, have opposite 
effects. Maternity leave policies are associated with greater gender occupational 
inequality while anti-discrimination policies are associated with less occupational 
inequality. This chapter also contributes to the literature on state policy by 
examining the patterns of state adoption of these policies since the early 1900s 
and variations in the level of benefits.  
The first two empirical chapters of this dissertation examined the context 
in which increased women’s employment gets translated into a better share of 
women in managerial occupations and reductions in gender occupational 
inequality. The last empirical chapter turned attention to the implications of 
women’s employment on the non-material aspect of gender inequality, gender 
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prejudice. This chapter contributes to the literature on gender inequality by 
developing a theoretical model that highlights the importance of women’s 
employment contexts for individuals’ gender prejudicial views in employment, 
politics, and education. First of all, results from this analysis suggest that 
individuals’ gender prejudice does change over-time and in the direction of a 
more gender-equitable direction. In addition to it, evidence from this research 
suggests that variations in gender prejudice across countries and over-time can be 
explained by women’s employment context.  
Previous researchers have argued that economic and political 
modernization is the major factor affecting gender norms and institutions 
(Inglehart and Norris 2003). In contrast, my results show that women’s labor 
force participation and laws that help women to have equal employment rights 
have an independent effect on gender prejudice in employment, even after 
controlling for countries’ economic and political conditions, and globalization 
measures (although economic development also explains individuals’ gender 
prejudice in employment).  
To achieve a more gender equitable society, gender norms need to change 
not only among women but also among men. I find that levels of women’s 
employment are associated not only with the overall levels of gender prejudice in 
employment in a society but also with gender gaps in levels of prejudice. The 
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quantity and quality of women’s employment within countries, and women-
friendly laws overall are associated with a smaller gender gap in prejudice against 
women’s entitlement to paid work.  
Finally, this chapter also contributed to the literature on neo-
institutionalism. This literature has emphasized cultural process through which 
taken-for-granted norms constructed within the world society infuse not only 
governments and organizations but also individuals at the state and local levels 
(Boli and Thomas 1999). From this perspective, links to gender egalitarian 
discourses through women’s INGO membership should have a direct impact on 
norms and attitudes concerning gender relations. I find only limited support for 
this claim. Women’s INGO links are associated with reductions in gender 
prejudice in only one area—politics. These links were not associated with changes 
in gender prejudice in the areas of employment or higher education. My findings 
suggest that the idea of a direct relationship between “global” and “local” needs to 
be qualified.  
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Appendix 1-1. Variable Description and Data Source 
 Variable Operationalization Source 
    
Dependent Variable 
 Share of women in 
managerial/administrative occupations 
 ILO: NETLAX database 
 
Independent Variables 
Women’s Labor Force Participation 
  
 Women’s Share in the Labor Force % Women of the total labor force World Bank: WDI 
Economic Globalization 
 Foreign direct investment Foreign direct investment net inflow (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank: WDI 
 Trade Trade (% of GDP) World Bank: WDI 
Penetration of Global Women's Rights 
 State ratification of key international 
treaties 
Cumulative number of human rights  
treaties ratified (0-12) 
ILO; UN 
 Linkages to global women’s rights 
movement 
memberships in international women’s 
rights organizations 
Paxton et al. 2006 
State Women’s Rights Policies 
 Women's rights reflected in law Index score for state protection of women’s 
political rights, social rights, and economic 
rights (0-12) 
CIRI Human Rights Data 
Project 
Political 
 Level of democracy Democracy-autocracy measure (0-10) Polity IV dataset 
Economic 
 GDP per Capita GDP per capita (2000 U.S. $ value) 
(logged) 
World Bank: WDI 
 Industrialization Agriculture as % GDP World Bank: WDI 
Demographic 
 Total Population Total population (logged) World Bank: WDI 
 Urbanization % of population living in urban areas World Bank: WDI 
 Fertility # births to a woman during the period of 
child bearing years 
World Bank: WDI 
Women's Human Capital 
 Education Female secondary school enrollment (% 
gross) 
 
 Proportion of women in national 
parliament 
% women in parliament Paxton, Green, Hughes 
2008 
Lagged dependent variable   
 Lagged term for share of women in 
managerial/administrative occupations 
Share of women in 
managerial/administrative occupations 
(previous year) 
ILO: NETLAX database 
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Appendix 2-1. Maternity leave law coding scheme 
 
 
Country: 
Law ID: 
 
The length of leave: __________________________________________ 
 
The percentage of compensation in regular pay: 
_______________________________ 
If it is fixed amount, specify: _________________________________________  
 
The provider of maternity coverage: __________________________________ 
 
Who is eligible for the above maternity benefits? _____________________ 
  
When did this law/decree/order become effective? __________________ 
 
Note: __________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 2-2. Equal access law coding scheme 
 
 
Country: 
Law ID: 
 
Equal rights to access any industry (Y or N)?   
 
Notes: __________________________________________ 
 
Equal rights in terms of work hours (Y or N)?   
 
Notes: __________________________________________ 
 
Rights to work while pregnant (Y or N)?  
 
Notes: __________________________________________ 
 
When did this law/decree/order become effective? __________________ 
 
  
 174 
 
Appendix 2-3. Equal pay law coding scheme 
 
 
Country: 
Law ID: 
 
Does law specify non-discrimination in pay based on gender (Y or N)?  
Notes: __________________________________________ 
 
When did this law/decree/order become effective? __________________ 
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Appendix 2-4. Maternity Leave Policies and Anti-discrimination Policies  
Country Duration of paid leave for 
mothers 
Maternity leave 
wage replacement 
First adoption of 
paid maternity leave 
First adoption of 
equal pay law 
Night hours Any industry Pregnant 
Afghanistan 14-25 weeks No information No information 1919 No information No information No information 
Albania 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1947 1989 Yes Yes No 
Algeria 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1949 1976 No Yes Yes 
Andorra 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information No information No information No information 
Angola Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1981 1981 Yes Yes No 
Antigua and Barbuda Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1973 1975 No information No information No information 
Argentina 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1934 1973 Yes Yes Yes 
Armenia 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes Yes 
Australia 14-25 weeks Flat 1912 1969 Yes Yes Yes 
Austria 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1888 1977 Yes Yes No 
Azerbaijan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 No No No 
Bahamas Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1972 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Bahrain Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1976 1976 No information No information No information 
Bangladesh 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1939 No equal pay law Yes No Yes 
Barbados Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1966 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Belarus 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes No No 
Belgium 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1894 1975 Yes Yes No 
Belize 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1979 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Benin 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1967 Yes No No 
Bermuda 12 weeks 100 2000 No information No information No information No information 
Bhutan No information No information No information No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Bolivia 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1939 1976 No No Yes 
Bosnia-Herzogovina No information No information 1922  Yes No Yes 
Botswana Less than 14 weeks 1 - 49% 1963 No equal pay law Yes Yes Yes 
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Brazil 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1923 1968 Yes Yes Yes 
Brunei Less than 14 weeks 1 - 49% No information No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Bulgaria 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1918 1986 Yes Yes No 
Burkina Faso 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1962 Yes Yes Yes 
Myanmar Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1954 1974 No information No information No information 
Burundi Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1966 1966 Yes Yes Yes 
Cambodia 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1957 No information Yes Yes Yes 
Cameroon 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1967 No No No 
Canada 26-51 weeks 50 - 74% 1957 1971 Yes Yes Yes 
Cape Verde Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1976 1985 No information No information No information 
Central African Republic 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1952 1961 No information No information No information 
Chad 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1952 1966 No No Yes 
Chile 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1924 No information Yes Yes No 
China 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1951 No information Yes No No 
Colombia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1946 1934 Yes No No 
Comoros 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1984 1984 No information No information No information 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1967 1967 No No Yes 
Congo, Republic of the Congo 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1964 No No Yes 
Costa Rica 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1941 1934 No No Yes 
Croatia 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1922  Yes Yes Yes 
Cuba 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1934 1934 No information No information No information 
Cyprus 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1956 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Czech Republic 52 weeks or more 50 - 74% No information No information Yes No No 
czechoslovakia No information No information N/A 1975 No information No information No information 
Denmark 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1901 1976 Yes Yes Yes 
Djibouti 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1982 1966 No information No information No information 
Dominica Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1975 1951 No information No information No information 
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Dominican Republic Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1947 No equal pay law Yes Yes Yes 
Timor-Leste Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% No information No information No information No information No information 
Ecuador Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1928 1971 Yes No Yes 
Egypt 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1959 1959 No No Yes 
El Salvador Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1949 1963 Yes Yes Yes 
Equatorial Guinea Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1979 1982 No information No information No information 
Eritrea Less than 14 weeks No information No information No information No information No information No information 
Estonia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes No 
Ethiopia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1962 1975 Yes No No 
Fiji 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1977 No equal pay law Yes No Yes 
Finland 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1963 1970 Yes Yes Yes 
France 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1913 1972 Yes No Yes 
Gabon 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1962 No No No 
Gambia, the Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% N/A No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Georgia 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes No 
East Germany No information No information 1883 1961 No information No information No information 
West Germany 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1883 1969 Yes Yes No 
Ghana Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1948 1969 Yes Yes Yes 
Greece 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1922 1983 Yes Yes Yes 
Grenada Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1980 1979 No information No information No information 
Guatemala Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1946 1961 Yes Yes Yes 
Guinea 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1960 No No No 
Guinea-Bissau Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% No information 1986 No information No information No information 
Guyana Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1969 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Haiti Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1961 1984 No information No information No information 
Honduras Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1954 1959 Yes Yes No 
Hungary 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1891 1951 Yes No No 
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Iceland 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1936 1961 Yes Yes Yes 
India Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1948 1950 No No Yes 
Indonesia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1951 1969 Yes Yes No 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1949 1959 Yes No Yes 
Iraq Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1956 1975 No information No information No information 
Ireland 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1911 1974 Yes Yes Yes 
Isle of Man 26 weeks 90% No information No information No information No information No information 
Israel Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1953 1964 Yes No No 
Italy 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1910 1964 Yes Yes No 
Cote d No information No information 1952 1964 Yes No No 
Jamaica Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1979 1975 No No Yes 
Japan 52 weeks or more 50 - 74% 1922 1972 Yes No Yes 
Jordan Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1960 1976 No No Yes 
Kazakhstan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes No No 
Kenya Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1966 No information Yes No Yes 
Kiribati Less than 14 weeks 1 - 49% No information No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Korea, Democratic People No information No information 1945 1945 No information No information No information 
Korea, Republic of 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1963 1953 Yes No Yes 
Kuwait Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1964 1964 No No Yes 
Kyrgyzstan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information Yes No Yes 
Laos Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1971 No information Yes Yes No 
Latvia 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes Yes 
Lebanon Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1946 1965 Yes No Yes 
Lesotho Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1967 No information Yes No Yes 
Liberia No paid leave for mothers No paid leave 1976 No equal pay law Yes Yes Yes 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1957 1970 No information No information No information 
Liechtenstein 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information No information No information No information 
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Lithuania 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes Yes 
Luxembourg 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1901 1963 No information No information No information 
Macedonia 26-51 weeks No information 1922 No information No No No 
Madagascar 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1960 No No No 
Malawi Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1984 No information Yes Yes Yes 
Malaysia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1957 No equal pay law No No Yes 
Maldives Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information No information No information No information 
Mali 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1962 No No No 
Malta Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1971 No information No information No information 
Marshall Islands No information No information No information No information No information No information No information 
Mauritania 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 No information No No Yes 
Mauritius Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1975 No information Yes Yes No 
Mexico Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1942 1970 Yes Yes No 
Micronesia, Federated States of No information No information No information No information No information No information No information 
Moldova, Republic of Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 No No No 
Monaco 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information No information No information No information 
Mongolia 52 weeks or more 50 - 74% 1975 1960 Yes No Yes 
Montenegro 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1922  No No No 
Morocco 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1959 Before 1925 No No Yes 
Mozambique Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1985 1985 Yes No No 
Namibia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% No information No information Yes Yes No 
Nauru No information No information N/A No information No information No information No information 
Nepal Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1963 1976 No Yes Yes 
Netherlands, the 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1913 1975 Yes Yes No 
New Zealand 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1938 1972 Yes Yes Yes 
Nicaragua Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1945 Before 1925 Yes Yes No 
Niger 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1962 Yes No No 
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Nigeria Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1961 No equal pay law No No Yes 
Norway 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1909 1978 Yes Yes Yes 
Oman Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1973 No equal pay law No No Yes 
Pakistan Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1950 No equal pay law No No Yes 
Palau No paid leave No paid leave N/A No information No information No information No information 
Panama 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1930 1971 Yes No No 
Papua New Guinea No paid leave for mothers No paid leave 1978 1978 No No Yes 
Paraguay Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1943 1961 Yes Yes No 
Peru 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1936 Before 1925 Yes Yes Yes 
Philippines, the Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1954 1954 No Yes Yes 
Poland 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1920 Before 1925 Yes No No 
Portugal 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1933 1979 Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1976 Before 1925 No information No information No information 
Romania 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1912 1972 Yes Yes Yes 
Russian Federation Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes No 
Rwanda Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1967 1967 Yes No No 
Samoa No paid leave No paid leave N/A No information No information No information No information 
San Marino 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% No information No information No information No information No information 
Sao Tome / Principe Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1979 1962 No information No information No information 
Saudi Arabia Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1969 No information Yes Yes No 
Senegal 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1962 No No Yes 
Serbia 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1922  No No No 
Seychelles Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1979 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Sierra Leone No paid leave No paid leave N/A No equal pay law Yes Yes No 
Singapore Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1968 No information No No Yes 
Slovakia 52 weeks or more 50 - 74% 1988 1975 Yes Yes Yes 
Slovenia 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1922  Yes Yes Yes 
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Solomon Islands Less than 14 weeks 1 - 49% N/A No equal pay law No No No 
Somalia 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1958 1972 No information No information No information 
South Africa 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% N/A No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Spain 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1929 1970 Yes Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1939 1985 Yes Yes Yes 
St. Kitts and Nevis Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% No information No information No information No information No information 
St. Lucia Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1978 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
St. Vincent / Grenadines Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1986 No equal pay law No information No information No information 
Sudan, the Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1970 1970 No Yes Yes 
Suriname No information No information N/A Before 1925 No information No information No information 
Swaziland No paid leave No paid leave 1962 1980 No information No information No information 
Sweden 52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1900 1979 No No Yes 
Switzerland 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% N/A No equal pay law Yes Yes Yes 
Syria Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1958 1959 Yes Yes No 
Tajikistan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% N/A No information No No Yes 
Tanzania, United Republic of 14-25 weeks No information 1946 No information No No No 
Thailand 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1958 1972 Yes Yes No 
Togo 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1952 1974 Yes No No 
Tonga No information No information N/A No information No information No information No information 
Trinidad and Tobago Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1971 No information No information No information No information 
Tunisia Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% 1950 1983 Yes Yes No 
Turkey 14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1945 1963 No No Yes 
Turkmenistan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% N/A No information No information No information No information 
Tuvalu Less than 14 weeks 1 - 49% N/A No information No information No information No information 
Uganda Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1975 No equal pay law No No No 
Ukraine 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes Yes 
United Arab Emirates Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1959 1980 No No No 
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United Kingdom 26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1911 1970 No No Yes 
United States of America No paid leave  No paid leave N/A 1963 Yes Yes Yes 
Uruguay Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1954 1989 Yes Yes Yes 
Uzbekistan 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1912 1918 Yes Yes Yes 
Vanuatu Less than 14 weeks 50 - 74% No information 1973 No information No information No information 
Venezuela 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1936 1936 Yes No Yes 
Vietnam 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1944 1956 Yes Yes Yes 
Zambia 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1984 No information No No No 
Zimbabwe 14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1985 1982 Yes Yes Yes 
Yemen Less than 14 weeks 75 - 100% 1978 1978 No No No 
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Appendix 2-5. Operationalization of Variables and Descriptive Statistics for the Panel Regression Analysis 
  Variable Operationalization Source Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Economic globalization         
 Trade Trade (% of GDP) World Bank: 
WDI 
61.18 32.86 17.34 139.70 
Penetration of global Women's employment Rights     
 State ratification of key 
international treaties 
regarding women’s work 
The number of treaties ratified: the 1951 ILO Equal Remuneration Convention, the 1952 ILO Social 
Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, the 1952 ILO maternity Protection Convention, the 
1962 ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, and the 1979 UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
ILO, UN 2.29 1.25 0 4 
 Country WINGO 
membership 
# of WINGOs of which citizens of the country has a membership YIO, UIA 7.64 2.66 2.5 12.5 
Political     
 Level of democracy Democracy-autocracy measure (-10-10) Polity IV dataset 3.31 7.47 -9 10 
Economic     
 GDP per Capita GDP per capita (2000 U.S. $ value) (logged) World Bank: 
WDI 
8.17 1.50 4.77 10.20 
State institutional characteristics     
 Maternity leave policy in 
1984 
 Various sources*     
 High-level maternity leave 26 weeks or more with 75-100% wage replacement  25.71%    
 Mid-level maternity leave 14-25 weeks with 75-100% wage replacement  25.71%    
 Low-level maternity leave Less than 14 weeks or less than 75% wage replacement  48.57%    
 Equal pay law in 1984 Having a law demanding “equal pay for work of equal value (coded 1; otherwise 0) Various sources* 85.71%    
 Equal access law women are allowed to work in all industries, during night, and while pregnant in a country (coded 1; 
otherwise 0) 
Various sources* 31.43%    
 Women's economic rights 
reflected in law 
Women's economic rights reflected in law (4 point scale) CIRI Human 
Rights Data 
Project  
1.60 0.69 0 3 
 Women's rights reflected 
in law 
Women's rights reflected in law (10 point scale) CIRI Human 
Rights Data 
Project  
4.66 1.91 0 8 
Women's human capital      
 Female labor force 
participation 
% women in the labor force World Bank: 
WDI 
41.77 14.74 11.6 75.6 
  Female tertiary education Female tertiary education enrollment rates (gross) Schofer 2005 18.70 14.81 0.3 77.7 
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Appendix 2-6. Women’s Employment policy: Main Variable Values for 35 Countries 
country   Maternity leave   Equal pay law   Equal access law: night 
work, all industries, and 
working while pregnant  
  Legal protection of 
women's rights 
  
  Logged odds of women to 
men being employed in 
high-status occupations 
  Duration Wage 
replacemen
t 
First 
adoptio
n 
 First adoption  Do women have equal 
access to all three 
dimensions? 
 Women's 
economic 
rights index 
Women's 
rights 
index 
 1984 2004 Change 
1984-
2004 
                Australia 
 
14-25 weeks Flat 1912 
 
1969 
 
Yes 
 
2 6 
 
-0.08 0.24 0.32 
Austria 
 
52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1888 
 
1977 
 
No 
 
1 4 
 
-0.17 -0.04 0.13 
Bangladesh 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1939 
 
No equal pay 
law 
 
No 
 
0 0 
 
0.15 -0.17 -0.32 
Belgium 
 
26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1894 
 
1975 
 
No 
 
2 6 
 
0.42 0.04 -0.38 
Botswana 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 1 - 49% 1963 
 
No equal pay 
law 
 
Yes 
 
2 5 
 
0.40 0.00 -0.40 
Canada 
 
26-51 weeks 50 - 74% 1957 
 
1971 
 
Yes 
 
3 8 
 
0.10 0.31 0.20 
Chile 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1924 
 
2009 
 
No 
 
2 5 
 
0.55 0.50 -0.06 
Colombia 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1946 
 
1934 
 
No 
 
2 4 
 
0.00 0.31 0.30 
Denmark 
 
26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1901 
 
1976 
 
Yes 
 
2 6 
 
0.46 0.10 -0.36 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1959 
 
1959 
 
No 
 
2 4 
 
0.50 0.51 0.02 
El Salvador 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1949 
 
1963 
 
Yes 
 
2 6 
 
0.25 0.22 -0.02 
Ethiopia 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1962 
 
1975 
 
No 
 
1 2 
 
-0.39 -0.81 -0.42 
Germany 
 
52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1883 
 
1969 
 
No 
 
2 7 
 
-0.14 0.18 0.31 
Greece 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1922 
 
1983 
 
Yes 
 
2 5 
 
0.05 0.19 0.14 
Indonesia 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1951 
 
1969 
 
No 
 
2 6 
 
0.15 0.55 0.40 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
 
14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1949 
 
1959 
 
No 
 
0 0 
 
2.01 0.76 -1.25 
Ireland 
 
26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1911 
 
1974 
 
Yes 
 
2 6 
 
0.56 0.07 -0.48 
Israel 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1953 
 
1964 
 
No 
 
2 5 
 
0.37 0.12 -0.25 
Japan 
 
52 weeks or more 50 - 74% 1922 
 
1972 
 
No 
 
1 4 
 
-0.25 -0.08 0.17 
Korea, Rep. 
 
52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1963 
 
1953 
 
No 
 
0 1 
 
-0.48 -0.36 0.12 
Malaysia 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1957 
 
No equal pay 
law 
 
No 
 
2 5 
 
-0.03 -0.01 0.02 
Netherlands 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1913 
 
1975 
 
No 
 
2 6 
 
0.06 -0.07 -0.13 
Norway 
 
52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1909 
 
1978 
 
Yes 
 
2 7 
 
0.19 0.00 -0.19 
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Pakistan 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1950 
 
No equal pay 
law 
 
No 
 
1 3 
 
0.34 -0.58 -0.92 
Panama 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1930 
 
1971 
 
No 
 
1 4 
 
0.83 0.67 -0.16 
Paraguay 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 50 - 74% 1943 
 
1961 
 
No 
 
1 3 
 
-0.23 0.30 0.53 
Philippines 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1954 
 
1954 
 
No 
 
2 6 
 
0.93 1.05 0.11 
Portugal 
 
26-51 weeks 75 - 100% 1933 
 
1979 
 
Yes 
 
2 6 
 
0.31 -0.07 -0.39 
Spain 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1929 
 
1970 
 
Yes 
 
1 4 
 
0.20 0.27 0.07 
Sri Lanka 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 75 - 100% 1939 
 
1985 
 
Yes 
 
1 4 
 
0.72 0.31 -0.40 
Sweden 
 
52 weeks or more 75 - 100% 1900 
 
1979 
 
No 
 
2 8 
 
0.26 0.08 -0.18 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
 
Less than 14 
weeks 50 - 74% 1958 
 
1959 
 
No 
 
1 4 
 
1.45 1.89 0.43 
Thailand 
 
14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1958 
 
1972 
 
No 
 
2 4 
 
-0.21 -0.16 0.05 
Turkey 
 
14-25 weeks 50 - 74% 1945 
 
1963 
 
No 
 
2 4 
 
-0.49 -0.37 0.12 
Venezuela, RB   14-25 weeks 75 - 100% 1936   1936   No   2 5   0.83 0.71 -0.12 
 
Appendix 3-1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
  
When Job scarce, men have more 
rights to job.   
Men Make Better Political Leaders 
than Women.   
A University Education is More 
Important for a Boy than for a Girl. 
 Mean S.D. Min Max   Mean S.D. Min Max   Mean S.D. Min Max 
Individual-level Variables 
              Dependent variable (agree with the statement = 1) 0.36 
    
0.44 
    
0.22 
   Age 41.40 16.15 15 99 
 
41.26 16.09 15 99 
 
41.28 16.1 15 98 
Gender (Men = 1) 0.48 
    
0.49 
    
0.48 
   Household income 4.77 2.4 1 10 
 
4.78 2.39 1 10 
 
4.77 2.39 1 10 
Education 4.57 2.31 1 8 
 
4.60 2.31 1 8 
 
4.59 2.31 1 8 
Married 0.65 
    
0.65 
    
0.65 
   Separated, divorced, or widowed 0.12 
    
0.11 
    
0.11 
   Never married (reference category) 0.24 
    
0.24 
    
0.24 
   Child (Not having a child = 1) 0.28 
    
0.28 
    
0.28 
   Number of children living with 1.90 1.78 0 8 
 
1.90 1.78 0 8 
 
1.90 1.78 0 8 
Religion (Religious = 1) 0.70 
    
0.71 
    
0.71 
   Full-time employed 0.35 
    
0.35 
    
0.35 
   Par-time employed 0.08 
    
0.08 
    
0.08 
   Self employed 0.10 
    
0.11 
    
0.11 
   Retired 0.15 
    
0.15 
    
0.15 
   Student 0.07 
    
0.07 
    
0.07 
   Housewife 0.16 
    
0.16 
    
0.16 
   Unemployed 0.08 
    
0.08 
    
0.08 
   Individual-level N N = 95677 
   
N = 91389 
   
N = 93345 
                 
               Country/wave-level Variables 
              GDP per capita (logged) 8.58 1.34 5.68 10.57 
 
8.56 1.33 5.68 10.57 
 
8.56 1.33 5.68 10.57 
Democracy 6.78 5.01 -10 10 
 
6.74 5.03 -10 10 
 
6.74 5.03 -10 10 
Trade (as % GDP) 70.50 34.88 20.52 211.2 
 
70.53 35.1 20.52 211.23 
 
70.53 35.1 20.52 211.23 
Women's INGO membership 12.00 6.1 0 24.6 
 
11.92 6.09 0 24.6 
 
11.92 6.09 0 24.6 
Female labor force participation 47.52 11.33 16 70.4 
 
47.40 11.35 16 70.4 
 
47.40 11.35 16 70.4 
% women of M/A position 26.39 11 2.94 58.96 
 
26.50 11.03 2.94 58.96 
 
26.50 11.03 2.94 58.96 
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Law protecting women's economic rights 1.51 0.71 0 3 
 
1.50 0.71 0 3 
 
1.50 0.71 0 3 
1994-1999 0.30 
    
0.30 
    
0.30 
   1999-2004 0.30 
    
0.30 
    
0.30 
   2005-2007 0.40 
    
0.40 
    
0.40 
   Country/wave-level N N =81 
    
N = 80 
    
N = 80 
   Country-level N N = 54         N = 54         N = 54       
 
 
 
